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For the past thirty years, federal health care policy has been
characterized by frustration and contradiction. On the one hand, Con-
gress has repeatedly enacted laws to secure consumer access to quality
health care at a reasonable cost and has appropriated billions of dollars
to achieve these ends.' On the other hand, federal statutes and, more
frequently, administrative practice have failed to establish effective
regulatory control over the providers of health care (doctors and
hospitals) who largely determine the use, quality, and price of the
publicly funded services, 2 or even over the federal and state officials
who administer the programs.3 Increased public funding has created
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1. See, e.g., Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040
(1946) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1970 & Supp. V 1975)) (establishing federal
funding for construction and modernization of hospitals and other health care facilities)
[hereinafter cited as Hill-Burton Act]; Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-97, §§ 1901-1905, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396d (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)) (establishing federal matching funds for state medical assistance) [herein-
after cited as Medicaid Act]; National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (Supp. V 1975) (renewed effort to achieve local health
planning); Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of
1966, 42 U.S.C. § 246 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (initial effort to coordinate health planning
on local and regional level).
2. For discussions of evidence demonstrating that doctors and hospitals exercise
dominant control over the use, quality, and price of health care services, and that public
programs have largely failed to change this situation, see J. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE
POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 33-45, 53-70, 81-102, 111-35 (1977); S. LAW, BLUE
CRoss: WHAT WENT WRONG? 161-80, 191-95 (2d ed. 1976).
3. There are many studies focusing on the failure of federal and state officials to
carry out their assigned regulatory role. See, e.g., J. FEDER, supra note 2, at 33-51 (failure
of federal officials to implement or enforce numerous statutory requirements regarding
quality and utilization review in Medicare); S. LAW, supra note 2, at 117-25, 130-35
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the potential for greater public control of the health care system to
meet consumer needs, but that potential has been suppressed or dis-
torted in a variety of ways, so that private control has been generally
maintained and even strengthened. The absence of effective regulation
to increase access to health care services, ensure quality, and control
costs has in turn contributed to the well-known features of the "health
care crisis": severe inflation of health care costs,4 maldistribution of
facilities and personnel,5 gross profiteering from public and private
(failure to implement federal statutory provisions regarding utilization review of services
under Medicare); Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-
Burton Act: Realities and Pitfalls, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 168, 168, 172-94, 200-01 (1975)
(failure of federal and state officials to implement or enforce Hill-Burton Act require-
ments regarding services to poor).
4. Annual national health care expenditures have increased by almost $100 billion in
seven years, from S69.2 billion in Fiscal Year 1970 to an estimated $162.6 billion in
Fiscal Year 1977. See Gibson & Fisher, National Health Care Expenditures, Fiscal Year
1977, Soc. SECURITY BULL., July 1978, at 5 (Table 1), 15 (Table 5). The major cause
of the rapid growth in national "outla)s" or expenditures for health is, according to the
staff of the Health Care Financing Administration of HEW, "'the exceptionally rapid
rate of increase in health care prices," id. at 10 (emphasis supplied), as distinct from in-
creases in population or the general cost of living. Data to support this view can be
expressed in several ways. First, health care spending has clearly outstripped population
growth, with per capita outlays doubling from $334 in 1970 to $737 in 1977. Id. at 10,
15 (Table 5). Second, health care spending has increased faster than the growth of the
economy as a whole, rising from 7.2% of Gross National Product (GNP) in 1970 to 8.8%
in 1977. Id. at 10, 14 (Chart 2). Third, annual rates of increases in the medical care
component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) have been significantly higher than the
rate of increase for the CPI as a whole, particularly since the ending of wage and price
controls in April 1974. For example, in 1976 the percentage increase in the medical care
services component of the CPI was 10%, compared with 5.7% for the CPI as a whole; in
1977, the increases were 9.9% for medical care and 6.5% for the CPI. Id. at 10; see
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEW,
MEDICAL CARE EXPENDITURES, PRICES, AND COSTS: BACKGROUND BOOK 20-26 (1975) (analyzing
various items in medical care services component of CPI and discussing CPI methodology)
[hereinafter cited as MEDICAL CARE EXPENDITURES: BACKGROUND BOOK]; Somers & Somers,
A Proposed Framework for Health and Health Care Policies, 14 INQUIRY 115, 116 (1977)
(pointing out that medical care inflation rates were even higher before enactment of
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 than in subsequent five-year period).
5. Maldistribution takes two forms: oversupply and undersupply. Oversupply is most
commonly measured in terms of "unnecessary" hospital beds, which are determined by
comparing an optimal hospital occupancy rate (usually 85%) with actual occupancy
rates, which are often much lower. See Caress & Kotelchuck, Politics Makes Strange
Beds, HEALTH-PAC BULL., July-Aug. 1977, at 1. HEW Secretary Califano estimates
that "[t]oday there are about 240,000 empty beds in our community hospitals. At least
100,000 of these beds are absolutely unnecessary, as determined by local as well as national
authorities. At a maintenance cost of $10,000 to $20,000 per empty bed, the annual cost
of 100,000 empty beds is $1 to $2 billion." President's Hospital Cost Containment Pro-
posal: Joint Hearings on H.R. 6575 Before the Subcomnm. on Health of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means and the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, at 9 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Joint Hearing on President's Hospital Cost Containment Proposal]; see B.
ENSMINCER, THE $8 BILLION HOSPITAL BED OVERRUN 1, 5, 15-41 (1975) (concurring in
estimate of 100,000 unnecessary beds and estimating an additional $6 billion annual waste
from overuse of unnecessary hospital facilities and equipment).
Although oversupply of hospital beds, expensive technology, and medical specialists
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funds,6 and unnecessary, deficient, and often harmful care.7 Perhaps
equally important, if less obvious, has been the impact of government
passivity on the experience of citizenship itself. There is now a wide-
(particularly surgeons) is currently the focus of health policy analysis, undersupply of
facilities and personnel, particularly for primary care, is also a major problem. Geo-
graphical disparities between urban and rural areas, and between inner cities and the
suburbs, remain substantial. For example, in 1972, "the ratio of physicians per 1,000
population in metropolitan areas was 1.73, more than twice the .80 ratio for non-
metropolitan areas." SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, REPORT ON THE
HEALTH PROFESSIOs EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1133, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 58 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1133]. Disparities between urban
and rural states were even more striking, with New York's 238 physicians per 100,000
population about three times Mississippi's ratio of 78 physicians per 100,000 population.
Id. at 62 (quoting AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, INCREASING
THE SUPPLY OF MEDic.L PERSONNEL (1973)).
Moreover, such average figures tend to understate the problem of undersupply by
failing to take into account quality of care, transportation, economics (i.e., inability to
afford care), and racial discrimination. In 1967, a presidential commission stated the
problem of rural health care in "starkly depressing" terms:
We have failed miserably to protect the health of low-income people in rural areas.
The health service they get is not only inadequate in extent but seriously deficient
in quality. It is badly organized, underfinanced, rarely related to the needs of the
individual or the family. Such health service as there is is too often discriminatory
in terms of race and income and heedless of the dignity of the individual.
PRESIDENT'S NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON RURAL POVERTY. THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND 59
(1967), quoted in S. REP. No. 1133, supra, at 61. Doctor/patient ratios in the urban
ghettos are particularly low; though the national average ratio in 1972 was one physician
for every 781 persons, ratios in the ghettos of Chicago and New York City were estimated
at one physician for every 9,000 to 10,000 persons. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND
PROFIT 12-13 (1978); P. DEVISE, SLUM MEDICINE: CHICAGO'S APARTHEID HEALTH SYSTEM 20
(1969).
6. Congressional and journalistic attention has focused on illegal or questionable
practices in the Medicaid program, particularly with respect to "Medicaid mills," nursing
home reimbursement, and unnecessary surgery. "Medicaid mills" are described by one
congressional committee as "unregulated, unlicensed, and poorly equipped storefront
units located in ghetto areas of large metropolitan cities." STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
HEALTH, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, AND SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT
ON FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PROGRAMS 2 (Joint Comm. Print
1977). Nursing home reimbursement has been found to be riddled with fraudulent
practices. Id. at 7-9. The losses to the Medicaid program from abuse and overutilization
are conservatively estimated to be $1 billion per year. See Problems of Medicaid Fraud
and Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) (statement of
Congressman Scheuer). Moreover, there is good reason to believe that fraudulent and
profiteering practices uncovered in the Medicaid program are only the tip of the ice-
berg and are by no means absent in the routine operations of prestigious private sector
hospitals. An investigation by the Washington Post in 1972 found that patient bills at
Washington Hospital Center, Washington, D.C.'s largest private nonprofit hospital, were
"inflated by a Variety of abuses that include conflict-of-interest transactions by trustees
and administrators, payments to doctors of profits of the hospital, favoritism, lack of
competitive bidding, and free care to the rich." Kessler, Abuses Pad Cost of Hospital
Center Care, Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1972, at 1.
7. The oversupply of surgeons has coincided with a concern about unnecessary
surgery. Relying on professional studies, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (chaired by Con-
gressman John E. Moss and hereinafter referred to as the Moss Subcommittee) estimated
that of the 14 million surgical operations performed in the United States in 1974, 17%,
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spread belief across the political spectrum that government in our
society is inevitably captured by highly organized private interests and
is therefore incapable of altering established patterns of health care
delivery (or other social services) to benefit either the majority of
middle-income citizens or minority groups and the poor.8
or 2,380,000 surgical procedures, were unnecessary. Such procedures were estimated to
cost $3.92 billion, and to result in approximately 11,900 unnecessary deaths. SuBco.N.t.
ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON COST AND QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE: UN-
NECESSARY SURGERY 30, 31, 34 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT ON UNNECESSARY
SURGERY]. The Moss Subcommittee's findings touched off a sharp debate with the
American Medical Association (AMA) regarding methodology and even the existence of
standards of" surgical "necessity." The major, but by no means only, study supporting
the Subcommittee was McCarthy & Widmer, Effects of Screening by Consultants on
Recommended Elective Surgical Procedures, 291 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1331 (1974).
8. The view that government cannot, or is not likely to, serve diffuse, unorganized
interests such as consumers or the poor is now a common theme in policy analysis and
related studies spanning the political spectrum. At the center of this spectrum, main-
stream social scientists increasingly agree that legislatures and particularly agencies are
heavily influenced by the most highly organized and well-financed interest groups. Since
regulated firms or industries inevitably have the strongest concern with the regulatory
programs affecting their interests and also have the greatest economic, political, and
informational resources, they are likely to "capture" the regulating agency. See, e.g.,
Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More Adequate-and
Less Pessimistic-Theory of "Clientele Capture", 6 POL'Y Sc. 301, 302-03 (1975) (sum-
marizing social science, legal and journalistic literature); cf. Marmor, Wittman & Heagy,
Politics, Public Policy and Medical Inflation, in HEALTH: A VICTIM OR CAUSE OF INFLA-
TION? 299, 305-11 (M. Zubkoff ed. 1976) (applying this approach to politics of health care
delivery). Analysts on the right end of the political spectrum take this point even further
by arguing that government in the United States is structurally more responsive to
concentrated producer interests, and that therefore diffuse, "public" interests can be best
pursued (paradoxically) by inserting financial incentives for socially desirable behavior
into the private market. See C. SCHULTzE, THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE INTEREST 5-6,
21-27, 87-88 (1977); Enthoven, Consumer Choice Health Plan (pt. 1), 298 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 650, 655 (1978); Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by
"Certificate of Need", 59 VA. L. REv. 1143, 1178-88, 1230-32 (1973). On the left, a variety
of Marxist analysts see regulatory legislation as serving primarily to reinforce and
legitimate the existing class system. Such legislation is said to accomplish this function
either by directly serving the instrumental goals of particular ruling class sectors or by
creating a general ideological climate in which public needs are defined in ways that are
compatible with private ownership of capital and alienated labor. See, e.g., B.
EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, THE AMERICAN HEALTH EMPIRE (1970) (analyzing particular
benefits flowing to medical school "empires" from increased governmental involvement
in health care system); Navarro, Social Class, Political Power, and the State: The Impli-
cations in Medicine, in MEDICINE UNDER CAPITALISM 183 (1976) (government intervention
in health care promotes both particular interests and more general ideological perspec-
tive). For a discussion of the relationship between pluralist theory and practice and the
collapse of political identity or citizenship, see Wolin, The State of the Union, N.Y. REV.
BooKS, May 18, 1978, at 28.
This article addresses the common concern of all of these studies-the tendency of the
political system to reinforce the existing distribution of power and resources-from a
perspective that recognizes the strength of such reinforcement while focusing on its
susceptibility to change. In this view, the question of whether the legal system can have
a redistributional impact cannot be answered a priori. Rather, the actual impact of
statutes and judicial decisions must be examined in particular contexts, as affected by




This article analyzes the legal structure of government passivity in
the area of health care reform as it has passed through three stages:
congressional ambivalence toward the problems, reflected in highly
symbolic legislative responses lacking clear mandatory language; execu-
tive inaction and abdication of even the minimal administrative en-
forcement duties created by Congress; and the judicial quandaries
faced by courts and often not resolved in consumer challenges to ad-
ministrative inaction. Part I sets forth the theoretical framework for
analyzing the problems that courts have confronted. Parts II through
IV apply this framework to three case studies drawn from the health
care reform experience and evaluate critically the judicial response to
consumer litigation against the agencies. Finally, Part V returns to the
concepts of statutory interpretation and judicial review set forth in
Part I and concludes that courts should contribute to the restructuring
of agency decisionmaking to provide for a more participatory process
and more justifiable outcomes.
I. The Legal Structure of Health Care Reform:
Creating the Appearance of Public Control
Congress can, and occasionally does, explicitly delegate public regula-
tory power to private interests.9 In doing so, it is restricted only by the
weak constitutional limits of the delegation doctrine' 0 and by the
political limits created by popular opposition. More typically, how-
ever, private control is maintained by a pattern of "symbolic" public
regulation." Under this pattern, social control is apparently created
9. See, e.g., Health Insurance for the Aged Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1395bb (Supp. V 1975)
(compliance with statutory quality-of-care deemed to exist if hospital accredited by Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, a private agency); S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 61-62 (1972) (Medicare's result was "almost total and blanket delegation of
authority over hospital standards to a private agency').
10. See, e.g., Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 968, 975 (5th Cir. 1977)
(upholding provisions of Hill-Burton Act that condition issuance of HEW regulations
on approval of Federal Hospital Council composed of private citizens, including rep-
resentatives of hospital industry and medical profession); Corum v. Beth Israel Medical
Center, 373 F. Supp. 550, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same). For an excellent discussion of the
weaknesses of the delegation doctrine, and of suggestions for reviving it, see Gewirtz, The
Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, L,%w 9- CON-
TEMP. PROB., Summer 1976, at 46, 49-65.
11. See M. EDEL.IAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLTics 22-25, 35-41, 188-90 (1964). Pro-
fessor Edelman notes:
There is virtually unanimous agreement among students of the antitrust laws, the
Clayton and Federal Trade Commission acts, the Interstate Commerce acts, the
public utility statutes and the right-to-work laws, for example, that through much
of the history of their administration these statutes have been ineffective in the sense
that many of the values they promised have not in fact been realized.
Id. at 24. Moreover, "[w]hen [this] does happen, the deprived groups [i.e., the groups
that anticipate benefits from the regulatory programs, such as consumers] often display
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by general statutory and regulatory provisions, but is simultaneously
undermined by a lack of enforcement. Federal health care statutes
promote government passivity of this sort through two common de-
vices: the statement of substantive goals and powers in general terms,
which leaves their implementation to relatively unstructured agency
discretion; and the absence of clearly articulated and accessible rem-
edies for consumer beneficiaries. Federal and state agencies continue
the process of nonenforcement by failing to translate statutory goals
into operational standards, failing to enforce whatever standards exist,
and denying consumer beneficiaries access to agency decisionmaking
or avenues for complaint and .relief.
The persistent gap between statutory promise and administrative
reality is rooted in the technology and politics of American medicine,
as well as in the dynamics of American interest-group politics.' 2 Within
medicine itself, physicians' traditional insistence that medical care be
treated as a market transaction between doctor and patient 3 has been
undermined by the growth of an increasingly technological and
specialized medical practice, the costs of which are now beyond the
reach of most individuals.14 By necessity, both providers and con-
little tendency to protest or to assert their awareness of the deprivation." Id. at 24-25.
These tendencies, Edelman argues, reveal "the largely symbolic character of the entire
process" for disorganized, large, uninformed groups such as "consumers" or "the general
public." Id. at 23. Though powerful, knowledgeable and highly organized interests can
and do seek concrete benefits from the political process, many (perhaps most) citizens
participate in politics as "spectators" and receive largely symbolic reassurance about
threatening forms of economic and social change. See id. at 35-41, 188-90.
12. The relationship between administrative nonenforcement of regulatory reform
and interest-group politics is treated extensively in M. EDELMAN, supra note 11, at 44-72.
See generally T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1682-83, 1713-15 (1975).
13. The classic form of this insistence is organized medicine's defense of "fee-for-
service" practice in which the doctor sets a price for each service or medical procedure
and the patient pays for each service at or soon after its delivery. See W. GLASER, PAYING
THE DOCTOR 25, 54-55 (1970). For an account of the AMA's opposition to, and attempts to
suppress, other forms of reimbursement, such as prepaid care, see Note, The Role of
Pre paid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REv. 887, 954-60
(1971).
The status of medical care as a commodity was legally confirmed in Hurley v. Edding-
field, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901), in which the Indiana Supreme Court held that
a physician who refused to render emergency aid "without any reason whatever"-the
fee having been tendered-did not incur liability for the patient's subsequent death. The
doctor, the court reasoned, had only refused to enter a contract of employment; like other
private sellers of goods and services, he had complete freedom to set the terms of his
contracts or to refuse to enter them altogether. Id. at 416, 59 N.E. at 1058.
14. The national average cost of one day's hospital care is now S158, and of the
average hospital stay, over $1,300. Joint Hearing on President's Hospital Cost Contain-
ment Proposal, supra note 5, at 7-8 (statement of Secretary Califano). The Public Health
Service defined "catastrophic" health care expenditures in 1970 as gross expenditures of
greater than $5,000 (i.e., including amounts covered by insurance), out-of-pocket outlays
of $1,000 or more, or out-of-pocket outlays equaling 15% or more of family income.
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sumers have pressed for social financing of health services and facilities
through taxes and quasi-public insurance such as Blue Cross.15 But
although providers need public funds to finance the rising cost of their
services, including profit,16 they strongly oppose public regulation of
their traditional power over the price and other conditions of medical
practice.' 7 The expansion of government financing and regulation of
health care has thus taken place in a political context in which largely
unorganized consumers seek relief from the rising costs and declining
accessibility of care, while well-organized providers seek public sub-
sidies for a health care system that remains largely under private
control.
The government policies that emerge from this context are heavily
See HEALTH RESOURCES ADM'N, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEWV, HEALTH
UNITED STATES 1975, at 48-49 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH UNITED STATES 1975]. The
effects of increased technology and rising costs on health care delivery are explored in
Kelman, Toward the Political Economy of Medical Care, 8 INQUIRY 30 (1972).
15. For example, both the American Hospital Association (AHA) and the AMA sup-
ported federal subsidies for hospital construction under the Hill-Burton program. Be-
ginning in the late 1930s, the AHA and AMA also began to support and actively promote
the development of nonprofit, state-regulated Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans. See S.
LAw, supra note 2, at 7-9; T. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 9 (1970). The AHA
eventually broke its alliance with the AMA and joined numerous consumer groups in
supporting the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, which provided extensive federal
and state funding for hospital and physician services. See S. LAw, supra note 2, at 32-33;
T. MARMOi, suPra, at 24.
16. The extent to which the rising costs of hospital and medical care can be at-
tributed to rising provider profits (or, as it is usually termed with respect to individual
practitioners, "income") is a controversial issue. A small number of hospitals are formally
organized as proprietary, profitmaking institutions, and are permitted to include a
"reasonable return on equity capital" as part of their "reasonable cost" reimbursement
under Medicare. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975); 20 C.F.R. § 405.402(c)
(1977); S. LAw, suPra note 2, at 70-72. Private nonprofit hospitals, however, provide about
65% of the patient-days in short-term general hospitals and generate from four to 20
times the expenses of all other ownership categories (e.g., governmental, proprietary). See
MEDICAL CARE EXPENDITURES: BACKGROUND BOOK, supra note 4, at 30-31. Although such
hospitals are in theory reimbursed by Medicare, Medicaid, and most Blue Cross programs
on the basis of the "reasonable costs" actually incurred in the provision of health care
services, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975); S. LAw, supra note 2, at 60 n.375,
the concept of "reasonable cost" has in fact been administered so as to allow hospitals to
generate significant amounts of "net income," i.e., revenues in excess of the direct or
operating cost of providing services. For discussions of how revenues in excess of direct
costs were included in the Medicare reimbursement formulas, and how the hospitals at-
tempted to justify them as the "cost" of invested capital (which had often been provided
at public expense), see J. FEDER, supra note 2, at 57-60; S. LAw, supra note 2, at 59-72; H.
SOMERS & A. SOmERS, fEDICARE AND THE HOSPITALS: IssUES AND PROSPECTS 177-85 (1967). As a
result of these reimbursement policies and other factors, "[a]nnual [net] incomes of
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals increased from $29 million in 1950 to $547 million in
1971." MEDICAL CARE EXPENDITURES: BACKGROUND BOOK, supra note 4, at 41.
17. Cf. American Medical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975) (uphold-
ing injunction sought by AMA against federal utilization review regulations). For detailed
discussions of provider resistance to government regulation, see J. FEDER, supra note 2,
at 1-25; S. LAw, supra note 2, at 31-58.
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influenced by the distribution of power between providers and con-
sumers at different stages of the political process. Congress will gen-
erally act on behalf of consumers only when the issue of health care
has achieved high political visibility, creating at least a potential for
consumer mobilization.' Providers, however, retain considerable legis-
lative influence even during periods of intense consumer pressure. The
resulting legislation usually attempts to satisfy both constituencies by
stating a general commitment to meet consumer needs while preserving
a regulated and subsidized private health care system. The task of
developing an operational program of financial inducement and reg-
ulatory control is then delegated with little legislative guidance to
federal and state agencies, where the crucial policy and enforcement
decisions have much less public visibility than the original legislation.
At the administrative stage, organized provider interests are better
able than unorganized consumers to extract tangible benefits and to
shape the programs to their own ends. 19
The assertion and subsequent denial of public authority to meet
consumer need, however, generates political and specifically legal
pressures for further change. Politically, the expansion of government
funding and regulation undermines the concept of health care as a
commodity and creates the potential for public control and bargain-
ing over the nature, distribution, and price of health care services.
Moreover, because federal statutes typically promise some public
regulation or services or both for the benefit of consumers, they ap-
pear to create legal standards for evaluating agency and provider
performance and thus encourage consumer claims for judicial relief.
The courts then face a choice of either legitimizing the gap between
general statutory goals and specific agency practices or attempting to
bring agency and provider performance into line with what appears to
be national health care policy. Such decisions are made enormously
difficult by the ambiguity of the congressional mandate: was Congress
"serious" about the statute's general substantive goals, or was its "real"
intention better expressed in its silences and omissions, which, accord-
ing to the agencies, justify passivity and nonenforcement? In the
absence of clear legislative guidance on the issues of enforcement and
remedies, courts necessarily rely on their own perspectives about
substantive policy and administrative structure, and in particular on
18. See T. MARMOR, supra note 15, at 111-13.
19. See id. at 87-88, 122-24 (documenting increasing provider influence on Medicare
policy in administrative as compared to legislative context); Freedman, Crisis and
Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1041, 1054-55 (1975) (linking
lack of specific legislative guidance with industry domination of regulatory agencies).
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their own conceptions of the judicial role in defining the remedial
implication of general statutory terms.
The result is that consumer demands for substantive health care
benefits become entwined with judicial decisions about the internal
structure of government: whether or not consumer beneficiaries are
entitled to participate in agency rulemaking and adjudicative pro-
cedures; whether or not consumers can obtain judicial review of agency
action and, if so, on what terms; and whether or not consumers can
initiate private actions for direct judicial enforcement of federal
statutory norms against private health care providers. Stated more
generally, the implementation of substantive health care reform tends
to become linked to what has been called the jurisprudence of rem-
edies: the standards by which courts decide when "interests" em-
bodied in statutes should be given the type of judicial protection
traditionally associated with enforceable individual "rights. ' 20
This article focuses on how the courts and agencies have responded
to these issues as they relate to three major health care programs that
have been the subjects of challenges by low-income consumers to the
legality of agency nonenforcement and provider noncompliance: (1)
the Hill-Burton hospital construction program, requiring grantee
hospitals to provide a community service and a reasonable volume of
care to persons unable to pay; 21 (2) the Medical Assistance (Medicaid)
program, requiring participating states to provide a reasonable amount
of necessary medical services to eligible low-income persons;22 and (3)
the health planning program, requiring the governing boards of local
health planning agencies to include a majority of consumers who
are broadly representative of the area's social, economic, racial, and
linguistic groups.23 In each of these areas consumers alleged that
particular agency and provider practices violated the broadly worded
statutory standards and subjected consumers to the types of substantive
harms and procedural arbitrariness that Congress intended to prevent.
The federal agencies generally responded not by attempting to justify
these outcomes in terms of the statutory goals, but rather by arguing
that the statutes did not require the agencies to reach the results de-
manded by the consumers, and that therefore the agencies' refusal to
20. See generally Katz, The Jurisp~rudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and
the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 1 (1968).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1970), discussed at pp. 264-86 infra.
22. Id. §§ 1396, 1396a(a) (10), (13), 1396d(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); see 42 C.F.R.
§ 449.10(a)(5)(i) (1977) (state plan must specify amount or duration of care provided to
categories of needy; such amounts and durations shall be sufficient "to reasonably
achieve their purpose" and may not be arbitrarily denied or reduced).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 300l-1(b)(3)(C)(i) (Supp. V 1975), discussed at pp. 304-30 infra.
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do so was within their delegated discretion. State agency and provider
defendants tended to resist reaching the merits even more strongly by
arguing that consumers had no standing to seek any type of judicial
review of agency and provider decisions.
In evaluating these contentions, the courts have concentrated on
the particular statutory language and agency practices at issue, but
have also been strongly influenced by one of two general approaches
to administrative law. The first, recently revived by the Burger Court
and some lower federal courts, discourages judicial review of agency
action regarding generally phrased statutory interests by defining
narrowly .the available sources of law and the inferences that can be
drawn from them. The historical basis of this perspective lies in the
formalist conception of judicial authority as sharply distinct from
legislative and executive authority and as limited to the mechanical
application of preordained rules.24 Since mechanically applicable rules
could only be supplied by explicit legislative directives or by the
"stable" standards of the common law,25 the courts often refused to
adjudicate controversies regarding the legality of agency action under
more broadly defined statutory standards. Under the formalist doctrine
of standing in administrative law, if an agency's action or inaction
did not invade a private "legal right" as traditionally understood or
did not violate a clear statutory directive, it did not raise a justiciable
legal issue and was therefore committed to the agency's nonreviewable
discretion.
2 6
Courts applying the contemporary, "neo-formalist" approach do not
usually deny individuals standing on the basis of the traditional
private rights doctrine, 2T but achieve the same result through formalist
modes of statutory interpretation. From this perspective, generally
24. For historical analysis of the development of formalist approaches in both public
and private law, see M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 253 passim
(1977). Formalism as an intellectual tradition emphasizing the mechanical application of
rules is discussed extensively in R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 194-216 (1976);
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Form and Substance] and Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 351, 358-59 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Legal Formality].
25. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 475-76 (1965).
26. See Barlow v. Collins, 398 F.2d 398, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated, 397 U.S. 159
(1970); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700-01 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320
U.S. 707 (1943); L. JAFFE, supra note 25, at 501-14; Stewart, supra note 12, at 1675-76.
There is some irony in the fact that the formalist doctrine of standing in administrative
law was developed not by judicial conservatives seeking to justify decisions favoring free
enterprise, but largely by judicial liberals seeking to minimize legal challenges by in-
dustry against New Deal regulatory programs. See Form and Substance, supra note 24, at
1753, 1756-60.
27. But see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 589 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
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worded statutory or constitutional provisions are not seen as the basis
for the inference of affirmative judicial relief. Courts have held, for
example, that statutory mandates excluding corporate funds from
campaign financing, requiring states to raise their welfare standards,
and prohibiting discrimination in federally financed programs do not
create private rights amenable to judicial protection, but rather are
public interests largely consigned to the agencies for enforcement.28
Even when an individual is recognized as having a legally protected
interest, the scope of that protection is narrowly confined to the en-
forcement of explicit legislative directives.29 Legislative silence is thus
often decisive; unless an agency can be shown to have violated a clear
statutory command, its action or inaction will tend to be upheld as
within its valid discretion." Since Congress rarely casts health care
and other social legislation in explicitly mandatory terms, the effect
of this judicial perspective is to uphold most agency decisions and to
deny supplementary judicial relief.
The neo-formalist approach coexists, however, with a second set of
doctrines encouraging judicial enforcement both of substantive statu-
tory goals and of principles of administrative due process. From this
perspective, the courts are not seen as sharply separated from the ad-
ministrative and political process or limited to protecting a narrow
range of common law and explicit statutory rights. Rather, they are
perceived as sharing responsibility with the legislative and executive
branches for furthering general statutory and constitutional values of
a necessarily mixed, public and private character.3 1 The courts have
performed this function on the basis of three broad doctrinal tradi-
tions: (1) the concept of "legal right" or "entitlement," and its sub-
28. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (campaign financing); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1071-75, 1077-83 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3142 (1978)
(No. 77-926) (discrimination in federally funded programs); Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d
170, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (welfare grants).
29. See New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421-22 (1973) (state
work rules restricting eligibility more narrowly than federal statute upheld as not con-
travening any "expressly provided" federal eligibility standards).
30. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977); Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1977).
31. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1286 (7th Cir. 1977);
Gomez v. Florida Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969); Stewart, supra note 12,
at 1716, 1723-30. For analogous developments in constitutional law, see Monaghan, Con-
stitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1368-71 (1973) (constitu-
tional adjudication is not merely incidental to resolution of private disputes; Supreme
Court has "special function" of interpreting and promoting constitutional values);
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1, 18-30 (1975) (courts have authority to create "common law substructure"
to implement constitutional values, subject to legislative revision). But see Schrock &
Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1117, 1118,
1126-45 (1978) (subconstitutional rulemaking raises questions of legitimacy and constitu-
tional authority).
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stantive and procedural implications;32 (2) the requirements of admin-
istrative procedure embodied in the federal Administrative Procedure
Act (APA);33 and (3) the implications of particular regulatory statutes
for both the substance and process of agency decisionmaking. 34 Draw-
ing on these sources, the courts have fashioned individual rights to
receive tangible benefits or results, and also "process rights" that re-
quire agencies to exercise their discretion according to procedures that
promote fair and rational policymaking.
Taken together, these doctrinal traditions comprise a "structural due
process" approach that defines broadly both the sources of applicable
law and the nature of the rights that can be inferred from them. For
example, in constitutional law, individual rights such as the right to
travel have been inferred not only from constitutional text and legisla-
tive history, but also from governmental structures and relationships
established or envisioned by the Constitution.Y A similar develop-
ment has occurred in administrative law. In J.1. Case Co. v. Borak36
and in King v. Smith,37 for example, the Supreme Court relied on
substantive standards embodied in administrative structures as the
basis for fashioning individual remedies for statutory violations.38
32. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972) (procedural due process
protection extends to liberty interests and to property interests with regard to which
person has "legitimate claim of entitlement"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(welfare benefits as protected entitlement).
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-557 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1258-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rule-
making procedures inferred from Natural Gas Act); International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rulemaking procedures inferred from
Clean Air Act).
35. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 Passiln
(1969) (discussing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868)).
36. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
37. 292 U.S. 309 (1968).
38. In Borak the Supreme Court permitted a private federal action for damages
based on section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976),
which prohibits solicitation of proxies "in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors." The Commission had in turn
prohibited solicitation of proxies by statements that are "false or misleading with respect
to any material fact," 377 U.S. at 429 n.4 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1964)), but did
not have the resources to make an independent examination of the representations con-
tained in proxy statements submitted to it. The Court held that although the statute
made no mention of private rights of action, the limited availability of administrative
enforcement resources, considered in the light of the Act's substantive purpose of "pro-
tecting investors," made private judicial remedies "necessary to make effective the con-
gressional purpose." Id. at 432-33; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 402 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing Borak). In King, the Supreme
Court upheld an injunction against a state welfare regulation sought by individual
recipients on the basis of §§ 402(a)(9) [now § 402(a)(10)] and 406(a) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(9), 606(a) (1970), which define federal requirements for approval
of state welfare programs by HEW. The Court skirted the question of the relationship
between private rights of action to enforce federal statutory requirements and the ad-
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The structural due process approach perceives a statute as an in-
terrelated whole consisting of structures and substantive standards
designed to achieve one or more congressional goals. These goals may
themselves be framed both as structures and as substantive results.
Even when a statute does not dictate a particular substantive result
or tangible benefit, it may bear on what Professor Laurence Tribe has
termed "the structures through which policies are both formed and
applied, and formed in the very process of being applied." 39 Statutory
provisions requiring agency hearings, and requiring decisions based
upon substantial evidence, have thus been interpreted as requiring
agencies to engage in a public and accountable process of decision-
making.
40
Operational standards based on these procedural values have
emerged from a decade of intense litigation centered largely, but not
exclusively, in the District of Columbia Circuit. The standards require
agencies engaged in rulemaking and other regulatory decisions to
articulate their aims and their factual assumptions, to examine avail-
able evidence and alternative solutions, and to submit their hypotheses
and proposals to meaningful scrutiny by the affected parties.4 1
ministrative structure designed to enforce them, see 392 U.S. at 312 n.3, but in a later case
explicitly ruled that private remedies were available to enforce substantive norms in the
absence of accessible administrative remedies, see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405-06,
406 n.8, 420-21 (1970). In both Borak and King the Court inferred private rights from sub-
stantive standards enacted as parts of administrative structures.
39. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 269, 269 (1975) (emphasis
deleted). The term "structural due process" will be used in this article in largely the
same sense as it is used by Professor Tribe, except that it is (i) being applied to ad-
ministrative law; (ii) referring to statutory as well as constitutional interpretation; and
(iii) including the concept of "structure" as a source as well as an object of legal inter-
pretation. See L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LXW 1137-46 (1978); Sager, Insular
Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,
91 HARv. L. Rav. 1373, 1411-23 (1978) (theory that certain types of legislative decisions
must be made by "deliberative" as opposed to plebiscitary process, thus promoting "due
process of lawmaking").
40. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1258-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring addi-
tional rulemaking procedures to permit judicial review under Natural Gas Act "sub-
stantial evidence" standard); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615,
630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (compelling additional rulemaking procedures to satisfy Clean
Air Act requirement of agency hearing). The structural due process approach may also
result in a denial of individuals' claims for administrative hearings and judicial review.
Analysis of a statute's substantive and structural provisions may convince a court that
Congress meant to commit the matter to agency discretion, or to preclude judicial review,
or that the matter is not appropriate for judicial intervention. See Morris v. Gressette,
432 U.S. 491 (1977); Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971); Hahn
v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249-51 (1st Cir. 1970). For a proposed restrictive use of
structural analysis in determining the reviewability of administrative action, see Note,
The SuPreme Court's Use of Statutory Interpretation: Morris v. Gressette, APA Non-
reviewability, and the Idea of a Legislative Scheme, 87 YALE L.J. 1636 (1978).
41. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620-24 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); cf. National Welfare Rights Organization v.
Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 645-48 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (agency regulations must "be reasonably
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Authority for these standards derives from the substantive and pro-
cedural requirements of the agencies' governing statutes, 4 2 the rule-
making requirements of the APA,43 and the limitations imposed by
the due process clause of the Constitution.4 4 The judicial commit-
ment to participatory and rational procedure has overlapped with
the substantive concern that agencies dedicated to functional missions-
such as licensing power plants or television stations-must not dis-
regard important public values. Thus the pioneering cases, Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC45 and Office of Communica-
related to the purposes of the enabling legislation" and must follow procedural require-
ments of APA and others imposed by agency itself); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (courts more willing to review agency
decisions and less deferential to agency judgment). See generally Stewart, supra note 12,
at 1756-60 (reviewing vast amount of litigation, statutory development, and academic
treatment of this trend); J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The
Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. Rav. 375, 379-81 (1974) (discussing APA).
42. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 390-92 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608, 613-20 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); J. Skelly Wright, Book
Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 591 (1972).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) (requiring federal agencies to give public notice of terms or
substance of proposed rule, to permit interested persons to participate in rulemaking
through submission of written data and views, and to give statement of rule's basis and
purpose after consideration of relevant matter presented); see National Welfare Rights
Organization v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 648-49 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (calling for adequate agency
notice to permit "informative, responsive comments" by interested parties to agency
regulations); Wright, supra note 41, at 379-81. In its recent opinion in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the
Supreme Court held that the APA provisions generally establish "the maximum pro-
cedural requirements" for agency rulemaking, id. at 524, and that absent extraordinary
circumstances, the federal courts have no authority to require agencies to use additional
procedural techniques such as discovery or cross-examination, id. at 524, 543-45. Many
of the operational standards for agency rulemaking articulated by the District of Columbia
Circuit and other courts of appeals, however, have been framed as interpretations of,
rather than additions to, the APA rulemaking requirements, or have been derived from
the substantive statutes governing agency operations. See, e.g., National Welfare Rights
Organization v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (interpreting APA); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (interpreting public
hearing provision of Clean Air Act). The impact of the Vermont Yankee decision on
judicial review of agency rulemaking is thus somewhat uncertain, particularly in areas
such as health care where agency practices often fall below the APA minimum require-
ments. See pp. 322-25 infra.
44. See Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (due process requires
that public housing tenants have right to notice and opportunity for written comment
prior to rent increases); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725,
734 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (welfare recipients' due process claims to participate in HEW
compliance procedures noted but not reached; equivalent relief granted under APA, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1976)). Formalizing procedural guarantees may lead to requirements of
rulemaking when discretion was previously allowed. See United States v. Barbera, 514
F.2d 294, 302-04 (2d Cir. 1975) (Fourth Amendment may require police rulemaking); K.
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENT Es § 6.13, at 224-27 (1976); Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 416-28 (1974); Wright,
supra note 42, at 588.
45. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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lions of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,46 stressed the need for
public participation in agency licensing proceedings in order to pro-
mote the values of environmental protection and racial equality.
The differences between the neo-formalist and the structural due
process approaches to administrative law are most striking in the re-
sponses each approach makes to the dilemma of agency nonenforcement
of regulatory reform. The dilemma arises from the tension between
broad legislative commitments to intervene in the private market for
the benefit of unorganized consumers and actual agency practices that
remain largely responsive to organized providers or firms. The neo-
formalist approach is less a resolution of this tension than a denial of
its existence; generally expressed congressional mandates are inter-
preted to be unenforceable or legally irrelevant, or the generality itself
is interpreted to confer virtually unreviewable agency discretion. Neo-
formalism thus ratifies the results of the market in administrative
choice in much the same way that formalist doctrines of contract law
ratified the results of the economic market: the outcome of political
bargaining in administrative decisionmaking, like economic bargain-
ing in the marketplace, may be judicially altered only on the authority
of an explicit legislative rule that can be mechanically applied. 47 Since
organized vested interests can usually block the enactment of explicit
and mechanically applicable rules for market intervention, the
formalist preclusion of judicial reliance on general standards results
in the ratification of private power even in derogation of statutory
goals.
The structural due process approach recognizes the tension between
statutory goals and agency practice and attempts a resolution. In con-
trast to the neo-formalist approach, general statutory standards are
interpreted as "law" to apply to the case at hand. Such standards are
not "law" that can be applied in a wholly traditional fashion, since
they do not mandate specific results. They do, however, require a
process of decisionmaking that takes statutory interests into account
in a justifiable fashion. This sort of mandate is sufficient authority to
allow courts to overturn agency decisions without simply usurping the
legislative or administrative function. A court employing structural
analysis recognizes that broadly worded statutes permit an agency to
reach more than one permissible policy outcome and that a court
should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency by dictating
what that outcome should be. The structural due process approach
46. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.).
47. See Form and Substance, supra note 24, at 1761 (discussing relationship between
formalism and market transactions).
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does, however, involve a court in examining the agency's explanation
or justification of its policy in terms of the statutory goals, and also
in examining the process by which it reached the decision. The crucial
difference between structural analysis and more conventional statutory
interpretation is the use of general statutory goals as the basis for
inferring the type of process the agency must use in rendering its
decisions and the type of reasoning needed to justify them.48
The central thesis of this article is that the courts can and should
use the techniques of structural due process to check agency nonen-
forcement of health care reform. The appropriateness of such a
judicial role depends on two related factors: whether it is legitimate
for courts to resolve disputes between agencies and citizens regarding
broadly defined statutory interests, and whether the courts are com-
petent to make such judgments in areas of complex social policy. These
issues have been traditionally examined in the jurisprudential context
noted above: whether courts have authority to invoke broad prin-
ciples in addition to determinate rules as a basis for judicial decision.49
They have also arisen in the doctrinal contexts of standing,50 implied
rights of action,51 the extent of nonreviewable agency discretion,5 2 and
the scope of judicial review of agency action. 53 Though analysis at
48. The leading, albeit confused example of this approach is Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The Court interpreted § 138 of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970), as prohibiting the Secretary of
Transportation from approving the use of parkland in constructing federally assisted
highways unless he finds that there "'are no feasible alternative routes or . . . [that]
alternative routes involve uniquely difficult problems." 401 U.S. at 416. Although the
Court ruled that the Secretary did not have to make "formal findings," id. at 417, the
effect of the decision is to create a strong incentive for contemporaneous agency find-
ings by permitting, in the absence of some agency explanation, judicial examination of
"the decisionmakers themselves." Id. at 420. Justices Black and Brennan would have
converted this indirect incentive for hearings and agency explanation into a direct
requirement based on the Act's substantive and structural provisions. See id. at 421-22
(separate opinion of Black, J., joined by Brennan, J.).
For other examples of cases relying on general statutory goals as the basis for inferring
required procedures or justifications, see Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (public housing held to be entitlement requiring limited procedural due
process in agency decisions raising rents); Brown v. Lynn, 385 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Il.
1974) (general goals of National Housing Act require agency to avoid mortgage fore-
closure policies that harm low-income beneficiaries without substantial justification).
49. For major contemporary examples of jurisprudential debate over this and related
questions about the nature of law, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF L w (1961);
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. Rrv. 14 (1967). For a critique of formalist
concepts as the basis of judicial authority, see Legal Formality, supra note 24, at 387-88.
50. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Evans v.
Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 589 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977) (en banc).
51. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423-25 (1975).
52. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-13 (1971);
Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249-51 (1st Cir. 1970); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A
Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion", 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968).
53. See, e.g., Texas ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019,
1025 (5th Cir. 1977); L. JAFFE, supra note 25, at 569-75.
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these levels remains important, this article addresses the issues of
legitimacy and competency in a specific policy context: the effort to
extend public control over public resources for the benefit of health
care consumers. It argues that the text and structure of health care
reform legislation, together with the agencies' actual performance, call
into question the neo-formalist approach to administrative law and
justify the type of judicial protection of health consumer interests that
has already emerged in a number of health law decisions.54 In develop-
ing this argument, each case study focuses on a particular source of
structural inference: legislation for the benefit of a consumer class
(Hill-Burton); legislation creating a statutory entitlement to benefits
for eligible individuals (Medicaid); and standards of administrative
procedure and judicial review contained in the APA (health planning).
The advantages of the structural due process approach over the
neo-formalist approach are apparent at a number of levels explored in
detail in the case studies. First, the role of government has changed
enormously since formalist administrative law doctrines were developed
in the early decades of the twentieth century. Increased government
involvement in complex social policy and the dynamics of interest-
group politics have often led to legislation specifying factors to be
weighed and structures of decisionmaking, rather than particular
results. Doctrines that discount the importance of structural statutes
as sources of individual rights run the risk of undermining democratic
choices by ratifying less visible administrative passivity.
Second, the neo-formalist approach, in its most mechanical form,
focuses artificially on a statute's remedial provisions or omissions and
ignores the substantive and structural provisions that usually receive
far more congressional attention. Third, and in a related vein, the
structural due process approach gives legal effect to the important
statutory goals of redistribution and consumer accountability in health
care services, while the neo-formalist approach tends to deny their
effect simply because they were not cast in a particular legal form.
Fourth, the tendency of the neo-formalist approach to ratify agency
nonenforcement seriously undermines democratic values by creating
zones in which legislative provisions can be given little or no weight,
for no articulated reason and with little effective review. The con-
verse danger of the structural due process approach-that a court will
misinterpret congressional intent in granting affirmative relief-has
much greater visibility, and hence is more likely to be remedied by
54. See, e.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (Hill-Burton program);
Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (Medicaid program).
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legislative action.5  Finally, the structural due process approach con-
tributes to the task of value choice that lies at the heart of most major
social programs. When, as is often the case, Congress has granted an
agency discretion to weigh competing values, there is serious danger
that one or more values will be disregarded through low-visibility non-
enforcement.
Under the structural due process approach, an agency charged with
balancing competing interests has a duty to recognize that there is
more than one interest to be weighed,56 to give the interests their ap-
propriate weight in the light of legislative intent and the agency's own
articulated policies, 57 to permit public participation in the balancing
process b providing notice and a meaningful opportunity to com-
ment,5" and to justify the consequences of its decisions in light of the
statutory goals.5 9 The case studies examined in this article strongly
suggest that without judicial enforcement of such duties, agencies can
and will disregard their responsibilities to low-income consumers and
thereby cause a great deal of human suffering and harm to the legal
system as a whole.
Despite the advantages of the structural due process techniques-
55. For a clear example of such legislative reaction, see H.R. REP. No. 500, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 580, quoted in Texas
ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019, 1025 n.13 (5th Cir. 1977),
discussed at p. 320 & note 359 infra; cf. Note, Judicial Control of Systemic Inadequacies
in Federal Administrative Enforcement, 88 YALE L.J. 407, 434-35 (1978) (court activity
will highlight enforcement problems and stimulate congressional action).
56. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (requiring FPC to consider "preservation of natural
beauty" as well as cost in proceedings to license power plant).
57. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13
(1971) (rejecting argument by government that Secretary of Transportation is "to engage
in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests"; holding that very existence of
statutes restricting building of highways in parks "indicates that protection of parkland
was to be given paramount importance"); Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J.) (setting aside decision of
Federal Communications Commission granting full-term television license on grounds
that FCC had failed to give appropriate weight to viewer complaints of unfair pro-
gramming regarding racial discrimination). But see Note, supra note 40, at 1656-65
(criticizing Court's interpretation of legislative scheme in Overton Park and arguing that
Court's approach involved revision of legislative scheme rather than reasonable interpre.
tation of it).
58. See, e.g., National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 648 n.17,
649 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (calling for adequate notice to permit "informatihe, responsive com-
ments" by interested parties to agency regulation); Thompson v.'Washington, 497 F.2d
626, 634-40 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (public housing tenants entitled to notice and opportunity
to respond in writing to proposed rent increases).
59. See National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 646-48 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (HEW regulation defining available income to include gross market value of
recipient-owned property without regard to encumbrances violates objectives of Social
Security Act); Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (proposed state system
of restricting available drugs under Medicaid program results in denial of necessary
medical care and services, thereby violating Social Security Act).
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public participation, rational decisionmaking, and adequate considera-
tion of statutory values-a number of substantial criticisms have been
voiced. It is argued that when the legislature has failed to choose
between or assign weights to competing values, neither the agencies
nor courts have sufficient guidance to develop operational standards
of "adequate consideration." 60 There is concern that elaborate pro-
cedural requirements for agency rulemaking and other decisionmaking
may actually reduce agency accountability by increasing the com-
plexity of the decision, the number of actors and considerations, and
the opportunities for delay."' Even if designed to elicit public partic-
ipation, complex proceedings may overwhelm the resources of all but
the most skilled consumer groups.62 Moreover, the direct and indirect
costs of such proceedings to the agency and the parties are often
thought to outweigh the practical benefits and to divert limited re-
sources from a proram's substantive goals.63 Finally, a restructuring
of agency procedures may ultimately have little effect on the balance
of forces influencing the agency, and hence, slight impact on its deci-
sions.6 4 From the perspective of consumers and other traditionally
weak groups, procedural techniques may be dangerous because they
merely secure access to a highly unequal political arena. Without a
concrete redistribution of power, or at least of advocacy skills and
resources, such access is likely to be a sham creating only the ap-
pearance of due process and pluralist democracy. One version of this
argument focuses on the limited impact of doctrinal change; new
definitions of legal rights or changes in the standard of judicial review
may have no practical value for welfare recipients, low-income health
care consumers, and others under intense pressure to waive their rights
and to accommodate more powerful professionals and agency officials. 5
These arguments reflect the real obstacles to significant social
change and the practical limits of judicial authority. It is clear that
administrative nonenforcement of health care reform is rooted in the
political system as a whole and can be fully remedied only by changes
outside, as well as within, the legal system. Nevertheless, the case
60. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 1779, 1781-84.
61. See id. at 1776-79.
62. See, e.g., Trubek, Environmental Defense, I: Introduction to Interest Group Ad-
vocacy in Complex Disputes, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAw 154-57, 185-86 (B. Weisbrod, J.
Handler & N. Komesar eds. 1978) (examples from case studies of environmental policy
disputes).
63. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 1770-76.
64. See id. at 1776-77; Handler, Public Interest Law: Problems and Prospects, in
LAW AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 106-09 (M. Schwartz ed. 1976).
65. See Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 479, 494-97 (1966).
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studies examined in this article suggest that if structural due process
doctrines were clearly articulated and acted upon, the courts could
contribute significantly to the implementation of substantive health
care reform. The advantages of this doctrinal development should not
be foregone even though its ultimate success requires additional
changes. Moreover, the arguments against the structural due process
approach, though suggesting real problems, tend in several ways to
misunderstand the actual and potential relationships among courts,
agencies, and Congress, particularly in the area of health care delivery.
First, the state of the bureaucratic art of health care reform is primi-
tive, with the basic policymaking and participatory structures still
embryonic. As the case studies reveal, the types of legal claims at issue
in health care litigation frequently involve difficult choices among
competing statutory values-about which Congress has often given
inadequate guidance-and more fundamental procedural questions
about how such decisions should be made. At this second level, Con-
gress has usually defined, at least in rough form, the factors and
structures for decisionmaking-but seldom with much impact on actual
agency practices. At this stage of development Congress has sufficiently
indicated to the courts that consumers are indeed meant to be bene-
ficiaries of health care legslation, and that agencies must consider
consumer interests in a rational and defensible fashion. In performing
this structural compliance function, the courts can rely on statutory
texts and structures to legitimate, as well as to render manageable,
their intervention. The objection that Congress has not provided
adequate guidance for judicial decision may well be valid as to some
issues, but not as to the frequent dispute over whether public control
on behalf of consumers should be exercised at all.
A second set of objections focuses on the complexity and costs of
structural due process' techniques and on their asserted failure to
produce benefits in terms of informed, accountable, and swift deci-
sions. To some extent, such objections merely reflect a reasonable
concern that decisionmaking procedures should be efficiently suited to
their functions. The appropriate response to this concern, however, is
not to dismiss process techniques altogether, but rather to shape them,
as several courts and agencies have done, and indeed as Congress origi-
nally intended,6 6 to the particular types of decisions at issue. 67 This
66. See S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1945) (noting that although notice
and comment rulemaking procedures specified in § 4 of APA represent "the minimum
requirements of public rule making," "[m]atters of great import, or those where the public
submission of facts will be either useful to the agency or a protection to the public, should
naturally be accorded more elaborate public procedures").
67. See Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Newsom v. Vanderbilt
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kind of pragmatic adjustment of the costs of due process is particularly
appropriate in the area of health care reform, where decisionmaking
procedures are still at an early stage of development, and where
providers and agencies are still contesting the preliminary question of
whether consumers are entitled to any procedural rights or tangible
benefits.
At a more fundamental level, objections concerning complexity and
cost raise the question of whether rights of participation and explana-
tion can actually illuminate the difficult value choices 'involved in
health care reform and can result in more responsive and equitable
decisions. A similar question is raised by those concerned with the
unequal distribution of power: even assuming a legislative and
judicial intent to benefit unorganized interests, is increased "legaliza-
tion" of the administrative process an effective way to accomplish that
goal? The existing inequality of resources between providers and con-
sumers undoubtedly puts consumers at a disadvantage in a legal as
well as in a political context. The open question, however, is whether
groups such as consumers receive at least a net gain in terms of benefits
or influence from more structured techniques of agency decision-
making. Although a complete answer to that question requires much
more empirical evidence than is currently available, the case studies
examined in this article tentatively suggest an affirmative answer.
Requirements of public notice, participation, and explanation create
at least the conditions for consumer influence: knowledge that a deci-
sion is being made, and a framework in which to attempt to influence
the decisionmakers' values and perceptions.68 In each of the three case
studies, consumers actually succeeded, with judicial assistance, in
changing the agency's perception of its own role and in increasing the
extent of public regulation in support of consumers' needs. Further-
more, legal efforts to restructure relationships between agencies and
consumer-beneficiaries need not, and in fact do not, occur in a political
vacuum. In each of the three case studies such legal efforts were, to
varying extents, part of, or stimulation for, new forms of consumer
organization and political participation. 69
Univ., No. 75-126-NA-CV (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 1978); Ho v. Chang, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 28,433 (D. Hawaii Apr. 27, 1977); Benton v.
Rhodes, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDIcAID GUIDE (CCH) 28,025 (S.D. Ohio
May 11, 1976), rev'd, No. 76-2177 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978).
68. The value of even such rudimentary avenues of influence is highlighted by the
difficulties caused by their absence. See Borosage, Para-Legal Authority and Its Perils,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1976, at 166, 174-77 (discussion of Central Intelligence
Agency and other national security agencies).
69. Prominent examples of Hill-Burton organizing efforts include the work of the
Rhode Island Workers Association (RIWA), the Philadelphia Unemployment Project,
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Finally, it is important to remember that the value of consumer
participation and agency explanation does not lie solely in the op-
portunity to secure a different outcome. What Professor Tribe has
termed "the right to be heard from, and the right to be told why...
express the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing,
is at least to be consulted about what is done with one." 70 Expressed
in political terms, this root concept of human dignity highlights the
need for a reconstruction of the democratic process, in which con-
sultation over fundamental human needs is not made meaningless
by a labyrinthine bureaucracy. By offering unorganized interests the
right to participate in programs for their own benefit, the traditions
of structural due process also help to encourage its exercise and thereby
help to strengthen democratic capacity.
Potential of this sort is, of course, not easily realized; "due process"
can reinforce inequality and passivity as well, and the legal system can
play only a contributory role in changes of this magnitude. The point
of this article is that such a role is possible, and that the costs of not
pursuing it are high.
II. Hill-Burton: Identifying the Beneficiaries and Their Remedies
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act (Hill-Burton Act) of
1946,71 which established federal and state regulatory systems to finance
the construction of hospitals for the ultimate benefit of health care con-
sumers, was a response to the serious economic and geographic barriers
to health services that had been highlighted during the Depression
and the Cape Cod (Mass.) Health Care Coalition. For description and discussion, see R.I.
HEALTH ADVOCATES BULL., July, 1976, at 4 ("RIWA Opens Hill-Burton Campaign in
Providence"); PHILADELPHIA UNEMPLOYMENT PROJECT, HILL-BURTON ORGANIZING GUIDE
(1976); Pastreich, A Report on Health Care Organization in Massachusetts, HEALTH L.
PROJECT LIB. BULL., Apr. 1977, at 2; Sparer, Legal Services and Social Change: The Uneasy
Question and the Missing Perspective, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 58 (1976-77). For descriptions
of extensive consumer organizing efforts concerning health planning, see Consumer Issues
Around HSAs (series), in HEALTH L. PROJECT LIm. BULL. (June-July 1977 to present).
The relationship of litigation to consumer organizing efforts is complex. Although
legal advocacy has helped to support and stimulate consumer and other popular move-
ments, it has also on occasion "'lawyerized' the issues . . . raised in ways that undercut
potential grass roots political organization." Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems:
The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106, 107 (1977); see Wexler, Practicing
Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1054 (1970); Comment, The New Public Interest
Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1075-88 (1970). This article does not attempt to address the
issue of when it is appropriate, from the point of view of consumers or their organiza-
tions, to seek judicial relief, as opposed to or in conjunction with other advocacy efforts.
Rather, it focuses on how courts should respond to consumer requests for judicial relief
once presented.
70. L. TRIBE, supra note 39, at 503.
71. See note 1 supra.
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and World War 11.72 Many individuals and even whole communities
could not afford the going market price for needed care.Va Economic
inequality resulted in widely varying availability of hospitals and
doctors, widely varying use of health services according to economic
class and geographic area, and, according to a prominent medical his-
torian, "hundreds of thousands" of needless, preventable illnesses and
"thousands" of premature deaths.
74
A. Congressional Intent: Hospital Access and Public Regulation
The Hill-Burton Act emerged from a clash between two opposing
perspectives on how to respond to this problem. The approach adopted
by the Truman Administration with the active support of organized
labor advocated public financing of health services through national
health insurance.7 5 The hospital industry, represented by the American
Hospital Association, its affiliates, and the medical profession, wanted
public funding to pay the costs of increasingly sophisticated facilities,
but without significant public regulation. 70 The industry's solution,
72. The lead sponsor of the Hill-Burton Act, Senator Lister Hill, noted that the
Senate's Subcommittee on Wartime Health and Education had assembled an enormous
quantity of information leading "to the inescapable conclusion that in the wealthiest
country in the world, we have not yet organized our efforts to the end that scientific
health care is readily available to all our people." Hospital Construction Act: Hearings
on S.191 Before the Senate Comn. on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 7
(1945) [hereinafter cited as 1945 Senate Hearings]. As specific examples, Senator Hill
noted that
about 40 percent of the counties of the United States have no recognized hospital
facilities . . . that health centers or modern facilities for the practice of preventive
medicine or public health are almost nonexistent . . . . [and that) nearly 40 percent
of our young men of draft age were found to be physically unfit for military duty.
Id.
73. See COMMIrEE ON THE COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 2-35 (1972) [hereinafter cited as M61EDICAL CARE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE]; S.
LAw, supra note 2, at 6-11.
74. Sigerist, Socialized Medicine, 27 YALE REv. 463, 465 (1938), reprinted in HENRY E.
SIGERIST ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICINE 39, 41 (M. Roemer ed. 1960).
75. For President Truman's proposed health legislation, see Health Legislation, [1945]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1143. A brief history of national health insurance proposals
under the Roosevelt and Truman administrations can be found in Falk, Proposals for
National Health Insurance in the USA: Origins and Evolution, and Some Perceptions for
the Future, 55 MILLBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 161 (1977). The differences between the
national health insurance perspective and that of the hospital industry and medical
profession appeared most clearly in 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, and in the
Senate floor debate on the Hill-Burton Act, in which Senator Murray offered seven
amendments, all of which were defeated. 91 CONG. REc. 11,716-20 (1945) (Sen. Murray);
see S. REP. No. 674, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 17, 21 (1945) (personal statement and reservations
of Sen. Murray) (stating need to create social insurance for health care).
76. See, for example, the questions and answers on the Hill-Burton bill developed by
the AHA for the guidance of its member hospitals. 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 72,
at 16-20. Of the 30 questions and answers, 10 concerned the extent and limits of federal
and state regulatory authority. Id.
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embodied in a 1945 bill introduced by Senator Lister Hill, 77 was to
limit federal funding to construction grants (as opposed to payment
for services) and to surround the program with a series of devices
designed to suppress the potential for public, and especially federal,
control. Thus Senator Hill's original bill provided that federal con-
struction funds be given to state agencies for distribution to the
hospitals without any legislative standards regarding services to con-
sumers beyond the general goal of "furnishing adequate [health]
services to all of the people. ' '78 More specific standards were to be
prescribed by the Surgeon General, but only with the approval of a
"Federal Advisory Council" composed of eight members "outstand-
ing in fields pertaining to hospital and health activities, [a majority
of whom] shall be authorities in matters relating to the operation of
hospitals." 7
9
Although Senate liberals were not sufficiently powerful to sub-
stitute their national health insurance approach for the hospital in-
dustry's plan, they were able to extract some significant concessions in
favor of service for low-income consumers. The Act as finally passed
contained two substantive federal standards applicable both to the
"state plans," in which the states were to set out their regulatory
framework for the distribution of funds and hospital operations, and
to the individual facilities themselves. First, hospital facilities con-
structed with Hill-Burton funds were to be made available to all per-
sons in the community without discrimination on account of race or
creed.80 Second, Hill-Burton hospitals were to make available "a rea-
77. See 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 7-8 (Senator Hill noting that in draft.
ing bill, he sought "best possible technical advice" from AHA, its affiliated groups,
Catholic and Protestant hospital associations, and American Public Health Association).
When introducing the revised bill to the Senate floor, Senator Hill stated that the special
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor appointed to revise the
original bill was particularly appreciative of the advice of Mr. George Bugbee, executive
secretary of the AHA, who had participated in the subcommittee's executive sessions. 91
CONG. RFc. 11,713 (1945).
78. S. 191, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. § 601 (1945), 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 1.
79. Id. § 633(b), 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 5; see id. § 612(3), 1945 Senate
Hearings, supra note 72, at 2 (power of Advisory Council to approve regulations).
80. Section 622(f) of the original Hill-Burton Act authorized the United States Surgeon
General to require such an assurance, and the Surgeon General did so in the program's
first regulations, 12 Fed. Reg. 6176, 6179, § 53.62 (1947). Section 622(f) also provided, how-
ever, for an "exception" to the nondiscrimination requirement "in cases where separate
hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups, if the [state] plan makes
equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities and services of like quality for each
such group," and the Surgeon General duly incorporated such an exception into the
regulations. Id. The Act's "separate-but-equal" clause was declared unconstitutional in
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
938 (1964), and Congress amended the Hill-Burton Act in 1964 to remove all reference
to racial discrimination. As amended, the Hill-Burton Act authorized the federal agency
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sonable volume of hospital services to persons unable to pay," at least
to the extent of the hospital's financial ability to do so.81
The Surgeon General was to prescribe by regulation "requirements
as to lack of discrimination on account of race, creed, or color, and for
furnishing needed hospital services to persons unable to pay there-
for."8 2 These requirements were to be enforced through the "assur-
ances" of compliance that could be, and were, required from all ap-
plicant facilities83 and through the withholding of funds from state
agencies or particular projects upon a finding that "any assurance
given in an application ... is not being or cannot be carried out. 84
Although the Surgeon General's regulations were still subject to the
approval of the renamed "Federal Hospital Council," the Council was
now to be composed of four industry experts and four members "ap-
pointed to represent the consumers of hospital services . . . [who are]
familiar with the need for hospital services in urban or rural areas.18s
Although the free care obligation was stated in general terms, the
text and legislative history of the Act indicated that Congress expected
it to be given operational effect. First, the Act referred to the "require-
ment," binding on both state agencies and individual grantee hospitals,
of "furnishing needed hospital services to persons unable to pay there-
for.""6 Second, the text of the Act authorized an exception to the hos-
pitals' free care assurance "if such a requirement is not feasible from
a financial standpoint"87 or, in the words of the Senate Report, if "the
hospital is financially unable to undertake such a commitment."'8 The
implication was that the hospital would have to devote some of its own
resources to providing free care. Third, the legislative history frequent-
to require assurances from grantee hospitals that they would be "made available to all
persons residing in the territorial area of the applicant." 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1970). The
legislative intent behind this provision appeared to be acquiescence in the Simkins pro-
hibition of racial discrimination without explicit statutory language reaching that result.
See Extension and Revision of Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Program: Hearings on
H.R. 10041 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 53-54 (1964) (colloquy between HEW Secretary Celebrezze and Representative Oren
Harris, chairman of the Committee).
81. Section 622(f) of the original Hill-Burton Act authorized the Surgeon General to
require such an assurance, and he did so in the program's first regulations, 12 Fed. Reg.
6176, 6179, § 53.63 (1947).
82. Hill-Burton Act, supra note 1, §§ 622(f), 623(a)(4).
83. Id. § 622(f). Such assurances were required from all applicants (subject to waivers
for states with "separate-but-equal" plans and for hospitals that could demonstrate
financial unfeasibility) in the Surgeon General's initial regulations. 12 Fed. Reg. 6176,
6179, §§ 53.62, .63 (1947).
84. Hill-Burton Act, sukra note 1, § 632(a)(3).
85. Id. § 633(b).
86. Id. § 623(a)(4)(D) (emphasis supplied).
87. Id. § 622(f).
88. S. REP. No. 674, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1945).
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ly referred to the problem of community need for subsidized or
charitable care. Under pointed questioning about whether grantee
hospitals could restrict their services to those who could afford to pay,
the president of the American Hospital Association assured the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor that low-income people "who
get into [grantee hospitals] will be taken care of at the local level,"' 9
and that the state plan would have to locate hospitals primarily accord-
ing to the needs of "people that cannot get hospitalization on their
own means." 90
Finally, the legislative history reflected reliance on the private non-
profit (or. "voluntary") hospitals' tradition of community service and
charitable care.91 Some congressional ambivalence is apparent in other
provisions of the Act that restricted the scope of federal regulation by
delegating the establishment of minimum hospital standards to the
states,92 by providing for appeals and judicial review at the initiative
of the state agencies,93 and by prohibiting federal officials from ex-
ercising "any supervision or control" over the administration or opera-
tion of grantee hospitals "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided."94
It was also evident, at least to the senators at the Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor hearings, that charitable services by grantee hospitals
could not meet all of the need of low- and moderate-income consumers
of hospital care.9 5 It would thus be fair to say that Congress intended
to accomplish a substantial but partial solution to the problem of
providing hospital services to lower-income patients through a limited
extension of federal funding and regulation over hospitals, and broader
federal supervision over the state agencies who were expected to per-
form the primary regulation. At the same time, it is clear that Congress
89. 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 30 (statement of Dr. Smeizer, president of
AHA).
90. Id. at 34.
91. See, e.g., id. at 24 (statement by Dr. Smelzer that assets of voluntary hospitals
would not be distributed for private gain "because [the voluntary hospital] really is a
public asset, even though it is not controlled by a branch of the Government"); 91 CONG.
REC. 11,724 (1945) (Senator Taft, who helped draft final bill, arguing for granting federal
funds to "private charitable hospitals not operated for profit," because their performance
of public function in health care services relieved "the States and cities of enormous ex-
pense which they would have had to meet if they had operated the hospitals as general
[i.e., public] hospitals"); 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 190 (Senator Taft
estimating that private nonprofit hospitals typically allocated at least 20% of services to
charitable care for poor).
92. Hill-Burton Act, supra note I, § 623(a)(7).
93. Id. § 632(b).
94. Id. § 635.
95. See 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 64-65 (Senator Pepper); id. at 194-95
(Senator Taft).
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intended the nondiscrimination and free care requirements to mean
something more than the mere filing of paper "assurances." Congress
had established state regulation under federal supervision in order to
translate the federal requirements of nondiscrimination and free care
into concrete policy.
The Act's provisions supporting hospital construction were imple-
mented with enthusiasm. From 1947 to 1973, the federal government
granted 53.9 billion to 5,986 hospital construction projects. These
funds provided about one-third of the cost of 358,000 general hospital
beds, which in turn composed one-third of all the beds in the nation.96
The federal agency administering the Act, HEW,97 published meticu-
lous "project registers" giving the details of every grant made and
analyzing aggregate program accomplishments according to types of
facilities and construction.98 Geographical disparities in the supply of
hospitals-as measured by bed-to-population ratios-were reduced,
which achieved one of the chief goals of the legislation.99
The Act's provisions requiring nondiscrimination and service to
those unable to pay received dramatically different treatment from
the administering federal and state agencies. From the program's
inception in 1947 until 1972, the federal and state agencies com-
pletely failed to perform this task. The Surgeon General's initial
regulations, issued in September 1947,100 provided no criteria for de-
termining who was "unable to pay" or how to measure a hospital's
"reasonable volume" of free care.101 The otherwise elaborate Hill-
96. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (Table 9), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. 9: AD. NEws 7842, 7862 thereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1285, with page citations to
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS].
97. Both the original Hill-Burton Act of 1946 and the 1964 amendments, Pub. L. No.
88-443, 78 Stat. 447 (1964), assigned administrative responsibility for Hill-Burton to the
Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service. The functions of the
Surgeon General were transferred to the Secretary of HEW by § l(a) of Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 8855 (1966).
98. see PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, HILL-BURTON PROJECT REGISTER
(1971) (summarizing data and listing projects approved from July 1, 1947 to June 1,
1971) [hereinafter cited as HILL-BURTON PROJECT REGISTER].
99. See S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 96, at 7863-64, 7881-82.
100. 12 Fed. Reg. 6176 (1947).
101. See id. at 6179, § 53.63. In addition to the absence of operational standards or
enforcement provisions, this regulation also contained a major substantive ambiguity. The
sentence defining "free patient care" referred to "hospital service offered below cost or
free to persons unable to pay therefor," id. (emphasis supplied), which suggests that the
essential criterion for "free patient care" was some financial loss to the hospital. The next
sentence, however, stated that "[s]uch care may be paid for wholly or Partly out of public
funds or contributions of individuals and ... organizations... or may be contributed at
the expense of the hospital itself." Id. (emphasis supplied). Under this language, a
hospital might be paid in full by public funds for services to the indigent, and still be
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Burton program statistics were entirely silent on how much or what
types of care to the poor had been provided, or what types of patients
had been served.102 Even worse, the state agencies were not required
to develop statewide eligibility standards, or even to issue guidelines
to help hospitals make their own policies. Nor were the state agencies
required to collect any information on services for the poor, much
less "plan" to meet their needs. The hospitals were not required to
report any information to the state, nor were the states required or
even urged to monitor what the hospitals were doing with regard to
charitable care. Under the supervision of the Surgeon General and the
state agencies, the nondiscrimination and free care "assurances" were
reduced to a set incantation filed with an application for funds and
thereafter apparently ignored. 103
B. Developing a Right to Agency Enforcement
After more than twenty years of agency nonenforcement, consumers
began active litigation in the federal courts and documented numerous
cases of seriously ill persons denied necessary hospital care because
they were recipients of Medicaid'04 or because they did not have cash
able to claim credit toward its Hill-Burton obligation, however defined, for services to
persons unable to pay therefor. This latter interpretation, which seems inconsistent with
the text and legislative history of the Hill-Burton Act, was not eliminated until 1972,
when HEW issued new regulations defining "'services to persons unable to pay therefor'"
as "uncompensated services." See 37 Fed. Reg. 14,721 (1972) (codified in 42 C.F.R. § 53.111
(b)(7) (1977)).
102. See HILL-BURTON PRoJEcT REcISTER, supra note 98. At a 1972 press conference
held by HEW to explain interim regulations that, for the first time, set quantitative
standards for compliance with the free care obligation, the administrator of the Health
Services and Mental Health Administration, Dr. Vernon Wilson, admitted: "There is
no well documented body of infromation on the national level as to the amount of
services which are being provided to people unable to pay. It is interesting that there
simply is not a national reservoir of this kind of information." U.S. Dep't of HEW,
Press Conference on Hill-Burton Regulations, Washington, D.C., at 5 (July 21, 1972) (un-
edited transcript).
103. The extreme nature of the agencies' nonenforcement, and of the hospitals' non-
compliance, was revealed in the Newsom litigation against Vanderbilt University Hospital,
one of the major teaching hospitals of the South:
Mr. Hewitt Rogers, who served as Director for Patient Admissions and Patient Ac-
counting for Vanderbilt Hospital for approximately 20 years prior to assuming his
present position as the hospital's Director of Admissions in the Spring of 1976,
testified in his deposition that the first time he had ever heard of the Hill-Burton
Act and of the hospital's obligation to provide free services was in the latter part of
1972.
Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 75-126-NA-CV, slip op. at 17 n.l (M.D. Tenn. June 1,
1978).
104. See Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 364 (E.D. La. 1972) (poor
women told by admitting personnel at three Hill-Burton grantee hospitals in New
Orleans "that the hospitals did not accept welfare or Medicaid patients").
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deposits, 1 5 a private physician, 00  or sufficient funds.10 7 The con-
sumer plaintiffs sought to enjoin exclusionary hospital admission
practices and to require hospitals to fulfill their Hill-Burton commit-
ments to provide a reasonable volume of care to persons unable to pay.
In the agency and provider responses to these claims, the most
fiercely litigated issue was whether low-income consumers had a
judicially enforceable right to any explanation or justification for the
refusal of hospital care. Relying on formalist conceptions of statutory
interpretation and administrative law, the agencies and hospitals com-
monly argued that the Hill-Burton Act's generally worded provisions
and its lack of explicit consumer remedies precluded any judicial
recognition of consumers' statutory interest in hospital care. Given the
text and legislative history of the Act, most courts rejected this ex-
treme and implausible reading of the statute. 08 Having done so, the
courts were faced with the precise problem identified by the agencies
and providers: how to extract from the Act's general language any
specific rights or duties on which to base concrete relief. 09 In order to
105. See Cloud v. Regenstein, No. C77-599 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 1977) (upholding public
hospital requirement of advance cash deposits against Hill-Burton challenge); Com-
plaint at ff III.27-.28, Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. July
24, 1970), reprinted in 2 HEALTH LALW PROJECT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW
SCHOOL, MATERIALS ON HEALTH LAW: THE HOSPITAL 71 (rev. ed. 1972) (alleging that two
named indigent black residents of New Orleans, suffering from congestive heart failure,
were refused hospital care at public Charity Hospital because of lack of facilities, and at
three private Hill-Burton hospitals because of failure to provide cash deposits of $200
to $250) [compilation hereinafter cited as THE HOsPrrAL].
106. See Campbell v. Mincey, 413 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (upholding, on
grounds of lack of emergency, public hospital's refusal to treat indigent black woman
giving birth; no Hill-Burton claim raised); Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D.
354, 364-65 (E.D. La. 1972) (poor women told by admitting personnel at three Hill-Burton
hospitals in New Orleans that "the hospitals would not treat them because they did not
have private physicians").
107. See Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief at 12, Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 75-126-
NA-CV (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 1978) (describing Vanderbilt University Hospital's "Weekly
Summary of Patients Denied Admission for Financial Reasons" as "replete with such
candid entries as 'Insufficient finances, sent out,' 'No money, or insurance, sent out,'
'Insufficient insurance, could not make deposit' ").
108. See Saine v. Hospital Auth., 502 F.2d 1033, 1034-35 (5th Cir. 1974); Euresti v.
Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1118-19 (10th Cir. 1972); Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center,
359 F. Supp. 909, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v.
James Archer Smith Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Cook v. Ochsner
Foundation Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603, 606 (E.D. La. 1970). But see Stanturf v. Sipes, 224
F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1963), affd on other grounds, 335 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 977 (1965) (dictum).
109. See, e.g., Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Foundation, No. 725-71
(D.D.C. June 28, 1972), reprinted in THE HOSPITAL, supra note 105, at 81-82 (denying in-
junction to enforce community service and free care obligations); Yale-New Haven Hosp.
v. Mathews, 32 Conn. Supp. 539, 343 A.2d 661 (C.P. App. Div. 1974), cert. denied, 164
Conn. 694, 341 A.2d 432, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1024 (1975) (low-income hospital patients
did not have standing or right to assert Hill-Burton Act as defense to hospital collection
action on unpaid bill).
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realize the substantive goals of the Act, the courts began, in an uneven
and hesitant fashion, to develop the concept, of a consumer right not
to a particular level of benefits, but rather to a process that defined and
allocated those benefits and that justified the program's results.
The first step in this development was the rejection of the formalist
approach advocated by the hospitals and adopted by the district court
in the early Hill-Burton case of Euresti v. Stenner.110 Since the Hill-
Burton Act focused on relations among the federal and state agencies
and grantee hospitals, and provided no explicit remedies for consumers,
the district court concluded that the Act's free-care requirement was
a governmental or "public" interest enforceable only by administra-
tive sanctions."' Private individuals, the court held, lacked standing
to enforce a governmental right absent specific congressional authoriza-
tion.112
Rejecting the district court's sharp distinction between public and
private interests, the Tenth Circuit reversed. 13 The Hill-Burton Act,
the circuit court held, "was passed to ensure that the indigent would
be supplied sufficient hospital services when needed.""14 Given "this
clear intent,"" 5 and the manifest inadequacy of HEW's administrative
sanctions, it was both necessary and appropriate to infer private legal
remedies in order to secure enforcement of the hospitals' public
obligations." 6
The shift in reasoning and result between the district and appellate
courts in Euresti reflects something deeper than differing modes of
statutory interpretation. For the district court, the private autonomy
of the hospital was paramount and demanded a limited judicial role;
the court was willing to intervene in the hospital-patient relationship
only on authority of a clear legislative command. For the appellate
court, the statute's general substantive goal was paramount and de-
fined a beneficiary class entitled to judicial protection. The decision
in Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital,17 cited with approval by
the Tenth Circuit in Euresti,"8 stated the point unequivocally: "the
only real beneficiaries of a hospital program are the people who need
110. 327 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972).
111. Id. at 114.
112. Id. at 115.
113. 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (Retired Associate Justice Clark sitting by
designation).
114. Id. at 1118.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970).
118. 458 F.2d at 1119.
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or may need medical treatment." 119 This statement indicates the
merging of public purposes with private nonprofit hospital status that
is inherent in the Hill-Burton program and was indeed the very prem-
ise on which the funds were disbursed.
The contradiction between private and public control reappears,
however, when one considers the issue of relief: what substantive stan-
dards should courts apply to enforcing a private right to "community
service" and to a "reasonable volume" of free care? The difficulties
with direct judicial enforcement of these provisions quickly emerged
in two important contexts.
First, an increasing number of low-income consumers, facing collec-
tion actions in state courts for large, unpaid hospital bills, attempted
to raise the hospitals' lack of compliance with the reasonable volume
of free care requirement as a defense or set-off to the hospitals' claims.
Many hospitals, upon receipt of lengthy Hill-Burton motions and in-
terrogatories from the defendant-patient, simply dropped their claims
rather than pay the high costs of litigation, but several contested the
patients' right to assert such a defense. In the only reported opinion, a
Connecticut intermediate appeals court ruled that low-income con-
sumers did not have standing to raise the Hill-Burton Act as a defense
in a collection action, primarily because the statutory and pre-1972
regulatory standards of hospital compliance were judicially unman-
ageable.' 20
Second, even in affirmative litigation, consumer-plaintiffs encoun-
tered difficulty in obtaining concrete relief. The problems appeared
most clearly in Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital
Foundation.'2' The consumer plaintiffs alleged that a Hill-Burton
119. 319 F. Supp. at 606.
120. Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Mathews, 32 Conn. Supp. 539, 343 A.2d 661 (C.P. App.
Div. 1974), cert. denied, 164 Conn. 694, 341 A.2d 432, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1024 (1975).
The Yale-New Haven case was decided under the pre-1972 regulations that, being
largely identical to the original 1947 regulations, gave virtually no guidance to hospitals
or courts as to what constituted compliance with the free care obligation. See note 101
supra. Since the issuance of more detailed federal regulations between 1972 and 1974, see
p. 277 infra, at least one state lower court has ruled, in an unreported opinion, that
a patient who was unemployed at the time that hospital services were rendered has stand-
ing to raise as an affirmative defense to a hospital collection action the issue of the hospi-
tal's noncompliance with the Hill-Burton free care obligation. See Alexian Bros. Hosp. v.
Brunette, No. 217473, Order at 2 (Dist. Ct., Union County, N.J. Dec. 9, 1977). In Newsom
v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 75-126-NA-CV (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 1978), a federal district
court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the University Hospital and its
collection agent from prosecuting a collection action in state court against the low-income
consumer plaintiff, pending a federal trial on the hospital's compliance with federal
regulations. See id., slip op. at 5.
121. No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972), reprinted in THE HOSPITAL, suPra note 105,
at 80 [subsequent page citations to THE HosPrrAL].
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hospital in southeast Washington, D.C. disproportionately served
suburban patients and effectively excluded city residents, many of
whom were Black and eligible for Medicaid. Although the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant hospital was not delivering a reasonable
amount of free care, the focus of their complaint was on the community
service standard and on whether it required a Hill-Burton hospital to
take steps to ensure that various types of patients were not excluded.'-2 2
Unlike many Southern hospitals, the defendant hospital was not
charged with flatly refusing to serve Medicaid and minority patients,
but rather with serving a much smaller proportion of such patients
than was justified by their population in the community. Plaintiffs
alleged that this disproportionate availability of services was due to a
specific set of hospital practices: Cafritz limited its admission privileges
largely to physicians practicing in the suburbs, refused to establish out-
patient clinics, and refused to enter into affiliation agreements with
public clinics serving the poor.' 23 The plaintiffs also sought affirmative
relief requiring the federal and state agencies to enforce the com-
munity service and free care standards.124
Identifying the issues raised by the Perry complaint to be "of para-
mount consequence to this community,"'' 25 Judge Gerhard Gesell
found that the plaintiffs had standing and critically characterized the
existing health policy process as reflecting "a somewhat indecisive and
casual approach to problems relating to hospital care."'' 2 6 Neverthe-
less, he found it "impossible ... to evaluate the meaning" of the key
regulatory term: "community service."'1 27 The statute simply pro-
vided for assurances that "the facility . . . will be made available to
all persons residing in the territorial area of [the hospital]."' 2 8 HEW's
implementing regulation in turn required grantee hospitals to provide
an assurance that they would "furnish a community service."' 129 The
regulations further explained that a community service meant that
122. See id. at 80-81.
123. Id. at 80-83. To remedy these asserted violations, the plaintiffs sought an order
under the community service standard requiring the hospital to distribute its patient
services in ratios roughly proportional to the geographic-and therefore economic and
racial-composition of the surrounding community. This would have been accomplished
in part by an expansion of outpatient clinic care. The plaintiffs also sought implementa-
tion of the free care requirement through an order requiring the hospital to devote at
least five percent of its operating costs to free or below-cost services to persons unable to
pay. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 80.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 81.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1970).
129. 42 C.F.R. § 53.112(a)(1) (1972) (current version at 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(c) (1977)).
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"the services furnished are available to the general public" or that
"admission is limited only on the basis of age, medical indigency, or
type or kind of medical or mental disability." 130 The plaintiff Medi-
caid recipients argued that since payment for their care was guaranteed
by a government program, they could not be excluded on grounds of
medical indigency and had to be served under the regulation as mem-
bers of the general public. Judge Gesell held, however, that even if
these arguments were valid, he could find no guidance in the statute
and regulations concerning the plaintiffs' claims for proportional
patient service and expanded clinic care:
There are no standards by which the Court could determine
whether whatever community services the hospital performs are
or are not reasonably related to the standard; and without that,
there is no way that the Court can function except by considering
itself some kind of an administrative agency in a rule-making and
administrative process, which is not the role of the Court.131
The judge pointed out that
[t]he legislative history does not in any way encourage court inter-
ference with the day-to-day operations of a complex urban hospital.
Indeed, there is much in the statute which would point rather
substantially the other way . . . . [W]hat Congress had in mind
[in passing the Hill-Burton Act] was not a decision to be made
hospital-by-hospital, . .. but that the approach was to be made
rather through regulations which the Secretary [of HEW] would
develop at least of a citywide character, if not of a regional char-
acter, in consultation with the local state agencies that are in-
volved.1 32
Because of the absence of such regulations-which, in June 1972, HEW
was finally in the process of developing-Judge Gesell declined to
grant any relief against the hospital. And in spite of his criticism of
the agencies' inaction, he also denied relief against the agencies them-
selves because of the lack of statutory guidance. 133
130. Id. § 53.1(s) (current version at 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(d)(1)(ii) (1977)).
131. Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Foundation, No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June
28, 1972), reprinted in THE HOSPITAL, supra note 105, at 81.
132. Id. at 83.
133. The Perry plaintiffs originally sought injunctive and declaratory relief against
HEW and the local District of Columbia agency for failure to implement and enforce
the reasonable volume and community service requirements of the Hill-Burton Act. See
id. at 80. When HEW began to develop reasonable volume regulations in the spring of
1972, the plaintiffs narrowed their motion for summary judgment against HEW to focus
on HEW's failure to promulgate community service regulations. See Memorandum of
Pointsiand Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 22-23,
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Judge Gesell was correct in noting that courts were not the appro-
priate institutions to resolve, at least in the first instance, the major
policy issues involved in defining the hospitals' obligations under the
Hill-Burton Act. The general statutory language does not provide
manageable standards for decisions about particular hospitals. The
issues are not within the courts' traditional areas of competence since
they involve difficult questions of fact and value, and Congress clearly
intended the federal and state agencies to be responsible for the def-
inition and enforcement of the standards. But conceding all this to be
true, Judge Gesell's opinion falls curiously in between recognition and
denial of the statutory goals as "law." On the one hand, the generally
phrased statutory provisions are treated as law for purposes of de-
fining the beneficiary class. This establishes standing and an implied
cause of action. On the other hand, the same provisions are treated as
too unclear to support even a declaratory judgment that the Secretary
has a duty to issue regulations. Having jettisoned the formalist model of
mandatory duty for purposes of standing, Judge Gesell then re-adopted
it for the purpose of denying relief. The decisive issue was thus seen as
whether the Secretary is required to accept the types of policies ad-
vocated by the plaintiffs, rather than whether his actual failure to
adopt policies complied with the Act. Judicial standards for testing
the Secretary's actions began to develop more quickly, however, as
HEW began to issue more detailed regulations.
C. The Role of the Courts in Defining the Agency's Function
Hill-Burton lawsuits by low-income consumers, originally designed
to secure "compliance" with federal law by grantee hospitals, con-
Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Foundation, No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28,
1972). In mid-June 1972, however, plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order
against procedural defects in the development of the reasonable volume regulations. As
summarized by one of the plaintiffs' attorneys:
The defects alleged were (1) the [Federal Hospital] Council [with statutory authority
to approve regulations proposed by the Secretary] was composed of only seven mem-
bers instead of the [statutorily] required 12; (2) although the comment period was
still open, the Council was determining the final regulation prior to the closing
date; and (3) Executive Order 11671, 36 Fed. Reg. 11307 (1971), requires advisory
committee meetings to be open to the public, while this meeting was closed-in fact,
one attorney representing poor people was specifically refused admission.
Rose, The Hill-Burton Act-The Interim Regulation and Service to the Poor: A Study
in Public Interest Litigation, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 309, 311 n.22 (1972). Judge Gesell
conceded that the plaintiffs had raised a "serious" question about the numerical composi-
tion of the Federal Hospital Council, but denied their request for a temporary restrain-
ing order and their motion for summary judgment because he believed that the statute
provided inadequate guidance for judicial intervention. See Perry v. Greater Southeast
Community Hosp. Foundation, No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972), reprinted in THE
HOSPITAL, supra note 105, at 83-84.
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tinually confronted the inadequacy of the federal regulations them-
selves, and HEW was soon joined as a defendant in most suits.134 The
effect of this litigation was to induce the federal agency, without any
formal court order, to begin drafting new regulations defining a reason-
able volume of free care. From 1972 to 1975, under continuous litiga-
tion pressure from consumers, HEW gradually issued new Hill-Burton
regulations requiring the state agencies to establish an annual dollar
amount of uncompensated care for each grantee hospital. 135 However,
this amount could be limited, at the hospital's option, to a maximum
annual figure of ten percent of the hospital's Hill-Burton grants during
the previous twenty years.' 36 The regulations contained some stan-
dards regarding income eligibility criteria 137 and billing procedures"38
for persons unable to pay, yet HEW resolutely maintained that it had
134. See, e.g., Saine v. Hospital Auth., 502 F.2d 1033, 1034 (5th Cir. 1974); Cook v.
Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 355 (E.D. La. 1972).
135. See 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(h) (1977). This regulation was originally promulgated in
an "interim" form on July 22, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,722 (1972), and in a final form,
with changes said to be only "technical," on June 22, 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 16,353 (1973). But
see Rose, supra note 3, at 174-78 (discussing promulgation process and significance of
"technical" changes).
136. The regulations permit the hospital to select one of three levels of service con-
stituting "presumptive compliance" with the free care obligation: (1) uncompensated
services valued at three percent of operating costs, (2) uncompensated services valued at
10% of federal assistance received under the Hill-Burton Act, or (3) certification that the
hospital would admit and serve any person seeking admission "without charge or at a
charge . . .which does not exceed . . . such person's ability to pay" as determined by
state-defined criteria. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d) (1977). The presumptive compliance guide-
lines in turn operate as a ceiling on the state agency's power to set a dollar amount of
uncompensated service for any grantee hospital in any fiscal year. See id. § 53.111. The
applicability of the free care obligation is also limited to 20 years after the completion of
construction subsidized by Hill-Burton grants or guaranteed loans. Id. § 53.111(a). Both'
the presumptive compliance guidelines and the 20-year limitation were upheld as con-
sistent with the statute in Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550, 554-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). Accord, Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 968, 973-74 (5th
Cir. 1977).
137. See 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(g)(1) (1977) (first promulgated at 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,721
(1972)) (requiring state Hill-Burton agencies to set forth "criteria for identifying persons
unable to pay for services," based on such factors as family size and income, extent of
insurance coverage, and generally recognized standards of need, subject to HEW approval).
But see Rose, supra note 3, at 181-86 (discussing widespread state agency failure to
implement this regulation).
138. See 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f) (Oct. 1972) (amended 1975) (permitting hospitals to in-
clude as uncompensated services only those services to individuals whose eligibility under
Hill-Burton standards had been determined in writing "prior to any collection effort
other than the rendition of bills"). The effect of this provision was to permit hospitals
to choose a portion of their unpaid bills to write off as Hill-Burton free care, without
any prior notice to low-income patients that such a program was available. This result
was declared to be in violation of the statutory requirement to aid persons unable (as
opposed to unwilling) to pay in Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550,
557-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The provision as amended requires hospitals to make the de-
termination of eligibility "prior to the provision of such services." 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f)
(1977).
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no duty to low-income consumers to clarify or enforce its own regula-
tions,'139 much less to respond to repeated evidence of their inade-
quacy. The result was that hospitals generally continued their pre-
1972 practices: exclusion of Medicaid patients,140 failure to give ef-
fective notice of the program's existence, 141 failure to make advance
written determinations of eligibility, 42 and writing-off of various types
of losses (e.g., refusal of third-party payors to reimburse for unneces-
sary care) as "community service" to the poor.1
43
The need for judicial standards to evaluate agency and hospital
performance, and the difficulty of articulating them, was apparent in
the Cook. litigation in New Orleans. During the two years following
the initial 1970 complaint, which had documented the exclusion from
Hill-Burton hospitals of Medicaid beneficiaries in urgent need of
care,144 the responsible division of HEW-the Health Care Facilities
Service-had done nothing even to ascertain "the accuracy of the
factual allegations."'145 At the same time, HEW lawyers argued that
the court had no jurisdiction to order administrative enforcement of
the community service regulation, since enforcement "is a discre-
tionary function."' 4 16 Judge Comiskey responded to this bureaucratic
callousness by ruling that the Secretary's failure to prescribe regula-
tions protecting low-income consumers from discriminatory exclusion
was "in disregard of the provisions and intent of the Hill-Burton
Act ."14T
In reaching this result, Judge Comiskey took pains to use the
vocabulary of the formalist approach to administrative law. As noted
above, HEW's community service regulation required grantee hospitals
to furnish "a community service," defined by the agency as services
"available to the general public.' '1 48 The Secretary argued that this
only prohibited "'discriminatory admission practices resulting in an
absolute exclusion of certain segments of the public' "'149 and did not
speak to the issue of serving Medicaid patients. Responding in equally
139. See, e.g., Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 75-126-NA-CV (M.D. Tenn. June 1,
1978); Lugo v. Simon, No. C74-345 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 1978).
140. See Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 358 (E.D. La. 1972).
141. See Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 75-126-NA-CV, Memorandum at 24-28, 42-
50 (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 1978), discussed at pp. 282-84 infra.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 28-31; Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550, 557-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
144. See notes 104-06 supra (discussing plaintiffs' allegations in Cook).
145. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 366 (E.D. La. 1972).
146. Id. at 359.
147. Id. at 361.
148. 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1977) (nondiscrimination).
149. 61 F.R.D. at 360.
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formalist terms, Judge Comiskey noted that HEW's standard of "'ab-
solute exclusion of certain segments of the public' " seemed to apply
precisely to the exclusion of 100,000 New Orleans Medicaid recipients
from hospital services, and held that the Secretary had misinterpreted
his own regulations. °50 In August 1974, fifteen months after this ruling,
HEW finally acquiesced and issued an amended community service
regulation requiring grantee hospitals to accept payment from govern-
mental programs (such as Medicaid and Medicare) that reimburse for
services on the basis of actual or "reasonable" costs.151
In form, Judge Comiskey's ruling purported to find a mandatory
duty in the language of the statute and regulation. Responding to
HEW's argument that "enforcement" was a discretionary function,
Judge Comiskey pointed out that HEW itself had adopted a regulation
requiring Hill-Burton hospitals to "furnish a community service."
15 2
Having done so, he continued, HEW had a duty to enforce this obliga-
tion, which he understood "clearly" to prohibit exclusion of Medicaid
recipients from federally funded hospitals.153 The Hill-Burton Act
itself provided that the Surgeon General, with the approval of the
Secretary "shall by general regulations prescribe" the requirements of
the community service and free care assurances,"54 and the Secretary's
failure to do so, the court held, violated the Hill-Burton Act and was
therefore a basis for judicial enforcement. 155
Judge Comiskey's opinion reflects a bizarre dialogue between HEW
and the court in which each side remained committed to the vocabu-
lary of mandatory duty. The Secretary steadfastly maintained that the
regulatory text had virtually no meaning and therefore allowed com-
plete discretion, while the court held that the vague terms had a plain
meaning and dictated a specific result. The advantage of the court's
approach is its incorporation of the myth that the judge is not making
a policy decision, but it neglects a middle range of interpretation that
far more convincingly supports the court's conclusion.
Such an analysis would concede that, in enacting the original 1946
nondiscrimination provision and its successor 1964 requirement that
grantee hospitals be made available "to all persons residing in the
territorial area,"' 56 Congress obviously had no intent with respect to
150. Id.
151. 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(d)(2)(i) (1977) (promulgated at 39 Fed. Reg. 31,765, 31,767 (1974)).
152. 61 F.R.D. at 360.
153. Id.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
155. 61 F.R.D. at 361.
156. Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 603(e),
78 Stat. 447, 451 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1970)).
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Medicaid, which was not established until 1965.157 Nevertheless, the
legislative history of the 1964 amendment indicates congressional
awareness that the generally stated requirement of availability to "all
persons" might be interpreted, in later years, to refer to issues other
than racial discrimination. 158 Moreover, the legislative history of the
1946 Act reflected Congress's expectation-and the hospital industry's
assurance-that Hill-Burton hospitals would function as quasi-public
entities-i.e., as public assets performing a public, charitable func-
tion.159 Given this background, a court could easily conclude that the
Secretary had abused his discretion by permitting federally funded
hospitals. to exclude with no apparent justification the beneficiaries of
a federally funded health care program. This, indeed, was the real
basis of Judge Comiskey's decision, and glimpses of it occasionally
came to light in the midst of unconvincing assertions about the plain
meaning of the regulatory text.
The problem of discrimination against Medicaid recipients by
hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds is complicated both by hospitals'
economic incentives not to treat Medicaid patients and by the failure
of Hill-Burton legislation to anticipate the later passage of Medicaid.
Why do hospitals refuse to participate in the Medicaid program, if
indeed it pays them for their services on approximately the same basis
as Blue Cross and Medicare? No study of this question has been done,
but some hypotheses can be offered. Although federally funded
state Medicaid programs are required by federal law to reimburse
hospitals for inpatient services on the basis of industry-defined "rea-
sonable cost,"' 60 there are effectively no federal requirements on
minimum state Medicaid reimbursement for hospital outpatient ser-
vices and physicians' fees.'"' In many states Medicaid pays far less than
157. See note 1 supra.
158. See Hearings on H.R. 10041 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54 (1964).
159. See p. 268 supra.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(D) (1970); see 42 C.F.R. § 450.30(a)(2) (1977). See also S.
LAW, supra note 2, at 59-114 (discussing and criticizing "reasonable cost" as basis for
hospital reimbursement).
161. See 42 C.F.R. § 450.30(a)(7) (1977) (requiring state Medicaid programs to establish
fee structures "which are designed to enlist participation of a sufficient number of pro-
viders of services in the program so that eligible persons can receive the medical care
and services included in the plan at least to the extent these are available to the general
population"). This provision would appear to require the states to set fees for physicians'
and hospital outpatient services at levels at least roughly comparable to prices paid b%
the general population; in fact many states do not come close to meeting this standard,
and many Medicaid recipients have great difficulty finding physicians who will accept
their Medicaid cards. See MEDICAID BUREAU, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADM'N, DEP'T OF
HEWV, DATA ON THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY, SERVICES, EXPENDITURES: FISCAL YLRS
1966-77, at 22 (1977) (39 of 52 Medicaid programs limit reimbursement to physicians by fee
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the going market rate for outpatient and physician care, and this
generates a large financial disincentive for hospitals and doctors to
serve the Medicaid-eligible poor. 102 Moreover, many hospitals are
organized around physicians' private practices, which involve a net-
work of financial and social relationships in which the poor are not
welcome.163  In particular, physicians and others involved in the
hospital may oppose the diversion of resources into the outpatient
clinics and salaried positions that might be needed to provide services
to the poor.
In enacting the Hill-Burton Act in 1946, Congress probably did not
intend the federal government to be directly involved in these types
of decisions. At that time, Congress's dominant concern was the small
community with a single hospital, in which all economic classes would
be treated under the prevailing tradition of charitable care.1 4 If ad-
missions policies and patterns of medical practice needed to be regu-
lated, it was to be done by the state agencies, subject to federal super-
vision. But by the late 1960s, the economic, social, and administrative
basis of this vision had largely collapsed. The enormous growth in
third-party payment for hospital care (through Blue Cross, Medicare,
schedules and maximum payments in manner different from "customary and prevailing
charges" reimbursement used in Medicare program) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAID DATA];
Rosenblatt, Lurching Toward the Abyss: Medicaid Cutbacks and Health Care Inflation,
HEALTH L. PRoJEcT LIB. BULL, Nov. 1975, at 1, 3 (New Jersey Medical Society expects
most physicians to phase out their Medicaid practices after state reduction of 10%). HEW
itself admits that under its current regulations, "while there is an effective ceiling on
payment, there is no corresponding floor." MEDICAID DATA, suPra, at 18; cf. 42 C.F.R.
§ 450.30(a)(4).(b) (1977) (establishing upper limits for state payment for services); id.
§ 450.30(b) ("The State agency may pay less than the upper limits.")
162. See MEDICAID DATA, sulra note 161, at 19 (13 Medicaid programs pay for hospital
outpatient services on basis of "fee schedule'); id. at 22 (39 programs limit reimbursement
to physicians in manner different from Medicare). In Pennsylvania, for example, the
Medicaid fee is $12 for a hospital emergency room or outpatient visit, and $200 for
surgery "during any one illness." See 2 MEDICARE-MEDIcAiD GUIDE (CCH) 15,632, at
6589-7, 6590 (1978).
163. See, e.g., Campbell v. Mincey, 413 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd mem., 542
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1976) (woman giving birth refused treatment because not patient of
one of hospital's staff physicians); Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 364-
65 (E.D. La. 1972) (poor women denied treatment because they "did not have private
physicians"); cf. Meyer v. Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary, 330 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Mass.
1971) (physician prohibited by hospital from informing low-income clinic patients about
availability of "private" treatment).
164. See p. 264 supra. In 1947, the AHA's model hospital constitution and bylaws
provided that the "Attending Medical Staff shall have the care of all charity patients in
the hospital"; the Association's model rules and regulations provided that "[f]ree patients
shall be attended" by appropriate members of the medical staff and that "[n]o physician
shall receive any compensation for the care of any patient who is receiving free care by
the hospital." See Rose, supra note 3, at 171 n.18 (quoting AmERICAN Hosp. ASS'N, MODEL
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAws FOR VOLUNTARY HOSPITALS AND RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
THE MEDICAL STAFF (1947)). The current AHA MODEL BYLAws no longer contain these
provisions. Id. at 196 n.157.
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Medicaid, and private insurance) 6 5 and the sharply rising costs of such
care, 16 together with increased professional specialization and urban-
ization, had undermined the personalized, charitable relationships of
American small towns and medium-sized cities, which had been the
ideal, if not the reality, of an earlier era. The state agencies, moreover,
had proved totally incapable of addressing the modern problems of
health care delivery. The question for the courts was whether, in the
face of such changes, the federal agency had an obligation to low-
income consumers to revise its substantive and procedural standards
in a manner consistent with the statute's general goals.
The answer emerging in the most recent Hill-Burton litigation is
consistent with the concepts of entitlement and due process that have
already been developed in the areas of public assistance and public
housing.167 Under this approach, the courts claim little authority to
determine the substance of the redistributive obligation (i.e., the
actual dollar amount of the hospital's "reasonable volume" of free
care), but do claim the authority to regulate the process by which the
obligation is defined and administered. Thus two federal district courts
have ruled that regardless of the fact that hospitals can limit their
annual dollar volume of free care to ten percent of their Hill-Burton
grants, the resulting benefits must be distributed in accordance with
publicly defined service priorities and eligibility criteria. 165
The case confronting these issues most explicitly is Newsom v.
Vanderbilt University,'6 9 in which a class of low-income consumers
challenged the common hospital practice of deciding who was to re-
ceive Hill-Burton subsidies without the knowledge of the applicants
themselves and without any public standards for making the selection.
For example, the Director of Admissions of Vanderbilt University
Hospital admitted that an applicant was almost never told that he or
she was even being considered for uncompensated care. The reason,
he said, was that if people were told of the existence of such a program,
165. In Fiscal Year 1974, third-party payments accounted for 89.6% of expenditures
for hospital care, and 64.6% of total health care expenditures. In contrast, in 1950 third-
party payments comprised only 31.7% of total health care expenditures. HEALTH UNITED
STATES 1975, supra note 14, at 41-42.
166. See note 14 suPra.
167. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits);
Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (public housing rent increases).
168. See Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 359 F. Supp. 909, 916-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 75-126-NA-CV. slip op. at 50-52 (M.D. Tenn. June 1,
1978); cf. Gordon v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 708, 722 (M.D.N.C.
1975), modified, 544 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1976) (requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies).
169. No. 75-126-NA-CV (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 1978).
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they would tend to falsify information to make themselves eligible for
reduced fees. 170 Although this might be a realistic concern, the court
pointed out that it should be balanced against two other factors. First,
the record was "replete with evidence that applicants for admission are
led to believe, and realistically so, that they will be turned away if
they are perceived to be unable to pay.'-171 This led patients to over-
state their resources and thereby complicate the process used by the
hospital to allocate care to those most in need. Second, many people
who were eligible under the Hill-Burton standards were in fact denied
admission for financial reasons, with "nowhere else to turn for needed
treatment"'172 and with no notice of the existence of a program that
could possibly help them secure it.
Judge Morton ruled that the Hill-Burton income eligibility stan-
dards, as established by the states under federal guidelines, created a
consumer "entitlement" at least to a fair process for allocating limited,
subsidized care. 173 Such a fair process would, at a minimum, include
effective notice of the program's existence, written and public stan-
dards of decision, and an opportunity for a fair hearing regarding the
application of the standard to the individual case.174 The court con-
ceded that a hospital might be able to convince the administering
agencies that the disproportion between need and available resources
was so great that eligibility should be limited to particular kinds of
cases, services, or residents of particular areas, but ruled that such
decisions had to be made publicly and had to be made pursuant to
criteria defined by the agency.' 7x This position is consistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Morton v. Ruiz,'7" in which the Court
held that the Secretary of the Interior had the authority to restrict
eligibility for cash welfare assistance on Indian reservations more
narrowly than the outer confines of the statute, but that he had to
promulgate such restrictions publicly, with opportunity for comment,
through the rulemaking procedures of the APA.
177
Like other due process decisions concerning welfare 178 and public
housing, 79 the Newsom decision does not expand the resources avail-
170. Id., slip op. at 27.
171. Id. at 27-28.
172. Id. at 28.
173. Id. at 38-40.
174. Id. at 41-42, 50-52.
175. Id. at 39-43, 50-51.
176. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
177. Id. at 231-36; ee p. 256 & note 43 supra (APA rulemaking procedures).
178. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
179. See, e.g., Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holmes v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
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able to subsidize expensive hospital services. It is certainly possible
that, in the hands of a hostile or insensitive bureaucracy, due process
techniques could degenerate into empty rituals preceding the in-
evitable denial of care. On the other hand, articulated standards and
fair procedures have never been tried, and it is also possible that thcii
use will more fairly allocate limited resources to those patients most
in need. More importantly, by raising the visibility of the need for
hospital care, due process techniques may contribute to political efforts
to increase the amount of resources available. In this sense, structural
due process functions as a mode of political participation by requiring
the agenc.y to expose itself and the community to the facts and values
inherent in its decisions. This may in turn encourage the development
of an adequately funded, substantive entitlement to hospital care.
D. The Contributions and Limitations of Judicial Relief
A structural due process approach to the Hill-Burton Act developed
from an initial recognition of consumers as intended statutory bene-
ficiaries to the more complex decisions about the process through
which consumer interests should be considered. These seemingly pro-
cedural doctrinal developments have also contributed, at least to some
extent, to increases in tangible benefits to consumers.
At the local level, litigation has occasionally resulted in agreements
by hospitals to supply specified amounts of free care or to establish
new types of community-oriented health care services.' 80 Even greater
benefits in some localities have been achieved without litigation when
organized low-income consumers have persuaded hospitals and state
agencies to adopt programs and procedures responding to consumer
needs. 181 The fact that negotiations with hospitals and state agencies,
coupled with organized community pressure, have had success high-
lights, rather than reduces, the importance of the doctrinal develop-
ment of structural due process. The judicial recognition of consumer
interests under the Hill-Burton Act and the consequent threat of
180. See Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 356 n.1 (E.D. La. 1972)
(eight defendant hospitals ordered in consent decree to supply free and below-cost
services to persons unable to pay therefor in amounts ranging from $34,000 to $230,000
annually); National Health Law Program, Hospital Staff Physicians Agree to Accept
Hospital Medicaid Patient Referrals to Fulfill Hill-Burton "Community Service" Require-
ment, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 787 (1977). But see Claire v. Centre Community Hosp., No.
78-636 (Ct. C.P. Centre County, Pa., filed Mar. 15, 1978).
181. For discussions of various organizing efforts see Pastreich, A Report on Health
Care Organization in Massachusetts: Union and Comnmnity Unite Around Health Care,
HEALTH L. PROJECT LiB. BULL., Apr. 1977, at 1; Sparer, Legal Services and Social Change,
HEALTH L. PROJEcT LIB. BULL., Feb. 1977, at 1.
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litigation have strengthened the position of consumers in nonjudicial
negotiation.
At the national level, consumer litigation and advocacy concerning
the Hill-Burton Act have resulted in several important new legislative
provisions. In enacting the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974, 12 Congress phased out Hill-Burton's orig-
inal grant program and established a new health facilities construc-
tion program as Title XVI of the Public Health Service Act. 83 The
Hill-Burton requirements that grantee institutions provide a com-
munity service and a reasonable volume of free care remain in the
new act,8 4 and the administrative and judicial enforcement mecha-
nisms are strengthened. Recognizing the massive failure of HEW and
the state agencies to enforce the Hill-Burton requirements,8 5 Congress
shifted most enforcement responsibilities to the federal government' "
and explicitly recognized a private right of action to enforce provider
compliance. 87 Yet even this explicit and strengthened legislative man-
date does not eliminate the need for judicial development of due
process techniques. For nearly four years after the effective date of the
new act, HEW again failed to develop even proposed regulations for
its implementation. This failure ended in a consent decree in Lugo v.
Simon,188 in which HEW committed itself to issue new regula-
tions according to a definite timetable and in consultation with
consumers. 189
The Hill-Burton experience thus shows some consumer success in
gaining new legislation, regulatory specificity, and due process protec-
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (Supp. V 1975).
183. Id. §§ 300o to 300o-3.
184. Id. § 300o-3(b)(I)(J).
185. S. RP. No. 1285, subra note 96, at 7900 (citing GAO report indicating "sorry
performance by the Department (of HEW%] and the State Hill-Burton agencies in imple-
menting a provision which has been in law for over 20 years").
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 300p-2(c) (Supp. V 1975) ("Secretary [of HEW] shall investigate
and ascertain, on a periodic basis . . . the extent of compliance . . . with the assurances
required to be made" when assistance received); id. § 300o-1:
The Secretary shall by regulation . . . prescribe the general manner in which each
entity which receives financial assistance under this subchapter or has received
financial assistance under [the new or the old Hill-Burton provisions] shall be re-
quired to comply with the assurances required to be made at the time such assistance
was received and the means by which such entity shall be required to demonstrate
compliance with such assurances.
187. See id. § 300p-2(c) ("fain appropriate action to effectuate compliance" with
Hill-Burton assurances "may be brought by a person other than the Secretary [of HEW]"
only if complaint was filed with Secretary and rejected or "Attorney General has not
brought a civil action for compliance" within six months of date complaint filed with
Secretary).
188. No. C 74-345 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 1978) (stipulation between plaintiffs and de-
fendant Secretary of HEW).
189. Id.
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tions, as well as in increasing the amount of available hospital care. It is
nevertheless clear that major problems remain: agency delay and non-
enforcement continue, as do exclusionary practices regarding Medicaid
patients, requirements of cash deposits for hospital admission, and
failure to inform patients of potential eligibility for Hill-Burton
benefits.
In the long run, it is clear that the Hill-Burton program cannot
function as a substitute for a progTessively financed system of public
subsidy and regulation. The receipt of a construction grant years ago
does not supply a hospital with current operating funds, and even
Hill-Burton "write-offs" must be paid for, usually by inflating charges
to increasingly small categories of privately paying patients.190 The
long-term significance of the Hill-Burton program is thus not as a
source of funds, but as a source of a principle-that government
agencies and publicly funded hospitals are not islands of standardless
discretion and autonomy, but rather institutions accountable to the
beneficiaries of their operations.
III. Medicaid: Entitlement and the Right to
Participate in Policymaking
The federal medical assistance program (Medicaid), enacted in 1965
as Title XIX of the Social Security Act,' 9 ' represented, together with
Medicare,' 9 2 the second generation of major federal health care legis-
190. In Fiscal Year 1976, only 9% of the $55.4 billion spent for hospital care was paid
directly by patients; the remaining 91% was paid by government, private health in.
surance, philanthropy, and industry. HEALTH RESOURCES ADNI'N, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
DEP'T OF HEW, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1976-1977 CHARTBOOK 4 (1977). The practice of
charging privately paying patients (including some patients covered by private health
insurance plans) fees in excess of "reasonable cost" was upheld in Borland v. Bayonne
Hosp., 122 N.J. Super. 387, 300 A.2d 584 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973), aff'd per curiain, 136
N.J. Super. 60, 344 A.2d 331 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 72 N.J. 152, 369 A.2d I
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817 (1977). Cf. Borland v. McDonough, 135 N.J. Super. 200,
343 A.2d 97 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), a!f'd, 72 N.J. 152, 369 A.2d 1 (1977) (upholding
decision of commissioners of health and insurance to exclude costs of indigent care from
"reasonable costs" paid by Blue Cross to hospitals and permitting costs of indigent care
to be imposed by hospitals solely on privately paying patients).
191. Medicaid Act, supra note 1.
192. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1801-1875, 79 Stat. 286
(1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395pp (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). Medicare is a
program of hospital and medical insurance for the aged, financed by federal payroll taxes
and administered by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), in part through
contracts with "fiscal intermediaries" such as Blue Cross. See generally S. Ltw, supra note
2, at 31-50. Medicaid is a program of medical assistance for the poor, financed by general
revenue taxes at the federal, state, and local levels, and administered by the federal
Medicaid Bureau (within HCFA) and by state Medicaid agencies. See generally R. STEVENS
& R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AER CA (1974); Rosenblatt, Book Comment, 44 U.
CIN. L. REV. 643, 647-57 (1975).
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lation for the benefit of low-income consumers. Like the Hill-Burton
program, Medicaid was a response to perceived failures in the eco-
nomic and political "market" of health care delivery: the economic
inability of poor persons to purchase quality health services and
the political inability of state and local governments to establish ra-
tional, comprehensive medical assistance programs. In enacting the
Medicaid statute, Congress sought to provide adequate health care
for the poor and, more ambitiously, to end the traditional segrega-
tion of poor patients in understaffed, fragmented, and generally in-
ferior institutions. Following the administrative pattern developed in
the Hill-Burton and other federal-state social welfare programs, Medi-
caid was to remedy these problems by providing federal matching
grants to state agencies conditioned on important reforms in the fi-
nancing and practice of health care for the poor.
A. Congressional Intent and Judicial Response: Health Care
as a Substantive and Procedural Entitlement
Prior to 1965, governmental health care programs for the poor were
primarily a local function, often linked conceptually and organiza-
tionally to cash welfare assistance. State statutes typically authorized,
but did not require, counties and municipalities to spend a portion
of their tax revenues on health care for the poor, either by construct-
ing and operating public hospitals or by purchasing care in the pri-
vate sector. 193 Decisions about who to make eligible, what services
to provide, and how much to pay for them were generally discre-
tionary with each locality, and the outcomes were determined not
by assessment of the medical needs of the poor, but rather by con-
sideration of the limitations in the local welfare budget and of pre-
vailing concepts of appropriate care for deserving indigent patients.
9 4
The result of such government programs and of practices in the
private market was a health care system explicitly stratified along
the lines of social and economic class. The larger cities often had
(and continue to have) two separate sets of health care institutions:
public hospitals and clinics for the poor, and private, nonprofit hos-
pitals (with associated private physician practices) for those who could
193. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH 8- SAFETY CODE § 1445 (West 1970); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:5-1
to -18 (West 1940 & Supp. 1978). But cf. MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 117, § 24A (Michie/Law.
Co-op 1965) (amended 1969) (town boards liable for the necessary medical expenses of
indigents until 1969, after which Commonwealth became directly liable).
194. See, e.g., Higdon v. Boning, 121 N.J. Super. 276, 296 A.2d 569 (Juv. & Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1972) (court overrules township welfare director's determination that needed physical
therapy is too "sophisticated" for coverage by local welfare program).
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afford to pay. 195 Even if a private hospital admitted poor patients,
as many did, there were sharp distinctions made within the institu-
tion, with poor patients in the ward, middle-income patients in semi-
private rooms, and elite patients in private accommodations. Whether
the tracking took place among or within institutions, the consequences
were similar: underfunded, fragmented, crisis-oriented care for the
poor-often organized around the educational needs of the medical pro-
fession-compared with, at least in theory, comprehensive, patient-
centered care for the middle and upper classes. 190
The original goal of the Medicaid program was nothing less than
the eventual elimination of inferior, dual track health care for the
poor and the incorporation of the poor into mainstream or middle-
class patterns of hospital and medical service.197 The program's gen-
eral strategy was to provide poor persons with the equivalent of a
voucher or credit card enabling them to leave the traditional charity
wards and clinics and to purchase high quality services in the private
health care market. The precise terms of these health care benefits
were to be set by state Medicaid agencies operating under two re-
lated types of federal standards: substantive provisions defining the
scope of eligibility and services and procedural provisions establish-
ing how the states were to exercise their policy discretion.
The administrative centerpiece of this complex reform effort was
the statutory requirement that each participating state establish a uni-
form, state-wide medical assistance program embodied in a federally
approved "state plan." Unlike prior medical assistance programs, the
basic elements of the state plan were mandated by federal law, and
its optional features were regulated by federal standards. For example,
195. See Rosenblatt, sukra note 192, at 644-45; E. Sparer, Class Medicine, Part 11
(forthcoming book 1978); cf. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (tax-exempt status of
hospital upheld, even though no indigent patients served).
196. See, e.g., Greater Washington D.C. Area Council of Senior Citizens V. District of
Columbia Government, No. 275-71 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 1975) (public hospital, serving in-
digents, "fell far short of recognized and acceptable standards in this community");
Meyer v. Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary, 330 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (D. Mass. 1971)
(physician-plaintiff alleges that "[i]n contrast to the quality personalized attention afforded
private patients," "clinic" patients receive inferior treatment and are exposed to greater
risks for experimental and educational purposes without their informed consent).
197. Congressional concern that the state programs should provide comprehensive,
high-quality benefits was embodied most prominently in § 1903(e) of the original federal
statute, which required the states to broaden available services and eligibility under their
plans so as to provide by 1975 "comprehensive care and services to substantially all in-
dividuals who meet the plan's eligibility standards." Medicaid Act, supra note I, § 1903(c),
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(e) (1970) (repealed 1972). HEW interpreted this and other provisions of
the Act to mean that "the medical and remedial care and services made available to
recipients ...[should] be of high quality and in no way inferior to that enjoyed by the
rest of the population." HEW, Handbook of Public Assistance Adm'n, Supplement D,
Medical Assistance Program § 5140 [hereinafter cited as Supplement D].
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the state plans were required to include five basic services (inpatient
hospital, outpatient hospital, laboratory and x-ray, skilled nursing
home care, and physicians' services) and could, at the state's option,
include a wide range of additional services (e.g., drugs, dental services,
eyeglasses, and hearing aids).'9 8 The states still had some discretion
to set physician fees in the light of limited funds, but reimbursement
had to be at least high enough "to enlist participation of a sufficient
number of providers in the program so that eligible persons can
receive the medical care and services included in the plan at least
to the extent these are available to the general population." 19 9 Simi-
larly, although the states had some discretion to limit the amount
of service within any given category (e.g., the number of physician
office visits, hospital days, etc.), HEW regulations required that all
services included in the state plan be "sufficient in amount, duration
and scope to reasonably achieve their purpose." 200 The states' discre-
tion, in other words, had to be exercised in a manner consistent with
the substantive goals of the program, described by HEW in terms of
Congress's "very clear ... intent that the medical and remedial care
and services made available to recipients under Title XIX be of high
quality and in no way inferior to that enjoyed by the rest of the
population."'
201
To achieve this ambitious goal, the Medicaid statute relied on open-
ended federal matching funds and on two legal devices: administra-
tive enforcement and individual entitlement. Administrative enforce-
ment was to be achieved by federal agency review of state plans and
operations, with a possible sanction of withdrawal of federal funds
following notice, a hearing, and an HEW finding of state noncom-
pliance with federal law.20 2 Individual recipients were given some
degree of entitlement to program benefits through requirements that
the state agencies provide program benefits "with reasonable prompt-
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
199. Supplement D, suPra note 197, at § D-5320.
200. 42 C.F.R. § 449.10(a)(5)(i) (1977); see Butler, State Limits on the Amount, Scope,
and Duration of Seruices under Medicaid, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 456 (1977) (general dis-
cussion of regulation).
201. Supplement D, supra note 197, at § D-5140.
202. To obtain funds, a state had to submit its state plan to the Secretary of HEW for
approval. Medicaid Act, supra note 1, § 1901, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970) (amended 1973). The
Secretary was directed to approve a state plan if it met numerous substantive and ad-
ministrative requirements, and maintained the level of state funding for medical as-
sistance established in prior programs. Id. §§ 1902(b), (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(b), (c) (1970).
After initial federal approval, the Secretary was required to discontinue all or part of the
federal funding if he found, after notice and a hearing, that the state plan no longer
conformed to federal standards, or if in its administration it failed "to comply sub-
stantially" with federal law. Id. § 1904, 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (1970).
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ness to all eligible individuals"20 3 and grant a "fair hearing" to any
individual whose claim for medical assistance was denied or not acted
upon.20 4 State agencies were also required by HEW regulation to
include Medicaid recipients and other consumers (as well as pro-
viders) in the policymaking process through formation of "medical
care advisory committees," which were to be given "adequate oppor-
tunity for meaningful participation in policy development and pro-
gram administration. 20 5
On its face, the Medicaid statute thus distinguished between two
types of interests with different methods of enforcement. Federal re-
quirements for state programs were defined as a federal governmental
interest t6 be enforced through administrative findings and sanctions
and to be subject to judicial review at the request of the state agency
involved.20 6 In contrast, factually accurate application of federal and
state standards in individual cases was seen as a recipient interest to
be enforced through administrative appeals known as "fair hear-
ings. '20 But the statute did not clearly address a crucial intermediate
issue: the extent to which state compliance with federal law is not
only a federal governmental interest, but also a recipient interest
to be protected by administrative due process and judicial relief.
In Goldberg v. Kelly20 8 and Rosado v. Wyman, 20 9 the Supreme Court
addressed this question in the context of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children, a program with entitlement and enforcement pro-
visions that are very similar to those of Medicaid.2 10 In Goldberg the
Court held that the federal and state statutes defining welfare eligi-
bility created a "statutory entitlement ' 211 and that, as a result, state
agency procedures for terminating or reducing individual grants had
to comply with the constitutional norms of procedural due process.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Goldberg and implemented
by HEW regulations, 212 procedural due process in this context in-
203. Id. § 1902(a)(8), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (1970).
204. Id. § 1902(a)(3) , 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (1970).
205. 42 C.F.R. § 446.10(a)(3) (1977).
206. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (1970) (Secretary's enforcement powers).
207. Id. § 1396a(a)(3) (1970); cf. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some
Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness
in the Adjudication of Social Welfare ClaimS, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772 (1974) (argument
that fairness in social welfare adjudications requires not only hearings, but better man-
agement); Project, Procedural Due Process and the Welfare Recipient: A Statistical Study
of AFDC Fair Hearings in Wisconsin, 1978 Wis. L. Rav. 145 (empirical study questioning
effectiveness of adjudicatory hearings as presently conducted in welfare context).
208. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
209. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
210. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); note 202 supra.
211. 397 U.S. at 262.
212. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1977).
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cludes a. right to prior notice of agency action to terminate or reduce
benefits, and to a hearing prior to agency action in which to present
evidence and argument, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to
receive a decision based on the evidence and applicable law.
In Rosado v. Wyman, the Court took the concept of statutory en-
titlement one step further, and held that recipients had an affirmative
federal cause of action to enforce the federal statute against non-
complying state legislation and policy.2 13 The Court rejected the view
that federal statutory standards were simply commands to federal and
state agencies, and held that since HEW had failed to provide re-
cipients with any remedial process for challenging either state or
federal agency decisions, 214 exhaustion of (nonexistent) administrative
remedies was not required and administrative sanctions could be sup-
plemented with direct judicial relief.21 5 In two later cases, federal dis-
trict courts applied Rosado's reasoning to the Medicaid program and
enjoined the state of New York from reducing its medical benefits
without complying with federal statutory standards.2 1 6
What neither Goldberg, Rosado, nor the subsequent Medicaid cases
made clear, however, was whether the federal standards meant that
the state agencies had to follow any procedural requirements when
engaged in policymaking, as distinguished from adjudication. Under
the APA, affected individuals and organizations have the right to
participate in federal agency policymaking prior to final decisions in
a variety of specific ways.217 Does the concept of entitlement mean that
recipients also have a right to participate in the state policymaking
process prior to final decision in addition to the right granted in
Rosado to challenge the state's decision after the fact in federal court?
As long as the federal Medicaid statute tightly constrained state discre-
tion, the right to federal court action against noncomplying state
policy was at least roughly sufficient protection for recipient interests.
But as Congress granted the states greater leeway in the late 1960s and
early 1970s the question of what procedures, if any, the states must
follow in exercising their discretion-particularly, how much oppor-
tunity they must give recipients to participate in their decisionmaking
and to comment on proposed action-became important to the future
213. 397 U.S. at 405-06, 420-23.
214. Id. at 406; cf. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (ordering HEW to permit welfare recipients to participate in federal
review of state agency compliance with federal law).
215. 397 U.S. at 405-06 & n.8.
216. See Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bass v. Rockefeller, 331
F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
217. See note 370 infra.
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of the Medicaid program. Since the APA requirements of public
participation in rulemaking do not apply to the state agencies, the
answers had to be derived either from constitutional sources or from
the Medicaid statute itself.
2 1 8
B. Congress's Revised Intent: Cost Control and
State Agency Decisionmaking
In the Social Security Amendments of 1972,219 Congress significant-
ly modified its earlier goal of improving health care for the poor and
focused instead on ways of limiting federal and state expenditures.
Reliance was placed primarily on two devices: "utilization review"-
i.e., programs to review physicians' decisions to treat patients in hos-
pitals and nursing homes220-and expanded state discretion to eliminate
covered services, to impose cost-sharing charges on recipients, and to
reduce provider reimbursement.
221
The shift in Medicaid's main goal from expansion to retrenchment
has roots in the program's two major structural features: significant
state and local financing and reliance on the private health care mar-
ket. Regressive property and sales taxes created pressures in most states
to keep eligibility levels low and provided a potent political base for
218. State administrative procedure acts may also provide recipients with a right to
notice of and participation in state agency rulemaking. In many states, however, such
rights are not accorded to Medicaid and welfare recipients either as a matter of law or
practice. Ashman, Representation for the Poor in State Rulemahing, 24 VAND. L. REV. 1,
21-23, 24-27 (1970); see Gray Panthers v. YeIdell, No. 3017-76 (D.C. Apr. 22, 1976), re-
printed in 10 CLEXEINCHOUSE REV. 137 (1976) (challenging Medicaid program reductions
on grounds of failure of local agency to comply with District of Columbia Administrative
Procedure Act).
219. Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972).
220. See Price, Katz & Provence, An Advocate's Guide to Utilization Review, 11 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 307, 308 n.6 (1977) (discussing provisions of 1972 Amendments concerning
utilization review). Such programs have become enormously complex. Although the thrust
of the 1972 Amendments was to require hospitals and physicians' organizations under
contract to HEW (known as Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs)) to
assess the necessity of hospital or nursing home care prior to, or concurrently with, its
delivery, state Medicaid agencies and fiscal intermediaries such as Blue Cross continue to
deny payment retrospectively (i.e., after services have been rendered) on the ground that
the care or type of institution was not "medically necessary." Id. at 314-15; see S. L.w,
supra note 2, at 115-44; Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Oils
in Medical Care. The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 58-60 (1975).
221. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 208(a), 86 Stat.
1329, 1381 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(14) (Supp. V 1975)) (authorizing the states
to impose nominal cost-sharing charges on recipients); id. § 230 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396b(e) (Supp. V 1975)) (repealing § 1903(e)) (states no longer required to broaden
scope of services and eligibility); id. § 231 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(d) (Supp. V
1975)) (repealing § 1902(d), which had required states to obtain HEW ruling that they
had implemented utilization review program as defined by federal standards before being
permitted to reduce scope of services under their plans).
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periodic campaigns against the program's escalating costs. 222 Reliance
on the private sector for delivery of services, however, insured that
these costs would be high; between 1967 and 1971, for example, phy-
sicians' fees rose 6.7% annually, 50% ahead of the general consumer
price index, while hospitals' "reasonable costs" rose 13.5% annually,
200% ahead of the index.223 Cost inflation and the rising numbers of
recipients caused Medicaid expenditures nearly to double from fiscal
years 1968 to 1971.22
-4
The concern of the federal and state legislatures with rising costs
was compounded by the administrative incapacity of the state agen-
cies and of HEW itself. The report of HEW's own prestigious Task
Force on Medicaid and Related Programs, issued in June 1970, sharp-
ly pointed out the weaknesses of the federal Medicaid agency: under-
staffing, a posture of "passive monitoring" of the state programs, and
a general failure to use Medicaid's purchasing power to expand access,
control costs, or improve the quality of health care for the poor.225
The consequences of these failures were serious. In 1969, after three
years of Medicaid, New York City's Piel Commission found conditions
in the city's hospitals and clinics still to be "deplorable" and part of
a "double standard of medical care: a reasonably adequate standard
for the well-off and a desperately inadequate standard for the poor." 226
In these circumstances, the loudly voiced concern of the federal and
state legislatures for "cost control" is highly ambivalent. On the one
hand, many legislators are simply interested in holding down govern-
ment expenditures by the quickest and politically easiest means-i.e.,
reducing the number of eligible persons and the scope of services
provided under the program.2 27 On the other hand, many other legis-
lators are aware that the program's high costs are caused primarily
by waste, inefficiency, and inflation, and that health care providers
are overwhelmingly responsible for these problems.228 From this per-
222. See, e.g., R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra note 192, at 111-12, 124 n.38.
223. On inflation rates, see C. SCHULTZE, E. FRIED, A. RiVLIN & N. TEETERS, SETTING
NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1973 BUDGET 227 (1972). On rising Medicaid expenditures, see R.
STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra note 192, at 183-94, 261.
224. See MEDICAID DATA, supra note 161, at 26, 29 (excluding administrative costs,
increase in combined federal-state expenditures was from $3.2 billion in 1968 to $6.35
billion in 1971, during which period recipients increased from 12 million to 17.9 million
persons). By 1976, program expenditures totaled $13.9 billion for 23.8 million recipients.
Id.
225. HEW, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAID AND RELATED PROG-MS 63-64
(1970) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
226. REPORT AND STAFF STUDIES OF THE COMMISSION ON THE DELIVERY OF PERSONAL
HEALTH SERVICES, COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES FOR NEW YORK CITY 19 (1969).
227. See R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, suPra note 192, at 115, 213 (discussing examples).
228. Id. at 214.
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spective, the appropriate method of cost control is not to reduce bene-
fits to the poor, but rather to seek to use Medicaid's purchasing and
regulatory power to reform the health care delivery system.2 29 The
ambivalent mood was reflected in the Senate Finance Committee's re-
port on the 1972 amendments giving the states greater discretion to
reduce program benefits. The Finance Committee stated that it
does not expect that [this amendment] will result in large-scale
cut-backs in benefits under the medicaid program, but it does
believe that [it] will provide States with greater flexibility to de-
sign their programs to meet effectively the needs of their people
for medical care within the fiscal constraints faced by given States
from time-to-time.
230
In theory, at least, Congress was still committed to a preference for
cost control through improved efficiency in health care delivery, and
the requirement that the states provide mandatory and optional ser-
vices in sufficient amount, duration, and scope reasonably to achieve
their purpose remained in force. Political pressures in the states for
fast savings, however, resulted in a widespread policy of cost control
through program reductions. 231 As the states began to cut back Medi-
caid benefits in the mid-1970s, low-income consumers sought judicial
relief against alleged arbitrariness of agency procedures and asserted
their right to participate in state Medicaid decisionmaking. In making
these claims, consumers argued that their "right" to have state actions
conform to federal law extends not only to the substance of state policy,
but to the policymaking process as well.
C. The Application of Structural Due Process to
Medicaid Policy: The 1975-1976 Cutbacks
The limits of the states' new discretion were tested in 1975 and 1976,
when twenty-three states undertook reductions in their Medicaid pro-
grams.232 Despite the Senate Finance Committee's professed expecta-
tions, these cutbacks were on a large scale and had severe consequences
for low-income consumers. Connecticut, for example, sought to save
229. The clearest official expression of this view appeared in TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 225, at 2-4, 26-52.
230. S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1972) (discussing repeal of Medicaid
Act § 1902(d)). In a similar vein, Senator Long, chairman of the Finance Committee, de-
fended the amendment on the grounds that it would allow states to reduce their program
expenditures when, "by good administration and careful review of patient care, .
they can give better care at less cost." 118 CONG. Rc. 33,899 (1972).
231. See MED IAm DATA, supra note 161, at 14-18.
232. See id.
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$2.3 million by a ten-percent across-the-board reduction in fees to most
health care providers, the elimination of all adult dental care except
in emergencies, and the elimination of adult benefits for eyeglasses,
podiatry, and private duty nursing.2 33 Ohio went even further, seeking
to eliminate all nonprescription drugs and therapeutic tranquilizers
such as Valium, most medical supplies, all transportation except emer-
gency ambulance services, and a wide range of other benefits including
dental, optometric, psychological, and physical therapy services.2 34
The Ohio cutbacks were challenged in federal court in Benton v.
Rhodes, 23  which presented a typical clash of views between Medicaid
recipients and the state agency. The Ohio Medicaid recipients chal-
lenged the announced reductions on numerous grounds: the inade-
quacy of the state's notice to recipients, the failure to provide an
opportunity for hearings prior to implementation of the reductions,
the failure to consult with the Medical Care Advisory Committee, the
elimination of arguably mandatory services, and the restriction of
optimal and mandatory services to levels insufficient in amount, dura-
tion, and scope reasonably to achieve their purposes. The state agency
took issue with all of these contentions, and argued in particular that
its notice had been adequate, that the Medical Care Advisory Com-
mittee had been consulted, and that no hearings were mandated by
federal law.
Faced with the recipients' claim for individualized trial-type hear-
ings prior to state program changes, and the state's argument that no
hearing was required either before or after such changes, the district
court in Benton, and federal district courts in similar cases brought
in other states naturally looked to the HEW notice and hearing regu-
lations to resolve the issue. As to notice, the federal regulations clearly
require the state agencies to provide advance individual notice to all
Medicaid recipients regarding program changes. 23G The rationale for
individual notice about program changes is partly to convey neces-
sary information to recipients about the scope of their medical cov-
233. See Robinson v. Maher, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH) 27,707, at 9051-52 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 1976).
234. See Benton v. Rhodes, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH) 28,025 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 1976), rev'd, No. 76-2177 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978). The
consequences of these reductions were alleged to be serious by recipients who challenged
them: without Valium, for example, patients with spinal cord injuries would be unable
to control muscle spasms that, according to a specialist physician "could be violent enough
to throw a person out of a chair." Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees at 2, Benton v. Rhodes, No.
76-2177 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978).
235. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 28,025 (S.D. Ohio
May 11, 1976), rev'd, No. 76-2177 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978).
236. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(3)-(5) (1977).
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erage and to give recipients who are relying on existing benefits
at least some opportunity "to plan for the cut, and to the extent
possible adjust to it."237 But the notice requirement is also designed
to inform recipients about the opportunity for a hearing, and the
question of whether pre-reduction hearings should extend to issues
of policy as well as to disputes about individual circumstances has been
difficult and controversial.
The applicable HEW regulations are not, as one court put it, "ex-
amples of clarity. 2 38 The pertinent regulations contain a general rule
that a hearing shall be granted "to any recipient who is aggrieved by
any agency action resulting in . . . reduction . . . or termination of
assistance." "A hearing need not be granted," however, "when either
State or Federal law require [sic] automatic grant adjustments for
classes of recipients unless the reason for an individual appeal is in-
correct grant computation."2 39 The regulations also state that agencies
may consolidate individual hearing requests into a group hearing "only
[in] cases in which the sole issue involved is one of State or Federal
law or policy or changes in State or Federal law." 240 This provision sup-
ports an argument that recipients are entitled at least to a "group
hearing" even when individual circumstances are not at issue, and that
hearings may only be denied for a limited subclass of changes in state
or federal law that can be characterized as "automatic grant adjust-
ments. ' 241 The issues are further complicated by the regulation's focus
on "grant computation," which by its terms applies only to cash as-
sistance programs, 24 2 and by confusing statements in the preface to the
regulation about whether or not hearings need to be held concerning
policy changes.
243
Despite the lack of clarity in the HEW regulations, the federal dis-
trict court in Benton concluded that Ohio's cutbacks violated them
in several ways. The court found that Ohio's notice had been deficient
because it had failed to inform affected recipients of an opportunity
for a hearing in which to show "that the facts of [the recipient's] case
237. Rochester v. Baganz, 479 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 1973).
238. Jennings v. Solomon, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH) C 28,105, at 10,397 (D. Md. Nov. 4, 1976).
239. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5) (1977).
240. Id. § 205.10(a)(5)(iv).
241. See Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F. Supp. 546, 553-54 & n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
242. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5) (1977), discussed in Jennings v. Solomon, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 28,105, at 10,396 (D. Md. Nov. 4,
1976).
243. See Jennings v. Solomon, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICID GUIDE
(CCH) 28,105, at 10,396-97 (D. Md. Nov. 4, 1976) (describing regulations and comments
of HEW, on issue, see 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005 (1973), as "not examples of clarity").
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are not caught by the proposed changes" in the state program,244 and
that the state's Medical Care Advisory Committee "was not adequately
and timely informed by the Department concerning the proposed policy
changes, nor given adequate input into the policy-making process." 245
As to hearings, the court held in effect that the issuance of a state rule
reducing Medicaid benefits was nearly simultaneous with "applica-
tion" of the rule to individuals receiving ongoing treatment, since
providers would probably respond to the reduction by terminating
services or by demanding payment for them. In this context, in-
dividuals had a Goldberg right to prior notice and a hearing, not on
the validity or wisdom of the rule itself, but on its application to their
individual circumstances. 246 Since the state agency had not provided
notice of or opportunity for such a prior hearing, the court enjoined
any Medicaid reductions until adequate notice had been given and
until the Medical Care Advisory Committee had been given an
"adequate opportunity for meaningful participation in the reduction
decision."
247
The district court's ruling in Benton was a response to three types
of recipient claims raised in the case that are typical of challenges to
state program reductions. Some recipients argue that a reduction does
not in its own terms apply to their individual circumstances. For ex-
ample, a recipient might present factual evidence to show that a needed
medical device is a "brace," and therefore covered under the state
program, rather than an "orthopedic shoe" no longer included as a
Medicaid benefit. 248 Other recipients argue that although the new
regulation in terms applies to them, it cannot validly be so applied be-
cause of their legal status or other legally relevant facts based on their
individual circumstances. Thus a child might contend that she is
eligible for dental services not provided to adults because the federal
Medicaid Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment pro-
gram makes such services mandatory for her.249 Finally, many recipients
244. Benton v. Rhodes, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
28,025, at 10,142 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 1976), rev'd, No. 76-2177 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978).
245. Id. at 10,143.
246. Although the plaintiffs argued that the HEW regulations required prior hearings
on policy issues, see Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10, Benton v. Rhodes, [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICm GUIDE (CCH) 28,025 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 1976),
the district court ruled that such hearings were only needed for the application of policy
to individual circumstances, Benton v. Rhodes, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 28,025; at 10,142 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 1976), rev'd, No. 76-2177
(6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978).
247. Id. at 10,144; accord, Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F. Supp. 546, 558 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (as
to notice requirement); Becker v. Toia, 439 F. Supp. 324, 329-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (as to
notice and advisory committee requirements).
248. See Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F. Supp. 546, 553-54 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
249. See 42 C.F.R. § 441.52(b)(2) (1977).
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argue that the new regulation cannot be validly enforced with respect
to anyone under governing federal standards, or that it should not be
adopted as a matter of policy. For example, Medicaid recipients in
Pennsylvania sought to show that widespread fraud and abuse in the
provision of orthopedic shoes could be remedied by less drastic means
than complete elimination of the covered service. 250 In Benton, the dis-
trict court held that the first two types of claims constituted adjudica-
tion subject to prior individual notice and hearing and that the third
involved the state rulemaking process governed by the requirement
that the state agencies consult with recipients and providers on the
Medical Care Advisory Committee.
In Benton and other federal cases, recipients' need for immediate
relief to forestall impending program reduction led litigants to focus
their claims around the two federal requirements of hearing and
consultation. Since most state agencies had omitted any mention of
hearings from their notices and had failed to consult with their ad-
visory committees, either defect (or both) often resulted in a prelim-
inary injunction halting the announced reductions .251 Judicially im-
posed delay in turn encouraged more careful consideration of state
policy. Budget figures showing the existence of a fiscal "crisis," for
example, sometimes turned out on close examination to be substantially
erroneous or to be the result of cash flow problems that could be
remedied without service reductions. Expanded participation by Med-
ical Care Advisory Committees sometimes led to innovative suggestions
on how to reduce program costs or increase revenues without cutbacks
in needed services . 52 Even when program reductions were considered
necessary, judicial intervention tended to raise the political visibility
of the recipients' claims and so increase the incentive for state agencies
and legislatures to take the interests of recipients into account.
Although the district court decisions in Ohio and other states granted
recipients immediate relief from program cutbacks, their reliance on
the federal hearing and advisory committee regulations left them
vulnerable to later attack. As discussed above, HEW's position on
when state agencies had to provide notice of and opportunity for a
pre-reduction hearing for class-wide changes was anything but clear.
The district courts' efforts to make sense of the tortured HEW
language resulted in decisions that required hearings on individual
250. Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F. Supp. 546, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
251. See, e.g., note 247 supra (citing cases); Robinson v. Maher, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 27,707, at 9053 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 1976).
252. See Robinson v. Maher, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDIcAiD GUIDE
(CCH) 27,707, at 9053 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 1976).
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circumstances of fact and law in the context of state rulemaking. The
decisions were thus vulnerable to reversal on the basis of the general
due process doctrine that prior hearings are not required when gov-
ernmental agencies act in a "legislative" or policymaking capacity. 53
Similarly, the advisory committee regulation, though cast in manda-
tory language, rested on such general phrases as "adequate opportunity
for meaningful participation."2 4 The absence of an articulated theory
of recipient participation in state agency decisionmaking created the
danger that the district courts' decisions would be dismissed as simply
a "misreading" of HEW and congressional intent.
That danger materialized in the Sixth Circuit's decision reversing the
district court's injunction in Benton.25 In an opinion remarkable for
its summary disposition of the issues and tone of overt hostility to the
poor, the appellate court held that "matters of law and policy are not
subject to any hearing requirements under the applicable regulations,
whether the hearing be pre- or post-reduction." 256 On the issue of
consultation with the Medical Care Advisory Committee, the appellate
court simply reversed the district court's factual finding and, without
discussion of the considerable evidence to the contrary, declared that
the committee "was sufficiently apprised of the problems." 2:7 Finally,
the Sixth Circuit did not even address the state's inaccurate descrip-
tion and omission of many of the proposed changes in the notice to
Medicaid recipients.258
The Sixth Circuit reserved its strongest language for criticism of
the district court's requirement of hearings for individual circumstances
in the context of state policy changes. "It does seem rather ridiculous
that a person, who has not even filed a claim, could object to the
reduction of optional benefits because of the possibility that he might
253. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1915),
discussed at pp. 300-01 infra.
254. See 42 C.F.R. § 446.10(a)(3) (1977).
255. No. 76-2177 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978) (reversing, after more than two years, the
district court opinion at [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
28,025 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 1976)).
256. Id., slip op. at 5.
257. Id., slip op. at 6. But see Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees at 32-33 (Medical Care Ad-
sisorv Committee first convened to consiler proposed cuts four days after notice of change
mailed to recipients; Committee only given one-page summary of Medicaid budget, and
requests for more information and time to review cutbacks denied).
258. For example, no mention was made of the reduction in the number of allowed
ph'sician visits, the possibility of obtaining prior authorization for eliminated services if
medically necessary, and the numerous exceptions to the reductions for children that
were required by federal law. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees at 12, Benton v. Rhodes,
No. 76-2177 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978). Some of the inaccuracies were noted in the concurring
opinion. See Benton v. Rhodes, No. 76-2177, slip op. at 8-9 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978)
(Keith, J.).
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want to have a corn removed from his toe, or might want to go to a
dentist to have his teeth cleaned."2 9 This is a serious misreading both
of the evidence and of the district court's opinion. The injunction had
been granted to prevent the state from denying important-even life-
sustaining-benefits to persons who were arguably eligible for them un-
der federal law.260 As the district court implicitly held, for these
recipients a state rule reducing benefits has both a legislative and
adjudicative effect, because once the rule is enacted, providers begin
to terminate benefits automatically. The Sixth Circuit's decision may
have effectively denied these recipients their right under Goldberg to
a prior hearing regarding individual circumstances. A fortiori, the
court seemed to hold in its very brief opinion, recipients have no right
to present evidence or argument to the agency regarding the necessity
of the cutbacks or the possibility of less harmful ways to accomplish
legitimate cost-control objectives.
Although the Sixth Circuit failed to support its position with any
analysis of legal doctrine or of the Medicaid program, such support
can indeed be found. The argument rests on the analogy of agency
rulemaking to the legislative process: since the state legislature itself
could enact a rule depriving persons of important Medicaid benefits
without any notice or opportunity to be heard, the state Medicaid
agencies, with authority delegated by the legislature, should have com-
parable procedural latitude.2 0 1 The usual authority cited is Justice
Holmes's opinion in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization,262 which is said to stand for the proposition that "no
hearing at all [is] constitutionally required" prior to agency action
"promulgating policy-type rules or standards. '2 6 3 In addition to the
analogy between rulemaking and legislation, it is generally argued
that it is impractical to hold hearings for the large numbers of persons
affected by a general rule and that the type of decision involved in
making general policy is not illuminated by the testimony regarding
particular facts that is characteristic of a hearing._ 0 4
Bi-Iietallic's distinction between rulemaking and adjudication as a
matter of constitutional doctrine remains good law, and no coun-
259. Id., slip op. at 6.
260. Benton v. Rhodes, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDicARE-MDirAID GUIDE (CCH)
28,025, at 10,142-43 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 1976), rev'd, No. 76-2177 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978).
261. See Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency
Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REV. 782, 787 (1974).
262. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
263. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973); see L. TRIBE, supra
note 39, at 514; Note, supra note 261, at 786-87.
264. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915).
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ter-doctrine has arisen to challenge it explicitly. But careful examina-
tion of how the courts have actually responded to procedural due
process issues in agency action of a general character suggests that
current doctrine involves a more complex analysis than simply de-
termining whether the agency decision fits into the category of rule-
making or adjudication. In deciding whether and to what extent pro-
cedural due process protections apply, the courts have increasingly
looked to the nature of the agency's mandate, the type of decisions
involved in agency action, the importance of the individual interests
at stake, and the contribution that some type of public participation
can make to the kind of decision involved.265 From this perspective,
one can make a strong case for the proposition that rulemaking by
state Medicaid agencies should be subject to the kinds of procedural
requirements that have emerged in the structural due process approach
to federal administrative law.
The argument is built on the fact that the federal Medicaid statute
does not simply set the state Medicaid agencies at large, but rather
requires them to operate the program so as to provide a reasonable
range of necessary services to eligible low-income persons. Under the
federal statute, the state program must include a significant number
of mandatory services, ranging from hospital and physician care to
preventive screening, diagnosis, and treatment for children. 266 Al-
though in theory a state might totally eliminate an optional service
like prescription drugs or dental care, in practice at least some of
these services are usually provided and so must be sufficient in amount,
duration, and scope reasonably to achieve their purpose.267 States are
also required to engage in extensive review of provided medical ser-
vices in order to insure the appropriateness, efficiency, and quality
of care.208 To be sure, cost control is also a congressional goal, but
the statute, legislative history, and HEW regulations indicate that it
is to be reconciled as far as possible with the program's original goal
of providing quality health care for the poor.
The state Medicaid agencies are thus in the difficult position of
having to balance the health needs of the poor against budget limi-
tations and to choose among cost-control measures ranging from pro-
gram reductions to significant reform of the health care system. The
265. See Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504
F.2d 483, 489-93 (9th Cir. 1974); Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 634-39 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (2d Cir. 1973).
266. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13), 1396d(l)-(5) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
267. 42 C.F.R. § 449.10(a)(5)(i) (1977).
268. Id. § 450.18.
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Medicaid statute does not explicitly require that recipients be in-
cluded in the process of making these choices, but exclusion of re-
cipients is strikingly inconsistent with the general governmental prac-
tice of allowing persons to participate, at least in some form, in
important decisions affecting their interests. The analogy between
administrative and legislative rulemaking authority articulated by
Justice Holmes in Bi-Metallic has, in a sense, been taken seriously,
though with somewhat different results than he anticipated. Require-
ments that agencies give public notice of proposed rules, permit sub-
mission of written comments, and respond to submissions with at
least a brief statement, are now seen as the appropriate administrative
equivalent of the legislature's public hearings and accessible legisla-
tive process.2
6 9
Although most rulemaking procedures have been developed in the
context of the federal APA, they have also been seen as having con-
stitutional sources that would apply to state Medicaid decisionmaking.
For example, several courts of appeals have held that tenants of public
and subsidized housing have a constitutional right to receive notice of
proposed rent increases and "to participate in the process of official
consideration of rent increases" through written submissions.270 The
rationale is that the tenants have a legal interest in obtaining decent
housing under the National Housing Act and that rent increases threat-
en "substantial deprivation" triggering constitutional due process pro-
tection.271 The tenants' right to be heard is further grounded on
the courts' finding that they can make a "material contribution to
the process of fixing rents" by supplying information about their
own ability to pay, the operating costs and sources of income of the
housing project, and "innovative suggestions for compromising com-
peting interests."27 2 The District of Columbia Circuit read Bi-Me-
tallic as consistent with this position; the right to notice and op-
portunity for comment does not depend on the number of affected
persons, but rather on "whether tenants can make relevant contri-
bution to the issues presented for decision, notwithstanding the fact
that they apply to a potentially large class. '273
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
269. See J. Skelly Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency
Rulemaking, 26 AD. L. Rav. 199, 211 (1974).
270. Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see note 265 supra
(citing cases).
271. See note 265 supra (citing cases).
272. Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 638-39 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
273. Id. at 638 n.42.
302
Vol. 88: 243, 1978
Health Care Reform
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2 7 4 does not
encourage the federal courts to define state rulemaking procedures,
but neither does it prohibit such a decision. On the contrary, the
Court cited Bi-Metallic for the proposition that the Constitution does
not require rulemaking procedures in addition to those specified in
the APA, which implies that the APA notice-and-comment procedures
may themselves have constitutional sources.2 7 5 In this context, the
focus of the Medicaid cutback litigation on the right to an individual
hearing obscures the central issue, which concerns the fact that many
state agencies are not allowing even elementary participation through
rulemaking procedures.
The history of the 1975-1976 Medicaid cutbacks indicates both
the need and the justification for expanding recipient participation
in state agency decisionmaking. Like publicly subsidized housing ten-
ants, Medicaid recipients have a federal statutory right to program
benefits. These benefits are obviously of great importance; agency
action reducing or terminating health care services threatens at least
as much of a "substantial deprivation" as rent increases for low-cost
housing. In the Medicaid area, moreover, the likelihood of unneces-
sary, illegal, and erroneous deprivation is high. The state agencies'
financial interest in holding down program costs often leads to dis-
regard of recipients' interests and even of applicable federal law, and
may also encourage poor administration as a way of rationing scarce
resources through error and delay. Finally, as in the housing cases,
Medicaid recipients could make (and actually did make) real con-
tributions to agency decisionmaking by pointing out exceptional
cases, unresolved administrative problems, and alternative means of
saving funds while minimizing reduction of health care services.27 G
Adoption of rulemaking procedures by state Medicaid agencies will
not, of course, resolve by itself the serious political and financing
problems of the Medicaid program. Agencies will still be subject to
strong internal and external pressures to respond to the inflation and
waste of the health care system by curtailing services to the poor. At
its best, however, a structured process of rulemaking would expose the
state agency's data and policy assumptions to public scrutiny and
provide the beginnings of a participatory process in which the difficult
issues of health care reform could be addressed.
274. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
275. Id. at 542 n.16.
276. See generally Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97, 105-07 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (sug-
gesting such a role); Robinson v. Maher, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE-MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH) 27,707, at 9053 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 1976).
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IV. Health Planning: The Meaning of Representation
By the early 1970s, Congress was becoming painfully aware of the
inadequacy of federal health policy. Despite billions of federal dol-
lars spent under Hill-Burton and other planning programs, the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare echoed in 1974 its pre-
decessor committee of 1945:
Widespread access and distribution problems exist with respect
to medical facilities and services. In many urban areas, hospitals,
clinics and other medical care institutions and services are crowd-
ed into relatively tiny sectors, while large areas go poorly served
or completely unserved. Many rural communities are completely
without a physician or any other type of health care service, while
adjacent urban areas are oversupplied.
2 77
The Committee also noted its "great concern" with the rapid esca-
lation of health care costs, 278 linked in part to unnecessary investment
in costly health care technology.
2 7 9
As one major response to these problems,2 80 Congress established
in 1974 a national system of health planning with ambitious substan-
tive goals: to expand access to primary and preventive care, especially
for the poor; 28' to reduce health cost inflation and maldistribution
of resources; 28 2 and to promote innovative forms of organized, ef-
ficient, and high quality care.2 8 3 To achieve these goals, Congress
largely sidestepped the obvious devices of regulatory standards28 4 and
277. S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 96, at 7879.
278. Id. at 7895.
279. Id. at 7879.
280. Congress's other major responses to the problems of cost inflation and unnecessary
utilization were: (1) limiting federal funding under Medicare and Medicaid for capital
expenditures (i.e., reimbursement for depreciation) to those health facilities that had
secured approval for capital expenditures from a designated health planning agency,
Social Security Act § 1122, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-l (Supp. V 1975), and (2) providing funds
for PSROs to determine whether services are medically necessary, meet professionally
recognized standards of care, and are delivered at the appropriate institutional level of
care for purposes of reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c
(Supp. V 1975).
281. See 42 U.S.C. §§ SOOk-2(l), (8) (Supp. V 1975).
282. See id. §§ 3001-2(a)(2) to (4).
283. See id. §§ 300k-2(2) to Z7), (9), 30l-2(a)(2).
284. The Health Planning Act itself does not contain any operational standard for
health planning that specifies, e.g., a maximum ratio of hospital beds to population, or
the minimum number of anticipated procedures needed to justify investment in particular
types of medical technology. Rather, the Act requires the Secretary of HEW to establish,
within 18 months of the Act's passage on January 4, 1975, regulatory "guidelines con-
cerning national health planning policy," id. § 300k-l(a), that must include "[s]tandards
respecting the appropriate supply, distribution, and organization of health resources," as
well as a statement of national health planning goals expressed "to the maximum extent
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financial incentives, 28 5 and relied on an exceptionally difficult tech-
nique: the redistribution of policymaking power at the state and
local levels from physicians, hospital administrators, and government
officials to "consumers of health care. ' 28 This was to be accomplished
by the establishment of local "Health Systems Agencies" (HSAs).
Health care providers and government officials were expected, of
course, to continue to play a very large role in defining and imple-
menting health care policy.2-8 7 But the theory of the National Health
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (Health Planning
Act)28  was that the traditional influence of health care providers
would be balanced by a strengthened consumer role in selecting
health care priorities and in ensuring that health facilities and ser-
vices were organized to meet them.
28 9
A. Congressional Intent: Strengthening Consumer
Representation in Health Care Policy
In choosing to rely on health planning as an integral part of na-
tional health care policy, Congress was engaged in a classic effort to
reform an existing but inadequate institution and thus achieve stated
public goals. "Health planning" as an organized activity was created
by the hospital industry during the Depression to limit the supply
of hospital beds in a period of declining revenue.290 But the efforts
practicable . . . in quantitative terms," id. § 3OOk-l(b). Local health plans (termed
"health systems plans," id. § 300l-2(b)(2)) developed by the Health Systems Agencies
(HSAs) must "take into account" and be "consistent with" these national health planning
guidelines. Id. § 300k-1.
285. Title XVI of the Health Planning Act holds out the possibility of federal grants
to upgrade the quality of public hospitals, to increase the number of outpatient facilities
serving medically underserved populations, and to stimulate planning and development
of high-priority health projects, but there is no assurance (and indeed much doubt) that
any more than a fraction of the necessary funds will ever be appropriated. See id.
§§ 3001-2(c)(3), 3OOp-l(d)(2), 500r, 300t, discussed in Schneider & Wing, The National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974: Implications for the Poor, 9
CLEARLINGHOUSE REV. 683, 687-89 (1976). In the absence of such appropriations, the health
planning agencies can only impose negative financial sanctions by blocking federal reim-
bursement for capital expenditures under § 1122 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-I (Supp. V 1975), discussed in note 280 supra.
286. 42 U.S.C. § 300l-l(b)(3)(C)(i) (Supp. V 1975).
287. Providers are to constitute 40% of the governing boards of the local HSAs, id.
§ 300l-l(b)(3)(C)(ii), and are to be represented on the Statewide Health Coordinating
Councils and on the National Council on Health Planning and Development, see id.
§ 300m-3(b). Government officials must be included on the governing boards of the HSAs,
either as consumer or provider members. Id. § 300l-1(b)(3)(C)(iii)(I); 42 C.F.R. § 122.109
(b)(3)(i) (1977).
288. Pub. L No. 93.641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 800k-300t (Supp.
V 1975)).
289. See S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 96, at 7885-86.
290. B. EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, supra note 8, at 199-200.
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of the urban hospital associations' "hospital survey committees" to
regulate the distribution of private philanthropy were generally un-
successful and, in any event, made no attempt to elicit or include
the viewpoints of consumers. Under the Comprehensive Health Plan-
ning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966 (CHP) ,291
Congress sought to expand and strengthen the existing voluntary sys-
tem of health planning by granting federal funds to local and state-
wide planning agencies that established advisory "planning councils."
A majority of the members of these councils had to be "representatives
of consumers of health services." 292 The federal law failed, however,
to define who a "consumer" was or to differentiate among types of
consumer interests. Without federal standards, local agencies were
free to define consumer qualifications in such terms as " 'education,
leadership ability, a broad sense of civic responsibility, and experience
in making decisions affecting the welfare of people and expenditure
of large sums of money.' ",293 This approach yielded "an overwhelm-
ing representation" on CHP boards of "local business leaders-often
hospital trustees in their spare time. ' 2 94 Congress understood that
consumer "representation" of this sort had contributed to the CHP
program's "marginally successful" performance 295 and attempted in
the 1974 Health Planning Act to prevent provider domination of
health planning by requiring the inclusion of a broader range of
consumer interests.
To accomplish this, the Health Planning Act established the HSAs,
a national system of local planning agencies. These agencies are gen-
erally organized as private, nonprofit corporations, 29 6 with professional
staffs funded by HEW grants and able to implement the detailed
priorities developed by the governing board of each HSA. The board,
in turn, must be composed of a majority (but not more than sixty
291. Pub. L. No. 89-749, 80 Stat. 1180 (1966) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 246 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975)).
292. 42 U.S.C. §§ 246(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(A) (1970).
293. B. EHRENREICH & J. EHRENREICH, supra note 8, at 211.
294. Id.; see O'Connor, Comprehensive Health Planning: Dreams and Realities, 52
MILLBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 391, 404 (1974) (study of CHP program shows that many
consumers on CHP boards are affiliated with provision of medical care in some way and
that "views of these consumers are on many issues more in sympathy with the providers
on the board than with other consumers").
295. S. RaP. No. 1285, supra note 96, at 7879.
296. Under the Act, an HSA may be either a "nonprofit private corporation," a
"public regional planning body," or a "single unit of general local government." 42
U.S.C. § 3001-1(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975). In the latter two cases, however, the jurisdiction of
the regional planning body or governmental unit must be identical to the HEw-
designated "health service area" served by the HSA, and governance of the unit must be
consistent with the requirements applicable to nonprofit private corporations. Id. §§ 3001.
l(b)(1)(B), (1)(C), (3)(A)-
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percent) of "consumers of health care" who must be "broadly rep-
resentative of the social, economic, linguistic and racial populations,
geographic areas . . .and major purchasers of health care."297 Al-
though the Act does not define "consumer of health care," it does
exclude from the consumer category "providers of health care," who
are in turn extensively defined as virtually anyone with a profes-
sional, financial, or institutional connection with the delivery of
health care services, as well as members of their immediate families.298
The powers of the HSAs are limited primarily to gathering infor-
mation, establishing priorities for new facilities and services, and of-
fering recommendations about the appropriateness of capital invest-
ment and the distribution of federal health funds.299 Nevertheless,
Congress clearly intended to encourage substantial consumer influ-
ence in health care policymaking to balance the "relatively dispro-
portionate influence" of health care providers, "particularly physi-
cians." 300 As one commentator noted, even the limited powers of
the HSAs and of their state-level analogues, the Statewide Health Co-
ordinating Councils, could, if "[a]ggressively pursued . . . begin to
change the direction of the health care system."
30 1
Between this potential and reality lie political and administrative
barriers. The Health Planning Act gave the HSAs legal authority to
establish health priorities and to influence resource allocation, but
it stopped short of requiring the HSAs to use their authority against
the inevitably strong opposition of hospitals and physicians. 30 2 On
the contrary, by announcing only general goals for HSA performance
and by failing to create strong financial incentives for the allocation
of resources to primary care, the Act provided numerous opportuni-
ties for local health leaders to continue defining patient needs in
terms of high-technology, professionally prestigious services. 303 The
most important check on the continuation of the status quo was the
possibility, encouraged by the consumer representation requirements,
297. Id. § SOOl1-(b)(3)(C)(i).
298. See id. § 300n(3).
299. See id. § 3001-2.
300. S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 96, at 7885.
-01. Sparer, Health Systems Agencies and Consumers: Will the Congressional Intent
Fail?, HEALTH L. PROJECT LIB. BULL., Oct. 1975, at 2, 4.
302. See Dunham & Marmor, Health Planning: A Comment, 6 INT. J. HEALTH SERVS.
667 (1976).
303. A comprehensive review of state "certificate of need" programs, which operate
similarly to the federal Health Planning Act, found that although the health planning
process "did indeed slow the growth in hospital beds, [it] accelerated the growth in in-
tensity per bed [i.e., capital expenditures on equipment and supporting plant] so that
capital cost increases (and hospital operating cost increases) remained unaffected." W.
McCLuRE, REDUCING ExcEss HOSPITAL CAPACITY 65 (1976).
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of a strong consumer health movement pressing for expanded access
and patient-oriented forms of care. But here too the Act spoke in some-
what general terms and left crucial issues for administrative im-
plementation.
The major responsibility imposed on HEW was to define the
nature of "representation." The statute was silent about the methods
by which an HSA governing board was to be selected, and the re-
quirement of "broad representation" could thus be read narrowly to
regulate only the descriptive outcome of whatever selection process
the founders of an HSA chose to adopt. Under this "descriptive"
model, consumer governing board members would represent their
constituencies by resembling them in some characteristic considered
relevant by the statute-race, linguistic group, geographic area, or
unspecified "social" and "economic" characteristics-and would to-
gether form a kind of cross-sectional "jury" for the purposes of health
planning.30
4
The legislative history of the Act, however, recognized that such
descriptive representation was inadequate for the complex and some-
what adversarial task of health planning. The goal of the Act was not
simply "consumer representation," but representation for the purpose
of achieving a difficult substantive goal: the injection of new values
and perspectives into health policy and the balancing of well-articu-
lated provider interests with the interests and needs of various types
of consumers. 30 5 The congressional committee report reflected this
substantive concern in its reference to what might be termed a "con-
stituency" model of representation. 30 6 Under this model consumer
board members would be selected by, and hence accountable to, "or-
ganizations representing the interests of consumers. ' 30 7 The House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee indicated that HEW
should develop an approach along these lines:
304. See generally H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967) (discussing
representation in its "descriptive" sense, and relationship of this sense to other concepts
of representation).
305. See 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975) (congressional findings) ("The massive
infusion of Federal funds into the existing health care system has contributed to infla-
tionary increases in the cost of health care and failed to produce an adequate supply or
distribution of health resources, and consequently has not made possible equal access for
everyone to such resources."); H.R. REP. No. 1382, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-35 (1974) (ex-
amining strengths and weaknesses of existing health planning efforts and cataloguing need
for new values and perspectives); S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 96, at 7879-81, 7885 (detail-
ing numerous criticisms of existing health care delivery and stressing need to limit appro-
priately influence of providers on health planning process).
306. See S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 96, at 7885.
307. Id.
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[I]t is particularly important that [the HSA governing boards]
adequately and equitably represent the area's population and
health care providers. Thus, it is intended by the Committee that
in the regulations for the program, the Department [of HEW]
take particular care to assure that the governing bodies [of the
HSAs] are chosen and composed so as to assure that they are not
dominated by any particular part of the area's health industry,
that they adequately represent all of the area's population, and
that they experience an appropriate turnover in their member-
ship. This can be partially accomplished by requiring the health
systems agencies to limit the number of terms which any mem-
ber ... may serve, or by requiring them to accept nominations
for membership from a wide array of consumer and provider
organizations within the area.308
The House Report thus envisioned a much broader role for HEW
than simply counting the descriptive characteristics (e.g., race and
income) of governing board members in order to determine com-
pliance with federal law, and hence eligibility for federal funding.
Rather, HEW was also to regulate the methods by which board mem-
bers were chosen in order to ensure that a descriptively representative
board would in fact "adequately and equitably represent the area's
population." 30 9 This is, to be sure, a difficult and controversial task.
The consumer health movement is in its infancy, and there is much
legitimate debate over which consumer interests deserve representa-
tion and over who can appropriately represent them.310 But even
granted the difficulty of the challenge, HEW did not make an ade-
quate effort to meet it. The Department rested on its classic nonen-
forcement device of failing to develop any operational policy of
consumer representation and thereby refusing to intervene in the
local political processes out of which the HSA boards emerged. The
result was that, without adequate guidance from Washington and
despite consumer objections, regional HEW officials granted millions
of dollars to organizations the governing boards of which were grossly
unrepresentative in descriptive terms311 and the members of which
had been chosen by methods that involved violations of the text and
spirit of the Act.312
308. H.R. REP. No. 1382, supra note 305, at 57 (emphasis supplied).
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Aldamuy v. Pirro, 436 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), discussed at pp.
314-17 infra (challenge by minority persons concerned with representativeness of minority
members of HSA governing board).
311. See note 324 infra.
312. For example, HEW's Regional Office in Atlanta funded the Atlanta-based North
Central Georgia HSA despite allegations that "of the 37 consumers on the original board,
2 were nominated by the State Nurses Association, one by the District Pharmacy Associa-
309
The Yale Law Journal
The consumers who tended to be underrepresented on, or excluded
from, the HSA boards were, as one might expect, from the politically
weakest groups: the poor, minorities, women, and the aged.1sa As in
the Hill-Burton cases, these consumers argued in the courts that the
Act required a different outcome, i.e., greater representation of po-
litically weak consumer interests on the HSA boards. Although con-
sumers, and particularly low-income and minority consumers, were
among the chief intended beneficiaries of the Act, the lack of statu-
tory specification made it difficult for the courts to conceive of par-
ticular outcomes to enforce. As happened in Perry v. Greater South-
east Community Hospital Foundation,1 4 the courts simultaneously
affirmed that consumers had a "legal interest" in representation on
the HSA boards and upheld agency and HSA decisions that appeared
to give that interest little if any weight. The way out of this dilemma
was not articulated by the courts, but has begun to emerge from
agency responses to litigation pressure: consumers have a right, not
to a specific representational outcome, but to a process of board se-
lection that takes statutory interests into account and produces mem-
bership outcomes that can be justified in terms of the Act's substantive
and structural goals.
B. HEWs Original Interpretation of the
Representation Provision
The enactment of the Health Planning Act required HEW to de-
velop implementing regulations within specified time limits, and in
October 1975 the Secretary issued proposed regulations soliciting ap-
tion, 6 by local hospitals, and 24 by local medical societies." Health Planning Amend-
ments of 1978: Hearings on S. 2410 Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Re-
search of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 448 (1978) (state-
ment of Dr. Daniel S. Blumenthal) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Hearings].
313. The flavor of minority representation on at least some HSA governing boards
was captured in Senate testimony. After detailing the excess hospital bed capacity of
New Orleans, see 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 312, at 437, and the refusal of 15 of
the city's 18 hospitals to serve Blacks in significant numbers, id. at 438, Russell Hender-
son, a consumer board member of the New Orleans Area/Bayou Rivers HSA, pointed out
that
few if any of our 39 consumer members are accountable to anyone. None are selected
from or by any low-income persons. To attain board membership, a prospective
member must pass the scrutiny of the nominating committee. To date, only a handful
of low-income persons or their advocates have passed that scrutiny . . . .My ability
to gain board status had nothing to do with my commitment to equal access and
cost containment, goals with which the nominating committee was not concerned,
but was the consequence of my status as chairperson of the Drug Abuse Advisory
Council of New Orleans.
Id. at 439-40.
314. See pp. 273-78 supra.
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plications for HSA designation and funding.3 15 The proposed regu-
lation concerning consumer representation, however, merely repeated
the statutory language requiring a majority of the board to be resi-
dents "who are consumers of health care," who are not providers of
health care, and who are "broadly representative" of the statutory
categories. 310 During the comment period, HEW received many re-
quests for further specification. 317 In its response in March 1976, the
Department noted that the regulation's language was taken verbatim
from the Act and "declined to further define or amplify this pro-
vision."318 HEW explained its position as follows:
Recognizing the variety in designated health service areas, the
Department wishes, at this stage, to give as much discretion as
legally permissible to health systems agencies. The Department
does state that in its view although the term "broadly represen-
tative" does not necessitate an equal proportion, it does indicate
that the consumer majority should roughly approximate, in its
representational aspects, the whole population of the health ser-
vice area.
The Department will, however, be reviewing the performance
of agencies in meeting these criteria to see if, in the future, more
specific regulation is warranted.319
On its face, HEW's position was not unreasonable. The concept
of interest representation in health care is at an early stage of devel-
opment; as in other programs, there is little consensus on how to
identify the relevant interests, assign them weights or proportions,
select their representatives, and assure accountability.3 20 On a practi-
cal level, experience under prior health planning programs had shown
that constructing a local planning board was often a matter of in-
tense political conflict. 321 In these circumstances, an argument cer-
tainly could be made that HEW should avoid premature hardening
315. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,802 (1975). The Health Planning
Act required the Secretary to "enter into agreements . . . for the designation of health
systems agencies" within 18 months of the statute's enactment. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-4(a)
(Supp. V 1975).
316. 40 Fed. Reg. 48,808 (1975) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 122.109(b)(1) (1977)).
317. See 41 Fed. Reg. 12,812, 12,820 (1976) (preface to final regulations).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See generally Stewart, supra note 12, at 1763-70, 1794.
321. Despite the relative powerlessness of the agencies under the Comprehensive Health
Planning Act of 1966, see p. 306 supra, vigorous struggles took place over membership
on their boards. See West & Stevens, Comparative Analysis of Community Health Plan-
ning: Transition from CHPs to HSAs, I J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 173, 176-77, 190
(1976).
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of policy and should experiment with a variety of ways to achieve
the congressional goal of broadly representative HSA governing boards.
The strength of this argument depends entirely, however, on the
quality of the experimentation carried out in relation to the risks of
the experimental period. The risks of HEW's position were substan-
tial, since the formative period of the HSAs is crucial to their future
performance. During this period the organization takes its basic shape;
its bylaws are written, key staff hired, traditions of working developed,
and important political relations formed. If the governing boards es-
tablished in the initial two-year conditional period excluded or seri-
ously underrepresented significant consumer interests, that distortion
would likely take root in the organization and resist subsequent
remedy. To guard against such distortions and to provide guidance
for experimental approaches, HEW should have developed at least
some tentative operational concepts of "representation" to use in
designating and funding applicant organizations as HSAs.
C. Agency Enforcement and the Theory of
Consumer Representation
As was discussed above, the text and legislative history of the Act
pointed toward two concepts of representation: descriptive represen-
tation, whereby representatives stand for other people by virtue of
resembling them in some characteristic considered relevant,3 22 and
constituency representation, whereby representatives are chosen by,
and are accountable to, "organizations representing the interests of
consumers. '"323 But as HSAs began to establish themselves in 1976 and
1977, it became clear that HEW had failed to translate either the
descriptive or the constituency approach to consumer representation
into operational policy. From a descriptive perspective, the HSA gov-
erning boards were seriously unrepresentative, particularly of low-
income consumers.32 4 The HSA for Texas Area 5, for example, cover-
322. See p. 308 supra.
323. See p. 308 supra.
324. See H. Hyman, HSA Governing Body Composition Analysis of Region II (May
1976), reprinted in 1978 Senate Hearings, suPra note 312, at 317-39 (most of HSA govern-
ing boards in HEW Region II (New York, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico) significantly
underrepresented women, elderly, and low-income consumers, but did contain adequate
quantitative representation of minority consumers) [hereinafter cited as Hyman Report
with page references to 1978 Senate Hearings]. These results were in part confirmed by
a second consultant's study for HEW. See 1 Orkand Corporation, Assessment of Represen.
tation and Parity for HSAs and SHPDAs (May 12, 1977) (mimeographed study, Con-
tract No. HRA-230-76-0210, prepared for the Office of Health Resources Opportunity
and the Bureau of Health Planning and Resources Development, Health Resources Ad-
ministration, Dep't of HEW, Rockville, Md.) [hereinafter cited as Orkand Representation
Report]. The Orkand Representation Report found that minorities (defined as Black,
\
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ing nineteen counties in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, had forty-one
consumer members on its governing board, but only three with in-
comes under $10,000 per year. This income group comprised 60.8%,
of the HSA's population, but only 7.3% of its consumer governing
board. In contrast, persons with family incomes over $15,000 per
year constituted only 17.1%/ of the population, but held 80.5% of
the consumer seats on the board .32  Such patterns were typical of the
entire nation.32 0 The constituency approach to consumer representa-
tion was also called into doubt by widespread litigation and adminis-
trative complaints in which important consumer groups protested
their exclusion from the HSA boards.
32 7
Asian, American Indian, and Hispanic) were, as a composite category, overrepresented on
HSA governing boards and executive committees, in the sense that their percentage of
board membership generally exceeded their percentage in the HSA's population. See id.
at 11-9 (definitions of representativeness and parity); 11-123 to -151 (statistical analysis of
representation); IV-12 to -13 (summary of parity and other data). This composite figure,
however, is subject to qualification; as the summary of findings section points out, over-
representation was concentrated largely among Blacks, "while relatively few agencies were
overrepresented for other minority groups." Id. at IV-12. Women, on the other hand,
were found to be "grossly underrepresented on HSA Governing Boards," with ap-
proximately two-thirds of the boards having percentages of women less than 80%o of
their percentage in the population. Id. at IV-12; see id. at IV-13 (reporting even lower
representation of women on HSA executive committees). The Orkand Representation
Report did not collect data on the incomes of HSA governing board members, but it did
present data on their educational levels and occupations, with distinctly unrepresentative
results. This data is subject to qualification, though, because of a high number (55%) of
members not reporting, and because data for both consumer and provider members was
combined. There may be important advantages to having board members with more
education than the population as a whole, but the implications of this pattern for the
representativeness of the boards deserve consideration.
325. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 15, Texas ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health Sys.
Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977).
326. Lawsuits raising similar representational claims were filed against HEW and all
six HSAs for the state of Georgia in Rakestraw v. Califano, No. C77-635 A (N.D. Ga., filed
Apr. 22, 1977), motion to dismiss action against HSAs for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion granted, id., Order at 5 (Dec. 19, 1977), and against the New Orleans HSA in
Louisiana ACORN v. New Orleans Area/Bayou Rivers Health Sys. Agency, No. 77-361
(E.D. La., filed Feb. 24, 1977). See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 312, at 412-565 (tes-
timony on behalf of legal services clients); HSA Survey Data, reprinted in id. at 526-31
(detailing gross disparities in income representation in HSAs for Central Arizona, South
Florida, New Mexico, Cleveland Metropolitan Area, Oklahoma, and Utah); Hyman Re-
port, supra note 324, at 333-34 (finding lack of representation as to income, sex, and age
in most HSAs in HEW Region II (New York, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico)); Checkoway,
Consumer Issues Around HSAs: The Case of the Champaign County Health Care Con-
sumers, HEALTH L. PROJECT Lm. BuLa., Mar. 1978, at 23 (reporting study showing lack of
active low-income, minority, and rural representation on sub-area councils of East Central
Illinois HSA and lack of HEW response to these findings).
327. See note 326 supra (citing complaints filed); Aldamuy v. Pirro, 436 F. Supp. 1005
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); Tannen, Consumer Issues Around HSAs: The Eastern Kentucky HSA,
HEALTH L PROJECT LIm. BuLL., June/July 1977, at 19 (reporting effectiveness of consumer
complaints filed with HEW in increasing representation of women, minorities, and
workers on Eastern Kentucky HSA).
The Yale Law Journal
A ldamuy v. PirroP,28 the first reported decision on consumer repre-
sentation in health planning,' involved a consumer challenge to an
HSA governing board on both descriptive and constituency grounds.
Minority individuals and an organization claiming "affiliation with
a wide variety of governmental bodies, community health organiza-
tions, health-related professions, and minority interests generally"32 9
sought to enjoin HEW funding of the Central New York HSA
(CNYHSA), centered in Syracuse, New York, on the grounds that its
board membership did not adequately represent the area's social,
economic, linguistic, and racial groups. Specifically, plaintiffs pointed
to the absence of poor persons or of any residents of the inner city on
the governing board, and to the designation of government officials
as "consumers," as evidence of violation of the Act and also charged
that the minority members of the board "do not really represent the
minority community."
330
Judge Port held that federal jurisdiction existed only as to the
Secretary of HEW,33I and characterized the legal issue as whether
the Secretary's approval of the CNYHSA board violated the Act or
328. 436 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
329. Id. at 1008 n.6.
330. Id. at 1009.
331. Both Judge Port in Aldainuy, and the Fifth Circuit in Texas ACORN v. Texas
Area 5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977), held (1) that plaintiffs had
to establish a $10,000 amount in controversy in order to secure federal question jurisdic-
tion over the HSA under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (Supp. 1978); and (2) that the consumer
plaintiffs had failed to state facts demonstrating that their representational rights under
the Health Planning Act could be valued at more than $10,000. See id. at 1023; Aldamuy
v. Pirro, 436 F. Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). Rejecting the theory that the juris-
dictional amount was met because the defendant HSAs' budgets greatly exceeded S10,000,
both courts required "evidence of potential or direct injury to [plaintiffs] themselves."
559 F.2d at 1023; accord, 436 F. Supp. at 1011. Both holdings are open to serious question.
First, Congress had amended 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to eliminate the $10,000 requirement for
federal question jurisdiction over the United States, its agencies and officers. See Act of
October 1, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 703(2), 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (codified in 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1331(a) (Supp. 1978)). This clearly established federal jurisdiction to hear the consumers'
claims against HEW. See 559 F.2d at 1022; 436 F. Supp. at 1009-10. By declining to extend
pendent jurisdiction over the defendant HSAs, the Aldamuy and Texas ACORN courts
created an anomalous situation in which the federal agency's decision to approve the
private party's action was subject to federal suit, but the private party itself (the HSA)-
although an integral part of the transaction and of the entire administrative scheme-
could not be involuntarily joined. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit in Texas ACORN wondered
why the HSA was resisting federal jurisdiction, since its own budget was at stake: "Surely
the HSA would be seeking to intervene, were the litigation to continue against HEW
without it." 559 F.2d at 1024 n.9. Second, even if the Aldantuy and Texas ACORN courts
were correct in holding that the $10,000 requirement applied against the HSAs, it is far
from clear that plaintiffs' representational rights were worth less than that amount. See I
MooRE's FEDERAL PRCATICE 0.96[3.-1], at 940-41 (2d ed. 1978) (noting that "problem of
showing the requisite amount in controversy has proved particularly troublesome ...in
cases seeking injunctive . . . relief where issues of the discretionary power of federal
officers are involved," with some courts viewing right to be protected as "'by definition'"
or "indirectly" worth $10,000).
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constituted an abuse of discretion. To determine the first question,
Judge Port compared the plaintiffs' specific allegations of noncompli-
ance with the text of the Act and found no specific provisions sup-
porting their claim for relief. For example, the court noted that
the Act required the board to be broadly representative of the social,
economic, and racial populations and geographic areas, but did not
specifically require representation of the inner city "geographic or
socio-economic area." 332 Similarly, Judge Port noted that the Act re-
quired the governing boards to include government officials and did
not prohibit such officials from serving as consumer members.333
The claim that the board did not adequately represent the minority
community was answered with the fact that 14%, of the consumer
board members were nonwhite, as compared with only 3.1% of the
area's population; this was held to satisfy a descriptive theory of broad
representation. 33 4 Concerning the plaintiffs' claim that the particu-
lar minority individuals selected did not "really represent the minority
community," the court chose to "yield to the proper exercise of the
Secretary's discretion," which could be overturned only if it were "'so
arbitrary as to be clearly wrong.'-335
In granting the Secretary's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim for relief, Judge Port may have reached the correct result, but
he did so on the basis of an erroneous conception of the legal issues.
If the plaintiffs indeed were who they said they were-approximately
thirty individuals with wide connections to health care activities and
minority interests 33 -their complaint of exclusion from the CNYHSA
board raised at least a question about whether the board was broadly
representative of the area's social, economic, and racial groups. The
applicable statutory standard is not numerical representation of mi-
norities, but rather, in the words of the House Report, whether the
board "adequately and equitably represent[s] the area's population." 3 7
Determining whether this standard has been met in any particular case
is a mixed factual and policy judgment that allows for the Secretary's
discretion and is subject to judicial review under the federal APA for
abuse of that discretion. But what does "abuse of discretion" mean in
this context? It cannot mean that a challenger must show that the
Secretary has violated a clear statutory mandate, for in such a case the
332. Aldamuy v. Pirro, 436 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1011 (quoting Whelan v. Brinegar, 538 F.2d 924, 927 (2d Cir. 1976)) (cita-
tions omitted).
336. See id. at 1008 n.6.
337. H.RL RaP. No. 1382, sugra note 305, at 57.
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Secretary would be said not to have discretion at all, and would be
accountable under the APA for action "unlawfully withheld or un-
reasonably delayed" or "in excess of statutory ... authority." 3 38 Even
when the Secretary has acted within the scope of his statutory authority,
courts must decide "whether the decision was based on a consideration
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judg-
ment."33 9 The Supreme Court has described this review somewhat
ambiguously as a "searching and careful" inquiry into the facts in
which, nevertheless, "[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency." 340
Though obviously deferential, this standard does not mean that
courts "must rubber-stamp the agency decision as correct."341 In par-
ticular, a reviewing court must determine whether the agency has
considered "the relevant factors" and has exercised what the District
of Columbia Circuit has termed "'a reasoned discretion, with reasons
that do not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative
intent.' "342
As applied to Aldamuy, the issue thus becomes whether the Secre-
tary considered the relevant statutory factors in reaching his discre-
tionary judgment that the CNYHSA board adequately represented
the area's population and whether he can support that judgment with
at least some -reasoning relevant to the Health Planning Act. Once
the factors have been demonstrably considered, and the agency's rea-
soning offered, the courts must apply a deferential standard of re-
view and may reverse only if the agency's judgment lacks a rational
basis or is otherwise improperly motivated or "clearly wrong." But
the only reasons advanced by HEW, and accepted by the court, were
that minority board members exceeded the numerical proportion of
minorities in the population, and that the Act did not require the
Secretary to achieve any of the specific results (e.g., representation of
the inner city) urged by the plaintiffs. 343 Such a passive agency pos-
338. 5 U.S.C. § 706(l), (2)(C) (1976).
339. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
340. Id. But see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 n.74 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976) ("Court's intent in Overton Park somewhat difficult to plumb and its
standard even more uncertain of application"; case may "unintentionally prompt"
"significantly more intrusive" review than is traditional); Note, supra note 40, at 1662-63
(criticizing Overton Park opinion as ambiguous and as "permitting an extremely wide-
ranging review").
341. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
342. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), quoted in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
343. See p. 315 supra.
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ture itself is at odds with Congress's intent, expressed in the House
Report, that HEW "take particular care to assure that the [HSA]
governing bodies are chosen and composed so as . . adequately [to]
represent all of the area's population. 13 44
A probing of HEW's actual standards for funding HSAs would
have revealed the incoherence of the agency's operations. As the
Aldamuy case indicated, HEW made no effort to evaluate whether
an HSA board adequately represented actual consumer constituencies;
to take a gross example, HEW funded the Atlanta-based North Cen-
tral Georgia HSA with a board whose consumer members had al-
legedly been nominated largely by provider organizations.3 45 But de-
spite its position in Aldamuy, HEW also made no serious effort to
enforce a numerical or descriptive approach to representation, and
it approved HSA funding without even collecting information on
the income levels of consumer members or their status as "indirect
providers." 346 When challenged in several cases for funding HSAs
with large numerical disparities in the representation of low-in-
come consumers, HEW abandoned its Aldamuy position and asserted
the power to approve HSA applicants virtually without reviewable
standards.
The numerical or descriptive approach to consumer representation
was the focus of Texas ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health Systems
Agency, Inc.,3 47 in which low-income consumer plaintiffs challenged
what was at least a seven-to-one disparity in the representation of
low-income consumers on the governing board of the North Central
Texas HSA.34s HEW opposed the plaintiffs' suit, but offered no al-
ternative theory or facts to the district court to justify the represen-
tative character of the HSA. On the contrary, in an answer to plain-
tiffs' interrogatories, HEW appeared to admit that the only board
344. H.R. REP. No. 1382, supra note 305, at 57.
345. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 312, at 448 (statement of Dr. Daniel S.
Blumenthal).
346. See id. at 472-73 (statement of Wayne Pressel).
347. 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977). As discussed in the district court's unreported
opinion, the plaintiffs were "low-to-moderate income persons who have family incomes
under approximately $10,000" and the Texas Association of Community Organizations
for Reform Now (ACORN), "an unincorporated association concerned with the interests
of low-to-moderate income persons ... with approximately 1,500 member families state-
wide" and particularly concerned with the distribution of health resources to poor and
low-to-moderate income persons in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Texas ACORN v. Texas
Area 5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., No. S-76-102-CA, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 1977),
vacated and remanded, 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977). Members of Texas ACORN had
met with HEW regional officials to express their concern with the composition of the
HSA governing board and had issued a study of the public hospital in Forth Worth,
Texas. Id. at 2.
348. See 559 F.2d at 1021.
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members who were "representative of low income consumers" were
the three whose incomes were under $10,000 per year.340 The de-
fendant HSA, though admitting that it had "no established criteria
for defining low and moderate income representatives," argued that
twenty-nine of its consumer members actually "represented" low-
income persons by virtue of factors other than income, such as mem-
bership in an ethnic minority, status as a public official or federal
employee, or designation by consumer organizations. 350 Since the HSA
offered no specific facts to support these contentions, and since the
uncontradicted statistical disparity was so great, 351 Judge Wayne Justice
granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment to en-
join the HSA's federal funding until the board membership was made
roughly approximate to the income distribution of the population
as a whole.
35 2
In reaching this decision, Judge Justice accepted the plaintiffs' ar-
gument that the Health Planning Act created two types of consumer
"rights" with respect to HSA board representation. The first was that
the statutory consumer categories would be represented by persons
who themselves shared the descriptive characteristics of the economic,
social, or racial group. The second was that the numerical proportions
of low-income and minority representatives would approximate their
actual proportions in the area's population. The dramatic consequence
of Judge Justice's ruling was the requirement that approximately one-
half of the HSA's forty-one consumer board members have incomes
under $10,000-an increase from three low-income members to from
sixteen to twenty-five. 353
The impulse of the plaintiffs and the district court to read the
statute as creating a clear right to a numerically descriptive board is
understandable. By requiring the boards to be broadly representative
of defined consumer groups, as opposed to merely requiring, as it had
in the past, an undefined "consumer representation," Congress un-
doubtedly did intend the new HSAs to have broader and more ac-
countable consumer representation than existed in the CHP program.
HEW's willingness to fund boards that were grossly unrepresentative
in descriptive terms, and the apparent unresponsiveness of HEW re-
349. Id. at 1025.
350. See Texas ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., No. S-76-102-CA,
slip op. at 10 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 1977), vacated and remanded, 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1977) (quoting defendant HSA's answer to interrogatories).
351. Id. at 10, 12.
352. Id. at 13.
353. Id.
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gional offices to consumer complaints of inadequate representation,35 4
strongly suggested that only clear numerical guidelines would lead to
any sort of regulation of HSA board composition. Finally, HEW itself
appeared to be adopting a numerical and descriptive approach to
consumer representation. The Department's answer to the plaintiffs'
interrogatories in Texas ACORN-that the only representatives of
low-income persons were those with incomes under $10,000-seemed
to rest on a descriptive model that was consistent with the preface to
the March 1976 regulations, which stated that "the consumer majority
should roughly approximate, in its representational aspects, the whole
population of the health service area."355
But if numerically descriptive representation was an understandable
effort to implement Congress's generally phrased requirement of
broad consumer representation, it also was subject to serious legal and
practical objections. Since the text of the Act, as well as its legislative
history, contained a blend of descriptive and constituency concepts of
representation, Congress had evidently considered the descriptive char-
acteristics of consumer members to be an important but not exclusive
standard for composition of the HSA boards. Moreover, in addition
to practical difficulties of administration (e.g., variations in a mem-
ber's income over time), it is easy to imagine a descriptive represen-
tation approach being administered so as to defeat the substantive
goals of the Act. As was alleged in Aldamuy, consumer board members
could be chosen who met the applicable income or racial standards,
but were otherwise not representative of, or accountable to, the
groups whose interests they purported to serve. The challenge to HEW
posed by the Act was to devise a system that effectively incorporated
both descriptive and constituency models of representation into the
actual practices of the HSAs.
On appeal, HEW seemed both to recognize and to deny the existence
of this challenge and its own failure to meet it. On the one hand, HEW
strenuously asserted that Judge Justice had misinterpreted the Act
and the Department's own position. The agency expressly disclaimed
any reliance on numerical standards of representation and argued that
the "appropriate test" applied by the Secretary in evaluating HSA
compliance was
whether the consumer portion of the governing body, looked at
as a whole, can reasonably be expected to consider and articulate,
in carrying out its health planning functions, the interests of each
354. See id. at 8.
355. 41 Fed. Reg. 12,820 (1976).
319
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 243, 1978
segment of the population of its health service area to a degree
roughly approximate to its share of the total population.350
The Secretary's decision to fund a particular HSA, the argument con-
tinued, could be overturned only if the plaintiffs could show that
the application of this standard was "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion. '3 7 On the other hand, HEW conceded, in a supplemen-
tary appellate brief, that its current regulations gave inadequate guid-
ance to its regional officials in approving HSAs, and moved for a
stay of all proceedings pending the development of new regulations.358
The Fifth Circuit, influenced in part by a congressional committee
report criticizing Judge Justice's decision,3 59 reversed the district court
and remanded the case for trial on the question of whether the Sec-
retary had abused his discretion in approving the HSA board.360 Just
356. Brief for the Federal-Defendants-Appellants at 17, Texas ACORN v. Texas Area
5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977).
357. Id. at 21.
358. Reply Brief for the Federal-Defendants-Appellants at 2-5, Texas ACORN v. Texas
Area 5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977).
359. The Texas ACORN district court opinion sparked considerable efforts by the
losing defendant HSA to obtain congressional support for its legal position, on which its
receipt of an annual operating grant from HEW of over .700,000 depended. Having lost
in the district court, the Texas Area 5 HSA apparently contacted Congressman Jim
Wright, the powerful member from its district, who is majority leader of the House of
Representatives. Wright in turn contacted Congressman Paul Rogers, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee that has jurisdiction over health planing legislation. Ten days
after Judge Justice's district court opinion in Texas ACORN, Rogers wrote to Wright
expressing the view that "[i]t appears likely that Judge Justice has given stronger inter-
pretation to our requirement for broad representation than was intended." Letter from
Congressman Paul G. Rogers to Congressman Jim Wright, March 11, 1977, reprinted in
Brief for Defendant-Appellant Texas Area 5 Health Systems Agency, Inc., Exhibit B,
Texas ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977).
In July, 1977, while the Texas ACORN case was on appeal from the district court
decision, Congressman Rogers' subcommittee issued a conference report on a bill to
extend the Health Planning Act that stated:
The conferees . ..wish to clarify the original intent of the [Health Planning Act
with respect to HSA governing boards] .... In particular, it was not the intent of
the Congress ... to mandate a quota system requiring the selection of representatives
of a particular category strictly proportionate to its representation in the population
of the area or to require that representatives of a category be members of the class
they represent. Instead, the Congress intended that ... health systems agencies have
the flexibility to adopt selection processes most appropriate to local needs.
H.R. REp. No. 500, supra note 55, at 581-82, quoted in 559 F.2d at 1025 n.13. Since
the bill at issue, H.R. 4975, contained no provisiohs regarding HSA governing boards,
the Conference Committee statement represented the views of a subsequent Congress and
could therefore "provide no controlling basis from which to infer the purposes of an
earlier Congress." Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.4 (1968); see United States
v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). Never-
theless, the Fifth Circuit in Texas ACORN admitted that the Conference Committee Re-
port "buttresses our conclusion" that the district court had misinterpreted the Act. 559
F.2d at 1025 n.13.
360. 559 F.2d at 1026.
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what the district court was to decide, however, was left unclear. The
Fifth Circuit reversed Judge Justice's ruling that consumer board
members had to be descriptively representative of the statutory cate-
gories and suggested that HEW, and perhaps a reviewing court, had
to engage in a far more complex inquiry regarding "effective expres-
sion and advocacy of the interests of all segments of the consumer
population." ' 1 Relying on HEW's Draft Guidelines of October 1976,
the Fifth Circuit held that "income level is but one factor, albeit
perhaps the most important one, in determining who may best rep-
resent a particular consumer group, be it low-income or otherwise."3012
Other factors, such as "demonstrated ability to negotiate and mediate,
understanding and appreciation of different perspectives in the com-
munity, credibility with community groups, [and] legal training and
experience" 3 3 were relevant to HEW's decision in approving low-
income representation on an HSA board. The district court was in-
structed to give HEW an "adequate opportunity to demonstrate the
way in which consumer members who make more than $10,000 per
year may be representative of low income consumers," and also to
develop facts proving "that the Board was 'broadly representative' of
the area population.
'3 64
The Fifth Circuit seemed simultaneously to require an expanded
HEW and judicial inquiry into the "effectiveness" of consumer rep-
resentation, and yet mandate a more deferential standard of review.
Although the court did not approve or even quote the Secretary's
"test" for measuring representational compliance, it described the
Secretary's task in similar terms as "in effect, an accommodation of
policy alternatives" regarding "numerous demographic factors and
policy concerns." 365 The district court was to determine whether the
Secretary's performance of this task had been "arbitrary, capricious or
an abuse of discretion." 3 6
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Texas ACORN is thus open to two
sharply different interpretations. The appellate court may have ap-
proved the Secretary's vague, essentially standardless approach to as-
certaining representational compliance and have ordered the district
court to accept virtually any facts that HEW could muster in sup-
port of its decision. On the other hand, the court's justification for
361. Id. at 1025.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1024.
364. Id. at 1025-26.
365. Id. at 1026.
366. Id.
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reversing Judge Justice's clear-cut descriptive model of consumer rep-
resentation was HEW's apparent offer of a more sophisticated alter-
native: an inquiry into whether consumer members could effectively
represent the actual range of consumer interests in the community.
Such an approach, if taken seriously, would require far more careful
monitoring of HSA boards by HEW and far more searching responses
by HEW to consumer complaints of the type raised in Aldamuy and
Texas A CORN. The necessity of deciding between these alternatives
was temporarily avoided by delaying the trial in Texas A CORN until
HEW promulgated new regulations. But the same problems of agency
responsibility and judicial review are likely to arise again in chal-
lenges to board composition under the new regulations.
The two approaches embodied in the Fifth Circuit's opinion reflect
the neo-formalist and structural due process traditions of judicial re-
view. For the neo-formalist, the absence of clear legislative rules and
the existence of broad agency discretion necessarily imply the absence
of applicable law and require judicial ratification of the balancing
or bargaining outcomes of the administrative process, whatever they
may be. This approach is distinctively neo-formalist because it does
not deny consumers standing or the form of legal rights, but rather
asserts that minimal, deferential judicial review under the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard constitutes a judicial process and the pro-
tection of recognized legal rights. The structural due process approach
also accepts the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review articu-
lated in the APA20T but applies it with more force because it defines
arbitrariness in relation to substantive and structural statutory norms,
From this perspective, HEW's decisions approving the North Central
Texas and Central New York HSAs are arbitrary if they cannot be
justified in terms of representational standards derived from the
Health Planning Act. The crucial step in the structural due process
approach is to conceive the agency's complex function of assessing
representational adequacy as not simply an argument against a man-
datory right, but also as the source of affirmative agency obligation
to weigh the relevant statutory factors in its decision and to demon-
strate in a record how it has balanced the factors.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee, 368 casts an
uncertain light on the choice between neo-formalism and structural
due process. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Rehnquist, 360 the
367. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1976).
368. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
369. Justices Blackmun and Powell did not participate in the decision. See id. at 558.
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Court held that the rulemaking procedures explicitly defined in the
APA370 establish "the maximum procedural requirements" 371 and
that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the federal courts have no
authority to impose additional procedural conditions on agency rule-
making. 372 Since structural due process techniques-public participa-
tion, rational decisionmaking, and adequate consideration of statutory
values-are all arguably constituent parts of the rulemaking process as
defined by the APA,373 Vermont Yankee does not necessarily affect
their validity. On the other hand, the tone of the Supreme Court's
opinion lends support to the formalist view that judicial authority is
sharply distinct from legislative and administrative authority and that
courts should be particularly reluctant to infer rights and obligations
in agency decisionmaking procedures from general statutory norms.
3 74
For several reasons, however, Vermont Yankee should not be read
as definitively closing the door to further development of structural
due process doctrines in administrative law. The Court's holding was
directed at one particular model of judicial intervention: the require-
ment, or at least strong "suggestion," 373 of specific rulemaking pro-
cedures such as "informal conferences between intervenors and staff,
document discovery, interrogatories, technical advisory committees
370. Except when a statute requires an agency to make rules "on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing," 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976), agencies may issue rules
under the "informal" procedures established by §§ 553(b) and (c). See United States v.
Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel
Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757-58 (1972). These procedures require an agency to publish a general
notice of the proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, including the "terms or sub-
stance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved." 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3) (1976). The agency must then "give interested persons an opportunity to par-
ticipate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments with
or without opportunity for oral presentation." Id. § 553(c). Finally, "[a]fter consideration
of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose." Id.
371. 435 U.S. at 524.
372. Id. at 524, 543-44.
373. See National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 648-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Wright, supra note 269, at 205-11.
374. See 435 U.S. at 549 (courts must not "stray beyond the judicial province to ex-
plore the procedural format or to impose upon the agency its own notion of which
procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good"). But
see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
547 F.2d 633, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (separate statement of
Bazelon, C.J.) (denying existence of "bright line" between rulemaking and adjudicatory
proceedings).
375. Justice Rehnquist conceded that whether the majority of the appellate panel
actually based its decision on the inadequacy of the agency's procedures, as distinct from
the inadequacy of the record, "is not entirely free from doubt," but concluded that
the majority had struck down the Commission's rule because of procedural inadequacies.
435 U.S. at 539-41.
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comprised of outside experts with differing perspectives, limited cross-
examination, funding of independent research by intervenors, detailed
annotation of technical reports, surveys of existing literature, [and]
memoranda explaining methodology." 376 The Court explicitly distin-
guished this disfavored approach from judicial review of the adequacy
of the record in support of an agency's decision 377 and remanded the
case to the court of appeals to determine whether the agency's action
was "sustainable on the administrative record made" according to "the
appropriate standard for review."
378
The crucial issue left open by Vermont Yankee is the level of scru-
tiny involved in judicial review of the adequacy of an administrative
record. On this point the law is in great flux; Professor Davis charac-
terizes the law on this subject as "not only unclear but quite con-
fused."379 Nevertheless the trend is fairly clear: courts are increasingly
engaged in review of "greater intensity, ... [in] examination of the in-
formal record on which the rulemaking is based, [and in] analysis of
the factual basis for rules." 3 0 As Judge J. Skelly Wright notes, a key
element in the courts' "more vigorous attitude"38' 1 has been the ap-
plication of the concept of the administrative "record" to informal
rulemaking and to other informal action. For purposes of judicial
review, a "record" now consists not only of the transcript of a formal
hearing, if any, but also of
virtually all the relevant materials that an administrator has used
as a basis for action .... Where the empirical or predictive basis
for an agency action is strongly contested by [the submissions of
interested parties], courts are now bound to take those submissions
into account in deciding whether the agency has given sufficient
consideration to . . . "the relevant factors."3 82
In a companion case to Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court reversed
a different panel of the District of Columbia Circuit for excessive re-
376. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub noma. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
377. 435 U.S. at 542-43, 549.
378. Id. at 549 (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)).
379. K. DAvis, supra note 44, at 652.
380. Id. at 656.
381. Wright, supra note 269, at 208.
382. Id. at 209 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971)). But see Auerbach, Informal Rule Making: A Proposed Relationship Between
Administrative Procedures and judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 15, 24-26 (1977) (argu-
ing that review of informal rulemaking on exclusive basis of agency "record" violates
original intent of APA and cuts off proper de novo judicial inquiry into relevant facts).
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view of the sufficiency of the record, but did so in terms that seemed
to leave intact the central trend toward more vigorous scrutiny.3 3
Aside from the uncertain reach of the APA, the Court's Vermont
Yankee opinion must be reconciled with other recent cases in which
procedural requirements have been inferred not from the APA itself,
but from the agency's substantive statute. Particularly in reviewing
informal agency action in specific cases in which the APA has few
procedural requirements, cases such as Dunlop v. Bachowski38 4 sug-
gest that courts may fashion a kind of common law" administrative
procedure consistent with substantive and structural provisions of the
agency's governing statute.38 5
Finally, the reach of Vermont Yankee is limited by the fact that it
arose in the environmental law context in which structural due
process techniques have been developed in their most advanced form.
The Court summarized in detail the extensive hearings and procedures
used in rulemaking and licensing proceedings and suggested that such
procedures go far toward assuring a "fully informed and well-con-
sidered decision."38 6 In the area of health care reform, on the other
hand, the pattern of agency decisionmaking is quite different, with
federal and state agencies frequently denying that a policy need even
exist, much less allowing participation in its development.
Thus, despite Vermont Yankee, it seems clear that the HEW de-
cisions approving the governing boards of the North Central Texas
and Central New York HSAs should not have been sustained. The
383. See 435 U.S. at 549-58 (reversing Aeschliman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). In reversing the appellate court's finding of an
insufficient record, the Supreme Court emphasized the intervenors' failure to focus their
contentions and the availability of some of the data claimed to have been inadequately
presented by the Commission. Id. at 553-57. The Court also stressed the "incredibly ex-
tensive review" given to the proposed plant. Id. at 557. The Court's ruling thus does
not necessarily validate administrative records when the challengers' contentions are well
focused, when important data in the agency's possession are not available to the public,
and when the agency's proceedings have been summary rather than extensive.
384. 421 U.S. 560 (1975); see Note, Dunlop v. Bachowski and the Limits of Judicial
Review under Title IV of the LMRDA: A Proposal for Administrative Reform, 86 YALE
L.J. 885 (1977).
385. Support for this position can be found in the Court's treatment in Vermont
Yankee of the relationship between the APA rulemaking requirements and the procedural
requirements of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). In response to the
argument that NEPA authorizes a court to require more extensive rulemaking procedures
than those specified in § 553 of the APA, the Court stated that NEPA's procedural re-
quirements are limited to its "plain language" and cannot serve as a basis for revising
"the carefully constructed procedural specifications of the APA." 435 U.S. at 549. In
the case of informal action other than rulemaking (such as approval of funding for a
particular project or organization), neither the APA nor most substantive statutes provide
clear legislative guidelines.
386. Id. at 558.
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question in each case was not whether HEW was required to enforce
a particular proposed standard, but how the agency actually con-
sidered the consumers' complaints and justified its decisions. In Texas
ACORN, for example, neither the HEW regional office nor the Sec-
retary had any established procedures for considering consumer com-
plaints about HSA board composition, 38 7 nor have any procedures
been established since then. When the complaints were made to the
appropriate regional official, the HSA was apparently not even asked
to explain or justify its underrepresentation of low-income consumers.
Such an agency process would not pass muster in decisions to license
a power plant,388 set airline fares,389 or regulate the importation of
tomatoes.390 The task of consumer litigants in the health planning
cases was to convince the courts that their statutory interest in health
planning representation deserved comparable procedural protection.
D. The Impact of Litigation on Agency Policy
Although the consumer plaintiffs in the health planning cases
have not won relief in the federal courts, their litigation efforts have
had an impact on agency policy. In June 1977, faced with the district
court decision in Texas ACORN and similar lawsuits in Atlanta3
91
and New Orleans, 3 92 HEW filed a supplemental brief with the Fifth
Circuit announcing a significant change in its approach to consumer
representation. The Department stated that Texas A CORN and other
consumer litigation "have prompted informal analyses of existing HSA
governing bodies by program officials," after which "it has become
clear . . . that there is a need for additional published guidance to
. * * HSAs and to the [regional officials] . . . with regard to the
'broadly representative' issue." 393 Having concluded that more specific
regulation was "imperative," HEW announced that "the process of de-
veloping such regulations has already begun." 394
387. Texas ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., No. S-76-102-CA, slip op.
at 8 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 1977), vacated & remanded, 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977).
388. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 556 (1978); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
389. Pillai v. CAB, 485 F.2d 1018, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
390. Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
391. See Complaint, Rakestraw v. Califano, No. C77-635 A (N.D. Ga., filed Apr. 22,
1977), dismissed as to HSA defendants, Order at 5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 1977).
392. See Complaint, Louisiana ACORN v. New Orleans Area/Bayou Rivers Health
Sys. Agency, Inc., No. 77-361 (E.D. La., filed Feb. 24, 1977).
393. Reply Brief for Federal Defendant-Appellants at 2, Texas ACORN v. Texas Area
5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977).
394. Id. at 4.
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In May 1978, almost a full year after the Department's announce-
ment in its Texas ACORN brief, HEW published a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking on governing body requirements for HSAs. 395 The
proposed regulations in effect conceded the validity of the consumers'
claims by adopting much of their position on both descriptive and
constituency representation. Under the new standards, the Secretary
must be satisfied that the percentage of [consumer members] ...
is roughly approximate to the [following groups'] percentage of
the entire population of the area[:] . ..
(A) Identifiable racial or linguistic population groups which
constitute a significant proportion of the population of
the area;
(B) All economic groups, including poverty and low-income
groups;
(C) Women; and
(D) Persons over age 65.396
Moreover, although an individual "need not necessarily be a member
of a particular population group" in order to represent that group,
he or she will not be considered a particular group's representative
"unless the individual has been selected or nominated for that pur-
pose by an organization composed primarily of members of the
group. '397 Finally, HEW for the first time asserted its regulatory role
over the selection procedures of governing boards by requiring a ma-
jority of the consumer and provider governing board members to be
chosen by some process "other than selection by the governing body"
or other committee of the HSA itself.398 To monitor compliance with
these provisions, HEW further proposed that the HSAs submit to
HEW information on income, racial, and other pertinent characteris-
tics of its governing body and other committees, as well as information
on the process by which these bodies were selected.399
Although the proposed regulations represent a marked improve-
ment in agency policy, they still contain a number of major deficien-
cies. First, the effort to regulate the selection process only prohibits
one particular form of abuse, i.e., the formally self-perpetuating gov-
395. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Governing Body Requirements for Health Sys-
tems Agencies, 43 Fed. Reg. 22,858 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 122).
396. Id. at 22,860 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 122.109(b)(1)(i)).
397. Id. (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 122.109(b)(1)(ii)).
398. Id. at 22,861 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 122.109(b)(4)).
399. Id. (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 122.109(g)). For a discussion of the development
of reporting forms to generate data for HEW monitoring of HSA compliance, see Orkand
Representation Report, supra note 324.
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erning board. Numerous other methods exist, such as failure to pub-
licize elections adequately and burdensome requirements for voter
and governing board eligibility.400 Second, the proposed regulations
do not require the HSAs to provide appropriate training and staff
support to their consumer members or, more generally, to promote
effective consumer participation in health care decisionmaking.
401
Third, the requirements of descriptive and constituency representa-
tion are not backed by an explicit enforcement system that would
require HSAs to respond to, and HEW to review, complaints of con-
sumer exclusion and underrepresentation in the composition and
operation of the health planning system.
Despite these deficiencies, the proposed regulations are a significant
step in developing an operational policy of consumer representation.
The explicit articulation of at least a rough quantitative standard,
the insistence on at least some constituency accountability, and the
promise of more active HEW review of governing board composition
provide levers for consumer influence and participation. These stan-
dards can, and undoubtedly will, be interpreted by some HSAs and
HEW officials to exclude important consumer groups. But judicial
relief in such cases will be much more likely in the context of these
more definite standards and so will provide both a corrective for and
a deterrent to arbitrary administrative action.
E. The Need for Broad Consumer Representation
The history of health planning programs under the earlier Com-
prehensive Health Planning Act and the subsequent Health Planning
Act provides abundant evidence of the capacity of "insiders"-leaders
of the hospital industry and medical profession, together with local
400. See, e.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 312, at 483 (statement of Melissa F.
Greene) (failure of Southeast Georgia Health Systems Inc. to publicize elections ade-
quately); Letter from Linnis Cook to Jay Halpem, chief of HEW Regional Planning
Operations Cluster (June 5, 1978) (student researcher notes that two-thirds of Delaware
HSA governing board is chosen by 'a self-perpetuating, limited (60) number- of people
mysteriously designated as having 'manifested an interest in the objectives and purposes
of the Delaware Health Council," and remaining one-third by Governor).
401. One suggestion as to how this might be accomplished was the proposal of legal
services organizations to amend the Health Planning Act to require HSAs to establish a
"consumer resource staff which is selected by and accountable to consumer members of
the health systems agency." See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 312, at 423. The func-
tions of such a staff would include education of consumer members with regard to health
care and health planning, facilitation of consumer involvement in HSA functions, tech-
nical assistance to consumer members, including review of HSA plans and project reviews,
and facilitation and review of the solicitation and election of consumer board members.
Id.
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and state political leaders-to dominate decisions about health care
resources. Although some HSAs have undoubtedly attempted to be
responsive to a broad range of consumer interests, many others have
successfully flouted the text and purpose of the Health Planning Act
through a host of exclusionary devices: self-perpetuating boards, closed
nominating procedures, unrepresentative policy committees, unpub-
licized meetings, and the withholding of information on projects being
reviewed.40 2 Aside from restricting board membership, many HSAs
blocked informed participation by the interested public through such
devices as "making it hard to obtain committee reports or staff pro-
jects analyses," and not seriously considering proposals offered by
"outsiders." 403 Low-income consumers and their advocates testified
repeatedly in the 1978 Senate and House hearings on HSA failures
to make serious efforts to educate either their consumer board mem-
bers or the public at large on HSA procedures and on the issues
involved in health planning. 40 4 The resulting decisions have fre-
quently contradicted the substantive goals of the entire program by
approving duplicative high-technology investment in areas already
saturated with sophisticated hospital services 405 and by studiously dis-
regarding racial discrimination and other access barriers to health
care for the poor.406
The addition of two or three low-income or minority consumers to
a thirty- or forty-member governing board is not going to balance
the pressure of strong provider interests, particularly when many
consumers themselves have no information about alternative health
care policies. Full implementation of the "broadly representative" stan-
dard would require more than token representation of the low-income
and other major groups of health care consumers, and would create the
potential for opening up health planning decisions to extensive public
participation. In a few instances this potential has been realized. In
Savannah, Georgia, for example, an active group of low-income con-
sumers helped generate a widespread dialogue in the press, as well
4102. See id. at 437-57, 479-85 (statements of Russell Henderson, Dr. Daniel S. Blumen-
thal, Willie Mitchell, and Melissa F. Greene).
403. Id. at 451.
404. Id. at 451, 456, 484-85.
405. Id. at 442-44.
406. See id. at 437-46, 455-57 (statement of Russell Henderson and Willie Mitchell);
Administrative Complaint addressed to Harry P. Cain, director, HEW Bureau of Health
Planning, and David Tatel, director, HEW Office of Civil Rights, by Memphis Area
Legal Services, Inc., the National Health Law Program, and NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund (Oct. 7, 1977), reprinted in id. at 517 (alleging "[d]enial of access to care
to blacks and Medicaid recipients in Memphis, Tennessee by Saint Joseph's East and
Methodist Central Hospitals").
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as in the HSA, over a hospital's proposed relocation from a poor down-
town area to a location adjacent to an existing county hospital, and
this initiative resulted in the HSA's first decision against excess beds
and duplicative services. 407 Extensive public participation in the hos-
pital relocation decision also led to a consumer coalition slate that
won half the seats on the governing board.408 Similar efforts at con-
sumer mobilization have occurred in other states, notably Arkansas
and Illinois.409
HEW could play an important role in supporting consumer efforts
to further the substantive goals of the Act. The federal agency has
the primiry responsibility for regulating the HSAs and has begun,
under consumer pressure, to prohibit some exclusionary practices and
require that information be made available to the public. As dis-
cussed above, HEW could go further by mandating various types of
outreach and publicity measures and by ensuring that HSA consumer
members receive adequate staff support to enable them to participate
effectively.
The courts also have an important role in reviewing HEW's stan-
dards and procedures, regarding consumer representation. Clear ar-
ticulation and application of the structural due process doctrines
would help to prohibit the most egregious exclusionary devices and
to preserve the option for more widespread popular involvement. The
existing evidence indicates that such involvement is crucial to achieve-
ment of the goals of the Health Planning Act, both because strong
consumer organizations with knowledge of alternate modes of health
care delivery are needed to counteract provider influence, and also
because popular understanding and acceptance is essential for major
change in a personal service such as health care. To the extent that
the techniques of structural due process can help promote agency
support for consumer independence and influence, they can increase
the range of choice in the development of health care policy.
407. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 312, at 482 (statement of Melissa F. Greene).
408. Id. at 483-84.
409. See Arkansas ACORN, ACORN Plan Endorsed: An Organizing Success Story,
HEALTH L. PROJEcr LiB. BULL., Ocr. 1977, at 15-16 (reporting success of Arkansas ACORN,
a citizens' organization, in persuading the Central Arkansas HSA to adopt plan making
24-hour, 7-day-a-week clinics "number one priority" of Central Arkansas HSA); Giarizzo &
Daley, A Report on Health Care Consumer Organizing in Illinois-The Association of
Health Care Consumers, HEALTH L. PROJECr LaB. BuLL., Dec. 1977, at 18 (success of con-
sumer organizers in Illinois).
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V. Conclusion: Participatory Structures of Decisionmaking
The Hill-Burton, Medicaid, and Health Planning Acts were at-
tempts by Congress to deal with serious problems in American health
care delivery. In each instance, Congress perceived the issue in both
economic and political terms: consumers, particularly those with low
incomes, lack the economic means to obtain needed care of adequate
quality in the private health care market and the political means to
secure effective regulatory and financial measures from state and local
government. In each context, lower levels of government, as well as
the private sector itself, had responded to a limited extent to con-
sumer needs-with public hospitals and private charitable care in the
1940s, small state and local welfare medicine programs in the 1950s
and early 1960s, and predominantly voluntary health planning pro-
grams in the middle and late 1960s. Although some of these efforts
were worthwhile, they varied enormously in their effects among and
within localities and were characterized by standardless decisionmak-
ing about the amount of resources committed and the allocation of
those resources among potential beneficiaries. As a result, consumer
interests were routinely subordinated to the institutional, budgetary,
and professional concerns of the hospitals and welfare agencies, with
no public review of the nature and basis of the choices made. Each
congressional program was a response to the perceived weaknesses in
health care policy resulting from the lack of public standards: uneven
geographical distribution of hospitals and inadequate care for low-
income patients (Hill-Burton), inadequate government health care
benefits for welfare recipients and other low-income persons (Medi-
caid), and inappropriate, often duplicative, capital investment in
health care technology at the expense of essential primary care (health
planning).
The congressional response to these problems has not been to abol-
ish or to alter radically the frontline institutions-hospitals, state and lo-
cal welfare agencies, and health planning programs-but rather to
attempt to enlarge their scope and to reform their operations through
conditional grants of federal funds. In each case, the Congress tried
to change established patterns of standardless decisionmaking into
more structured systems of choice in which the interests of politically
weak consumers would be taken into account. Thus, in the Hill-Burton
program, the traditions of private philanthropy and institutional chari-
ty were to be integrated into a "state plan" for adequate hospital care.
Similarly, the historically fragmented patterns of state and local wel-
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fare medicine were to be rationalized into state Medicaid programs
under federal supervision, and federally guided health planning was
to create a countervailing force of consumer representatives to bring
capital investment and resource allocation into line with defined na-
tional and local needs.
Carrying out such statutory schemes, however, has proved to be
enormously difficult. The most immediate reason is that the theoret-
ical beneficiaries of the programs-the poor and the general public-
have always been much weaker in terms of organization, knowledge,
and resources than the hospitals, state agencies, and health planning
agencies that comprise the "regulated firms." Moreover, these private
and state agencies are integral elements of the programs themselves,
with considerable power over day-to-day operations and with strong
support in Congress for their financial viability and political auton-
omy. The federal agencies at the top have thus been in the unen-
viable position of having to balance the often antagonistic interests
of low-income consumers against the interests of powerful health care
providers and state and local governments. The administrative agen-
cies have had the task of reducing inequality of resources and power,
while simultaneously responding to the pressures of powerful interests
to maintain and even strengthen their dominant position.410
The response of the federal agencies to this dilemma has been vir-
tually to deny the existence of low-income consumers as program
beneficiaries. As a practical matter, this has been accomplished in
each of the three programs through nearly identical nonenforcement
devices. The federal agencies routinely failed to develop operational
standards to guide federal and state officials and private actors. Absent
outside pressure, the agencies did not define criteria for determining
whether a Hill-Burton hospital was providing a reasonable volume of
free care, whether a state was providing an adequate amount, dura-
tion, and scope of Medicaid services, or whether an HSA governing
board was broadly representative of its area's population. In a related
fashion, the agencies repeatedly failed to collect relevant data that
might have indicated the need for a more specific policy: the budgets
that hospitals themselves claimed they devoted to charitable care, the
results of the states' utilization review programs, or the demographic
characteristics of the HSA governing boards. Even when the agencies
410. See generally R. UNGER, supra note 24, at 176 Passim (discussing such tensions
throughout the legal system); Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, 1 MARXIST
PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978) (same).
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did collect pertinent information,411 the "policy" branch of the agency
seemed to have no impact on the "operations" branch, so that viola-
tions went uncorrected and operational decisions remained unchanged.
Finally, even when the statute or regulations contained clear legal
norms-such as the National Health Planning Act's requirement that
HEW collect compliance data on Hill-Burton hospitals412 or HEW's
requirement that state Medicaid agencies consult their Medical Care
Advisory Committees on major policy issues413-the agencies took no
effective steps to enforce them.
When consumers challenged the legality of these nonenforcement
devices, the federal agencies (together with state agencies and pro-
viders) responded by invoking neo-formalist modes of statutory inter-
pretation. The core of the neo-formalist argument is that the purpose
of the legislative scheme should be inferred from the large scope of
discretion granted the federal agencies and from the absence of ex-
plicit remedies for consumers. From this perspective, the primary
purpose of the statutes is to create an administrative bargaining re-
lationship, rather than a substantive legal one, between the federal
funding agency on the one hand, and the grantee hospital, state
agency, or health planning program on the other. To be sure, con-
sumers are meant to be beneficiaries of this relationship, but the
nature and amount of that benefit is to emerge from bargaining be-
tween the federal agency and the grantee institutions.41 4 The outcome
of this bargaining, expressed in federal regulations, guidelines, and en-
forcement practices, is to be subject only to very limited judicial re-
view to ensure compliance with clear statutory commands. Thus, neo-
formalist analysis makes it a sufficient defense for an agency whose
decision is challenged in court to show that it is not required by statute
to grant a consumer's claim.
Under the structural due process approach, the focus of the judicial
inquiry shifts from whether, for example, HEW is required to define
health planning representation in the particular way requested by
411. See note 324 supra.
412. See 42 U.S.C. § 500o-1 (Supp. V 1975).
413. 42 C.F.R. § 446.10 (1977), discussed at p. 299 suzpra.
414. An argument by Hill-Burton grantee hospitals along these lines was made in
Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603, 604-05 (E.D. La. 1970). See T. Lows,
supra note 12, at 144 (legislation increasingly cast in form of instructions to administrators
rather than commands to citizens; meaning of these instructions then subject of bar-
gaining among organized interest groups); Cahn 9- Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity,
81 HARv. L. Rav. 921, 929-57 (1968) (discussing impact of politics and discretion on agency-
grantee relationship and lack of due process protections for politically weak grantee
institutions as well as for consumer-beneficiaries).
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consumers, to whether the agency has in fact exercised its discretion
in accordance with the statute's substantive and procedural norms.
From this perspective, agency nonenforcement practices involve a
double violation of a more broadly conceived statutory purpose. First,
the substantive results sought by Congress are pervasively frustrated:
low-income patients are excluded from Hill-Burton hospitals because
of their race and income, Medicaid recipients are unnecessarily de-
prived of needed services, and HSAs fail to promote primary care and
nonduplicative hospital investment. Second, the process envisioned
by Congress to resolve the often complex and difficult value choices
does not come into existence: federal and state Hill-Burton agencies
do not define standards of community service and free care in relation
to hospital resources and community needs, state Medicaid agencies
often do not consult with consumers and providers in identifying pri-
orities and inefficiencies, and HSAs often are not broadly represen-
tative of the consumers in their communities. The substantive and
procedural failures are closely linked. For example, the unrepresen-
tative character of most HSA boards contributes to their frequent
incapacity to promote the national health goals of consumer-oriented
primary care.
In choosing between these two approaches in deciding claims of
agency nonenforcement, the courts must interpret the legislative pur-
pose in relation to the agency's own defense of its policies and pro-
cedures. As expressed in the neo-formalist mode, the agency's typical
defense is simply that it has discretion-that the statute does not
require it to accord consumers more participation, more definite
standards, more detailed explanations, or more benefits. In every case
discussed in this article, the agency's position consisted largely of
asserting delegated authority and the absence of specific restraint.415
In only two cases did the agency attempt to justify its policy with
reference to substantive statutory goals.4 16 This posture of nonexpla-
nation, blanket discretion, and routine disregard of unorganized con-
sumers is precisely what characterized the state, local, and private sys-
415. See, e.g., Texas ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health Sys. Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019
(5th Cir. 1977); Saine v. Hospital Auth., 502 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1974); Aldamuy v. Pirro,
436 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603
(E.D. La. 1970).
416. See Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (agency justification of drug
formula reduction as meeting standard of medical necessity); Corum v. Beth Israel Medical
Center, 373 F. Supp. 550, 554-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (agency justification of limiting free care
obligation to "maximum compliance" guidelines for 20 years after Hill-Burton grant).
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tems of health care delivery and planning that predated the three
statutes and that Congress attempted to reform.
The agency defense that the statutes do not require a particular
result may be correct, but it is also beside the point; the legislative
purpose is in large part not to specify particular results, but rather
to create an agency process that takes into account the interests of
the relatively unorganized health-care consumers. The Hill-Burton
Act, for example, does not contain a formula defining the balance
between a hospital's financial integrity and a consumer's need for
free and below-cost care. But it does require grantee hospitals to
provide a significant amount of services to low-income consumers and
creates a public, administrative process for regulating the amount and
nature of the services given. 417 The minimal statutory duty of the
administering agencies, therefore, is to develop regulations and an
enforcement procedure that reflect at least some consideration of the
applicable values and interests. This may seem like an elementary
standard, but the federal and state Hill-Burton agencies have often
failed to meet it. The second Cook opinion, in which Judge Comiskey
ruled that HEW could not permit Hill-Burton hospitals to exclude
Medicaid beneficiaries, 418 rests essentially on this ground. The federal
agency itself had recognized that the issue was important and was
appropriately addressed under the community service regulations, but,
for no articulated reason, had persistently failed to issue any policy.419
In these circumstances, Judge Comiskey was justified in ordering the
Secretary of HEW to issue some policy with at least minimal pro-
tection for consumer interests. 420
In the end, however, techniques of structural due process can only
inform, but not substitute for, a fundamental judicial choice. Given
our legal traditions, courts would obviously feel much more confident
and legitimate in enforcing general statutory goals if Congress would
417. See pp. 267-68 (discussing community service and nondiscrimination requirements
of Hill-Burton Act).
418. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 361 (E.D. La. 1972).
419. See Rose, supra note 3, at 178-79 (HEW acknowledged that issue of whether
refusal of hospital to participate in Medicaid was breach of Hill-Burton obligations re-
lated to community service assurances, see 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,720 (1972), but did not
formulate regulations on issue until two years later, see 39 Fed. Reg. 31,765, 31,767 (1974)).
420. HEW's failure to issue regulations or to take other action in response to well-
documented complaints of widespread exclusion of Medicaid patients from Hill-Burton
Hospitals in New Orleans, see Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 261
(E.D. La. 1972), may well have amounted to what the Supreme Court has suggested is
the "rare case" of agency abandonment of its enforcement function "that might justify
review beyond the confines of the [Secretary's] reasons statement," Dunlop v. Bachowski,
421 U.S. 560, 574 (1975).
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provide more definite standards for decision and more explicit reme-
dies for consumer beneficiaries. 421 Since Congress has not done so, its
intent is not "clear," and enforcement of statutory goals does not com-
fortably fit within traditional models of judicial application of legis-
lative rules. On the other hand, Congress continues to articulate gen-
eral statutory commitments in favor of unorganized interests and spends
billions of dollars at least in part in an effort to fulfill them. Com-
mitments of this magnitude cannot be ignored, but neither can they
be unreservedly enforced; they are clear, but not clear enough, 42 *2
and so tend to reproduce political ambivalence in the form of remedial
incoherence and doctrinal contradiction. The techniques of structural
due process cannot honestly be used to solve this dilemma by imagining
neutrally applicable rules when none exist. Their value lies rather
in enlarging the judicial role to include what seems to be an inevitable
part of both legislative and judicial law in an era of major social
change: the fashioning of a democratic process in which to continue
the debate about basic social values and, indeed, to recognize that the
debate is taking place.
421. Indeed, one of the major lessons of the health care reform experience is that
Congress should define explicit standards and remedies in future legislation seeking to
benefit unorganized interests.
422. Cf. Form and Substance, supra note 24, at 1773 n.158 (criteria of justice are suf-
ficiently defined to orient search for relevant facts, but not intelligible enough to con-
stitute formal system of per se rules).
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